I.
I have been meaning to compose an article on the American dissident Right for some time, but I have been hesitating, as the old adage 'If you don't have anything positive to say, don't say it' has been lurking in the back of my mind. I have become somewhat alienated from the Americans over the course of the past ten years, and if I were to write anything on them, I would be writing a condemnation, but I am reluctant to do so, as I do not want to appear to be 'negative'.
Why the alienation? See the recent events in Gaza. We find lamentations for the Palestinians - from white nationalists, race realists, neo-Nazis, immigration restrictionists and so forth; they call the Israeli bombing 'butchery', 'genocide'. But I do not recall any bemoaning the fate of the civilians who were being bombed and shelled by Russia and Syria in Idlib; these relentless and malicious attacks on civilian targets - marketplaces, hospitals, etc. - were not denounced by the dissident Right, which showed little to no awareness that these were taking place. The one or two commentators who were aware dismissed the actions of Putin and Assad as taking care of the 'terrorists' in the region. In the past ten years I have learned, from the dissident Right, that there are good terrorists and bad, good jihadis and bad. Hamas and Hezbollah stand on the 'good terrorist' and 'good jihadi' side of the ledger, the rebels in Idlib on the 'bad'; and also, every Arab civilian death in Gaza is a tragedy, every Arab civilian death in Syria, a non-event. But I myself cannot understand the basis of this evaluation, as it is never been explained to me successfully, and it is one of the reasons why I stopped comprehending the dissident Right.
Likewise, events in Ukraine after 2014 added to my confusion and alienation. The question I ask, nearly ten years later, is: what was it, precisely, that made the Ukrainians deserve to lose Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, and what made the Russians worthy enough to annex them? The corrupt and incompentent Yanukovych was toppled and fled the country after Maidan - which most on the American dissident Right seem to regard as a crime for the ages - but it has never been explained how Yanukovych's policies differed from his successors; that is, why it was that Yanukovych was so good and Poroshenko and Zelensky so bad. Would Yanukovych's return to power make life better for Ukrainians, and if so, how? Inquiring minds want to know.
I would sum up the 2010s as the decade in which the movement was taken in by Russian propaganda; the movement made a large investment in it. But that Russian propaganda shall one day be exposed in the same way that Soviet propaganda (on Katyn, for instance) was. Putin will not live forever and eventually the internal Russian documents on Syria and Ukraine will be declassified. And then we shall discover, lo and behold, that Russia knew all along that flight MH17 was shot down by Russians in Eastern Ukraine in 2014, that chemical weapons were used by Assad in Douma in 2017. Will, I wonder, the dissident Right then express its shame over being taken in? The answer is no. I think shame presupposes conscience, and many of today's luminaries on the dissident Right lack it; they are an unprincipled bunch.
More and more people in the movement are beginning to see through 'based' Putin, but the old attitudes, and the old lies, persist. But I could be here reproached for judging the dissident Right unfairly: why deprecate it for Ukraine and Syria, both of which are peripheral to the cause of white survival? And it is true that Ukraine and Syria should not occupy our attentions overly much. The reason why the dissident Right has taken up Russia's cause is that the Right has navigated off-course; it has waded into unfamiliar territory; it should have stuck to what it was good at.
As what is the American dissident Right's metier, we have to look at what was a better, purer time - the 1990s. (That decade began on the 1st of January, 1990 and ended (in my view) on the 11th of September, 2001: after the terrorist attack of 9/11, America and the world entered the 2000s, the decade of Bush's War on Terror).
II.
I ask: was life for Americans better in the 1990s? That is impossible to judge. So I will rephrase: was life for those on the American dissident Right better?
The answer is yes. America, in 2021, since the Biden coup, is ruled by three political actors: Big Tech, Hollywood and the Media. The ideology that animates this terrible trio is extreme leftism. In order to understand that ideology, we must recognise that the modern Left can be divided up to six different factions. The past of twenty to thirty years ago was an improvement on the present insofar as that none of the factions had political power. Someone on the Center or Far Right, were they travel in a time machine back to America in the 1990s would discover that the country was blessedly free of Marxism.
Here I will go through each of the six and explain where each stood in the 1990s:
- Old school Marxism / communism: Marxism had been discredited with the fall of the Soviet Union and the backsliding of communist China into capitalism. Communist parties in the Anglosphere (e.g., the United Kingdom and Australia) dissolved themselves. In America, traditional Marxist stalwarts the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA) and the Democratic Socialist of America (DSA) were relegated to obscurity, as were their Trotskyite and New Communist Communist Movement (NCM) offshoots; many of the NCM groups had dissolved themselves by the time of the fall of the Eastern European communist bloc and the scandal of the Tianamen Square massacre. In the 1990s, for the first time in over a hundred years, conservatism did not have contend with Marxism, which had ceased to exist.
- Antifa and anarchism: these could be found only at the fringes of society - along with the goth, skinhead, 'black' heavy metal subcultures - and did not possess a fraction of the political power that they possess in 2021.
- Woke capital: corporations paid lip service to liberal causes such as environmentalism, but only lip service. In 2021, companies such as Facebook (which recently prevented its users from posting news articles on race riots in Minneapolis) seek to actively control their customers, which is unprecedented. In the 1990s, or any foregoing decade for that matter, corporations did not behave in this way. The profit motive came first.
- Social Justice Warriors / SJWs: Popular culture was not as corrupted by the Left in the 1990s; it was bereft of overt demands for 'representation', 'equity', 'social justice' and the like, and it did not engage (for example) in the practice of race-swapping white characters for black. And, furthermore, the infrastructure which supports SJWs - social media, especially Twitter - did not exist in the 1990s.
- Black Lives Matter (BLM): like SJWism, this did not exist in the 1990s.
- Queer Studies, Women's Studies, Black Studies, Post-colonial Theory, Critical Race Theory: like a serpent in the garden of Eden, this brand of academic neo-communism marred what would otherwise have been a perfectly post-leftist and post-political decade. Troublesome as it was when it first appeared, postmodernist and post-structuralist academic theory did not involve itself overly much politics, but its children - in particular, Critical Race Theory - did, with consequences we all know too well. Academic neo-Marxism (or Cultural Marxism) was conceived in the 1990s, was born in the 2000s, and grew to maturity (and attained, we hope, what was the full extent of its power) in the 2010s. Every silver lining has its cloud, and in the 1990s, postmodern academic 'pozzedness' was it, and I think that it gradually seeped into the popular culture of the time. This phenomenon explains, for instance, the 'pozzedness' of Kurt Cobain, the first politically correct rock star in history (Cobain, it should be remembered, named his daughter after a runaway negro slave).
I made mention of the post-political, and this is important. One common argument in political theory is that the Right only defines itself in relation to the Left: conservatism, as we know it, only came into being after the advent of leftism, which was sometime a few hundred years ago, in the 18th century: see Edmund Burke, who wrote the founding text of conservatism in reaction to the French Revolution, which was the culmination of the rationalist, egalitarian, democratic French ideas of that period. If it were not for the Left, the Right would not exist; so what happens when the Left disappears? The answer is, the Right disappears with it. In the 1990s, Thatcherism, Reaganism, and all the 'New Right' ideology became passé: after the fall of the Soviet Union, there was no ideology enemy for the Right to fight against, Russians and Eastern Europeans all agreed with Thatcher and Reagan that capitalism was a good thing, so, what was the point of Thatcherism and Reaganism? But, so the argument goes, with the termination of the Left came the termination of the Right: so, no more politics. And this respite from the political raised serious questions. For the first time in over a hundred years, conservatives lived in a world which was free of Marxism; socialism no longer dangled over their heads like a sword of Damocles. Did that mean that they had ceased to be conservatives? Did that entail the end of politics? The American sociologist Daniel Bell wrote a famous work, The End of Ideology: on the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the 1950s (1960), on that subject: after 1945, he argued, the appeal of socialism and class war had diminished and both sides of politics in Western life had settled into a consensus. In the 1990s, Bell's ideas were dusted off and revived. As a Swedish academic, Daniel Strand, wrote:
In the 1950s, scholars in Europe and the United States announced the end of political ideology in the West. With the rise of affluent welfare states, they argued, ideological movements which sought to overthrow prevailing liberal democracy would disappear. While these arguments were questioned in the 1960s, similar ideas were presented after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Scholars now claimed that the end of the Cold War meant the end of mankind’s “ideological development,” that globalization would undermine the left/right distinction and that politics would be shaped by cultural affiliations rather than ideological alignments. In the 1950s, scholars in Europe and the United States announced the end of political ideology in the West. With the rise of affluent welfare states, they argued, ideological movements which sought to overthrow prevailing liberal democracy would disappear. While these arguments were questioned in the 1960s, similar ideas were presented after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Scholars now claimed that the end of the Cold War meant the end of mankind’s “ideological development,” that globalization would undermine the left/right distinction and that politics would be shaped by cultural affiliations rather than ideological alignments.
Hence, we saw Francis Fukuyama's The End of History and the Last Man (1993), which encapsulated the spirit of the age - or the decade - perfectly; and then Carl Boggs' The End of Politics: Corporate Power and the Decline of the Public Sphere (2000), which is one of the best books that summed up the political developments - or lack of them - in that decade.
One might think that in the 1990s, the Far Right would have sunk into oblivion, given that the West, in the post-Cold War, post-political era, had fallen into somnolence, complacency and self-satisfaction. But the end of politics, the end of ideology, the end of history, liberated the Far Right, and for the first time since the end of WWII, it came into its own. In its way, the 1990s were insurrectionist from a political and cultural standpoint; as Boggs documents, the decade saw a proliferation of cults, gangs, militias, terrorists, all with a decidedly apocalyptic and millenarian bent; these were extremist and radical, but not of course left-extremist and left-radical; they were inclined to conspiracy theories and anti-government paranoia (both of which abounded in the great TV series of that time, The X-Files, which like Fukuyama's book, was representative of the zeitgeist). Did anything unite these disparate tendencies? Yes: I would argue it was the desire to retrieve a lost spiritual essence and state of purity. It is this, I feel, that marks the ideology of the groups as reactionary, even right-wing. The Right wants such a retrieval or recovery; the Left, a redistribution of wealth and resources. Given that in the 1990s, the odds were stacked more in favour of the Right than the Left, naturally, 'extremists' of the William Pierce or Richard Butler sort flourished - and the more apocalyptic and millenarian their beliefs were, the larger their audience.
This leads to the question of how it was that these 'extremists' got their message across. In the 1990s, old-school forms of entertainment (movies, TV shows, comic books, popular music on AM and FM radio) drew audiences numbering in the millions, as did old school forms of media (newspapers and other journals, radio, TV). The American Far Right, at the start of the nineties, used print media - books, magazines, newsletters, journals - to disseminate propaganda, and also other forms of old media. William Pierce read his incendiary polemics on radio, and even, for a time, appeared on his own cable TV channel; we moderns live in a comparatively unfree time, and we find it remarkable that the likes of Pierce were able to make his message heard in forums now unavailable to us.
Pierce saw a great potential in radio. He says:
And we can do it. Three years ago there was no one willing to say publicly what we are saying now. Everyone was letting himself be intimidated into going along with the controlled media and the government. Then we started broadcasting on one radio station - just one broadcast a week. A year ago we had grown to seven stations. Now we're broadcasting on 15 stations each week. We have been able to grow like that because the people who listened to us on our first station three years ago told other people about us, and they began listening too, and then they told their friends. And our support grew, so that we could add more stations to our network.
And we can keep growing. The 100,000 of us who now gather each week can grow to a million and then to ten million. All we have to do is keep spreading the word to our friends, our neighbors, our relatives, our co-workers, and to strangers too. We can spread the word by telephone, by letter, by spray-painting the time and frequency of this broadcast on fences and walls, by taking out advertising, by handing out leaflets. We can have 100 stations in our network by the end of this year.
And we really must do that. Not just because it'll feel good to have a million of us together each week instead of only 100,000. We have to do it because we need to be able to speak with a big enough voice to prevent the enemies of America, the enemies of our people, from silencing us. [From the radio talk, 'Freedom: Use It or Lose It', February 1995.]
Pierce evidently saw himself as a rebel, a resistant, and that is the reason why his radio program was titled American Dissident Voices, his journal Free Speech. He operated outside the accepted American culture, and like the anti-hero of Dostoyevsky's famous novel, he wrote missives which were notes from the underground. Being under ground means being in the dark, and that made up one of the themes of nineties. One could find that theme - of a life lived in darkness and shadow - in the popular culture of the period. Compare the dim lighting and dark colours of the nineties TV show the X-Files to the bright lighting and pastel colours of the eighties TV show Miami Vice.
The underground man theme was also embodied in the work of Art Bell, the late-night radio host who broadcast to millions of listeners from his studio in the Mojave Desert; Bell was obsessed by UFOs, the paranormal and anti-government conspiracy theories - many of the favourite preoccupations of Americans in that period. It is appropriate that in one of his famous broadcasts Bell clashed with Pierce, another titan of the airwaves; Bell and Pierce could be seen as two competing brothers.
Wilmot Robertson sums up the feeling of being an underground man, an outsider, in a January 1995 issue of his journal Instauration:
Instauration is a small journal, known to only a thin number of Americans. It cannot be bought on any newsstand. You will never see it hawked by the corner paperboy. Whenever it is mentioned in the mainstream press, the words are couched in tones of fear and loathing. The handful of public figures who have suggested that the world's most controversial magazine might have some slight merit have been treated as if they were advance agents of the Anti-Christ.
Despite these rather lethal drawbacks, it is comforting to know that even if we are undersized, underfinanced and furiously ignored, Instauration is more perceptive, perspicacious and prescient than Time, Newsweek, the New Republic, the New York Times and the Washington Post.
The simple truth is that what has been predicted on Instauration's pages is relentlessly coming true. The political, social, cultural and racial policies the magazine generally espouses are unquestionably coming to the fore. Nothing can stop this process and our enemies know it. Thus their frenzied hatred. The bell tolls for them, not us. ['Things are coming together']
III.
Robertson gives us an example of an American persona - both a literary and political - I call the gentleman scholar as racialist, the racialist as patrician. The great racialist authors Madison Grant and Lothrop Stoddard represent the type in the first half of twentieth century, and Wilmot Robertson, Jared Taylor and the anonymous author of the Ron Paul newsletters in the second. They are distinguished from the more crude type of racialist by their learning, culture, refinement, literary skill, and above all, class. As one letter writer to Instauration (February 1995) puts it:
I never met an Instaurationist and often tried to visualize one. I pictured an older gentleman of Anglo-Saxon background, but not too old, mind you. Are you familiar with the TV show, Magnum PI? If so, the delightful older chap, Higgans or Higgins, fits the bill. He is the fellow with the aristocratic English accent.
At first sight, Pierce - an erudite and cultured man - would belong in this category, but on further examination, he does not; his radicalism precludes it. Even though he finds himself mostly in agreement with Robertson, he presents his ideas in a different manner: his incendiary radio broadcasts recall those Father Coughlin, the Depression-era 'radio priest', and the political strategy of his hero of the Turner Diaries - a book written in the seventies - that of the urban guerrilla left-wing groups of that decade. It is this violent and radical streak which separates him from the genteel Grant and Stoddard.
Pierce's journal National Vanguard (the official organ of his National Alliance) differs in its tone from three of the patrician-racialist journals of the 1990s: Instauration, the American Renaissance newsletter and the Ron Paul Survival Report: these three sounded conservative, National Vanguard sounded radical. Ron Paul's newsletter - which may or may have not been written by him - spoke of African-Americans, homosexuals, immigrants and Jews in what Pierce would have called euphemistically a 'political incorrect' manner, but all the same, the newsletters were grounded in American conservatism, Paul being a free-market libertarian. Likewise, two of the American Renaissance circle - Joe Sobran and Sam Francis - began their careers as op-ed writers for conservative journals (which they were later blacklisted from). Conceivably, Robertson and the other contributors could have written for conservative journals (providing that they kept well away from 'politically incorrect' subjects). But Pierce, an affiliate of George Lincoln Rockwell and a contributor to National Socialist World in the 1960s, would have never been allowed near a conservative publication; his reputation would have preceded him. The same could be said of other white nationalist luminaries of the decade David Duke, Don Black, Tom Metzger, Ben Klassen. A distinction which I am inclined to call a class distinction existed.
But what united all these men, patricians and non-patricians? First and foremost, a concentration upon the negro question, which in the 1990s was thrust to the forefront of the American national consciousness by the spectacle of the 1992 Los Angeles race riots - the first race riots (at least, the first which attained prominence) since the 1960s. The Los Angeles riots demonstrated that the negro question could not be ignored, and set the pattern for the race riots to follow, including those that took place in 2020.
Here is one account of a race riot in Cincinnati - all italics are mine:
Everyone in America knows about Cincinnati. That is, everyone at least has seen the sanitized images of the Cincinnati race riot that have appeared on television screens across the country. In that regard the Cincinnati riot is different from the Seattle race riot of nearly two months ago. News of the Seattle riot was successfully suppressed by the controlled media outside the Seattle area.
In other ways, however, the riots were very similar. Although the controlled media decided not to try to suppress the news from Cincinnati, it is clear that the sympathies of the media bosses were as much with the Blacks in Cincinnati as they were in Seattle. Here's one small example of that: The 19-year-old Black thug whose shooting by a White policeman was the Blacks' excuse for rioting in Cincinnati had a long arrest record. There were 14 more arrest warrants outstanding for him at the time he was shot.
The policeman who shot him, in other words, realized that he was dealing with a habitual criminal, and he responded to what he believed was an attempt by the Black to draw a weapon from his waistband by shooting him.
None of this was mentioned on the television news coverage of events in Cincinnati, of course. The Black who was shot was described by the media as "an unarmed Black youth" - or, in the case of Cincinnati's Channel 9 television news program, as "an unarmed African American teenager." And here's the clincher: Instead of using one of the readily available police mug shots of the Black, the media managed to dig up a photo of him in a formal suit with a big, innocent smile on his face, presumably taken at some high-school dance - and that is the photograph shown repeatedly to Americans on their television screens: not the police mug shots of a hardened, 19-year-old Black criminal, but a photograph of smiling, well-dressed, teenaged Black innocence. You can be sure that some Jewish news director got a bonus from a Jewish network boss for digging up that photograph.
At the Black's funeral last Saturday the White governor of Ohio and the White mayor of Cincinnati both appeared among the mourners. That's a symbolic thing. You can be certain that they wouldn't have attended the funeral of some White street thug shot by a Black cop. They attended the funeral, alongside Louis Farrakhan's Nation of Islam people, Kweisi Mfume of the NAACP, and members of the New Black Panther Party, and they looked appropriately contrite and said nice things about the deceased for one reason only: they were frightened to death that the Blacks would continue rioting.
And why were they afraid of that? They could have stopped the riot dead in its tracks any time they wanted. That is, physically they could have stopped the riot. Even though 43 per cent of the population of Cincinnati is Black, the police could have wound up the riot within half an hour, and the Blacks who survived the gunfire would have been trembling behind closed doors, afraid to show their faces. Militarily it would have been a trivial matter.
But both Mayor Charles Luken and Governor Bob Taft understood that politically they were at the mercy of the Black rioters. They knew which side the Jewish media were on. They knew that if they took strong measures against the rioters they would be crucified by the media. So just as in Seattle the cops, under orders from the politicians, simply let the riot run its course. They arrested 200 or so Blacks they caught looting stores or setting fires when they could do so without danger of any real conflict, but it was more a matter of picking off stragglers than it was any real attempt at riot control. For the most part the police just watched. They watched while Blacks stopped cars with White drivers, pulled the drivers out of their cars, and stomped and beat them mercilessly. They stood by and watched the Blacks beat a White woman "to a pulp." Those words - "to a pulp" - aren't mine; they came from the April 12 edition of the Cincinnati Post. The rule governing the cops was: don't provoke the Blacks.
The reader may be surprised to learn that the above excerpt was taken from a May 2001 talk by William Pierce, 'Riot and Revolution', as the riot it describes could have taken place yesterday. African-American riots did not begin with the advent of Black Lives Matter.
What is significant is that the race riots of 1992 and 2001 could not be blamed on communism - i.e., the African-American rioters, looters and arsonists had not been stirred up by communist agitators; neither could be blamed on economic misery and hardship, as America in the 1990s was the most prosperous it had been since the 1960s. No, any honest commentator, after the riots of 1992, needed to face (and face squarely) certain immutable racial realities and this is what Pierce and Taylor did. What divided the two men was their approach.
IV.
Patrician racialism is still with us, but it was dealt a blow by the decline of the print media and the rise of the Internet. Instauration, the Ron Paul Survival Report, and the American Renaissance newsletter ceased publication. The Internet became the primary means of disseminating racialist ideas and perspectives, and this development worked against the genteel and literary brand of racialism, as discourse became open to all - democratised. The quality of thought diminished. In the 1990s, readers of Instauration and the American Renaissance journal needed to master the art of composition if they wanted their comments to appear in the letters pages; nowadays, those who post their comments on any white nationalist site do not bother.
The decline of 'gentleman racialism' helps explains why it is that so much of the American dissident Right has veered into what is not American. Robertson wrote extensively on the Jewish question and Holocaust and WWII revisionism (although you would never know from this recent American Renaissance post); even Taylor looked at these subjects (albeit in passing) in the 1990s newsletters. But articles on these controversies were outweighed by those on the subject of race and the 'colour of crime'. One advantage of writing for a print journal is that you can weight your articles; you can bring articles on the more important subjects close to the front pages and consign the less important to the back; using a website, you cannot direct your reader's attention the same way, as you are forced to give all the articles equal billing. Their format was one of the reasons why the gentlemanly journals stayed focused. In contrast, very little in the way of a unifying American theme can be found in most of today's white nationalist or dissident Right sites. We see posts on Celtic myth; on 19th century Romantic art; on Ukraine and Syria (of course written from a pro-Russian perspective); on Israel and Zionism; on Holocaust Revisionism. Posts of speeches and articles by German National Socialists written over 75 years ago sit incongruously alongside current American news stories. A melange, a chaos, arises as a result of this lack of a theme - the Renegade Tribune being the best example.
Once a site deviates away from the 'dispossession of the majority' and the 'colour of crime', the quality of its comments deteriorates. Sites which tackle Israel, Zionism and Middle East politics (such as Unz.Org) attract some of the worst people in the comments, and sites which stay grounded (such as American Renaissance and Stuff Black People Don't Like) some of the best. This is because decent, ordinary Americans from all walks of life can relate to the 'colour of crime', for it is omnipresent in their lives; whereas the wars in Ukraine, Gaza, Syria, are not. Paul Kersey's Stuff Black People Don't Like only deals with the negro question - nothing else! - and Jared Taylor's American Renaissance only deals with race; neither will touch the Jewish question with a barge pole, as evidently Taylor and Kersey are of the opinion that it will go over the heads of most Americans. There is something to be said for this empiricism and pragmatism.
Here an objection may be raised and Pierce pointed to as an example of an activist who, his writing and speaking, shifted between a number of subjects and at the same time stayed coherent. It is true, I will concede, that Pierce achieved this feat; but I will observe that Pierce, who died in 2002, did not write for the new media but for the old - print and radio - in which a certain amount of craft and skill was required.
V.
Speaking of Pierce, an examination of his speeches from the nineties show that he would disagree with me that the decade was 'conservative' in any shape or form; Pierce saw the America of the time as a multi-racial dystopia, in which the political system and the culture was hopelessly Judaised, and in which leftism ran amok. I will qualify my earlier remarks by stating that in the nineties liberalism (or leftism) was prevalent, but this was a 'soft' leftism, unconnected to the 'hard' leftism of the Marxist-Leninist variety. The latter has come back into a fashion, in a big way, and its revival can be attributed to increased non-immigration: Third World immigration brings with it Third World Marxism - something 'race-blind' conservatives are unwilling to acknowledge.
As for Judaisation, the 2010s have seen a slight diminution of Jewish power - on the Left, at least. In the 1990s and 2000s, any criticism of Israel by any politician, either of the Left or Right, was equated with anti-Semitism and discouraged - the African-American Democratic Party Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney was ousted because of a perceived 'anti-Semitism' - but in the Left today, anti-Semites are more than welcome. During the recent bombing of Gaza, we were treated to headlines (in the conservative media) such as 'Pro-Hamas mobs are hounding Jews coast to coast'; left-wing activists (who more often than not people of colour) were insulting, harassing and attacking Jews in what the pro-Israel conservative media saw as a pogrom. This 'left' anti-Semitism has been furthered by non-white immigration, in particular, immigration from the Islamic world; it does not (as Pierce would have hoped) represent any anti-Semitic 'racial awakening' on the part of whites.
Pierce, in his radio talks, was always documenting instances of some of the bad behaviour of African-Americans, including some of the grisly black-on-white murders which took place in that period, and he was always pointing out that these had been hushed up by a complaisant media. One development - and this is one he would have approved of - is that since the Black Lives Matter riots, the conservative media, while holding to its usual anti-racist line, is posting pictures and videos of African-American public nuisances and criminals, and is even reporting on some black-on-white murders. It does so in a passive-aggressive manner; it understands that it is still beholden to what Paul Kersey calls 'Black Run America' and it does not want to openly acknowledge the 'colour of crime'. But it is reflecting, I think, the mood of its audience: there is a new impatience on the part of white Americans with African-Americans. Some of the commenters at American Renaissance have declared that they were ordinary Americans who were led on the path to 'race realism' by mainstream news stories chronicling African-American misbehaviour.
One has to ask what Pierce of the 1990s would have made of today's America. I think it would have been beyond his comprehension; he would not have understood it. And such is the disconnect between his time and ours, if you were to travel back in time and tell him that the 2020s would be much worse by way of comparison to the 1990s, he would have regarded you as insane.
