Why the Neocons should shut up about Munich

Many commentators in Bush 43 era objected to the neocons because of the role they played in fomenting the Iraq invasion and in propping up the Bush administration, ideologically, during the period of the 'War on Terror'. They took umbrage with Bush, the neocons and the 'War on Terror' on mainly humanitarian grounds: it was wrong, unethical, to kill and blow up so many Arabs and Muslims.

Moving forward to 2016, the neocons can't really be castigated for that reason: quite a few of these critics of the neocons now approve a 'War on Terror' - as it is waged by Assad; they approve the torture, kidnapping, bombing and murder of Arabs, so long as Assad, and the 'progressive', 'secularist' forces of Russia and Iran are doing it. The Syrian war is shaping up to be the most devastating conflict in the Arab world's recent history, and Assad will prove to be much worse than Bush 43. So, on this point, we should cut the neocons some slack.

I find the neocons - Krauthammer, Kristol, Podhoretz, Stephens, Kagan and the rest - fairly agreeable up to a point; they don't really differ all that much - especially since the election - from Steve Sailer, Hunter Wallace, VDare - in their criticisms of immigration, political correctness, the Democratic Party, Black Lives Matter... They are obsessed with Obama's Iran deal, but I could take or leave Iran.
As for their other obsessions - Israel, the Palestinians, the settlements in the West Bank - not being an Arab or Jew, I don't have a dog in the fight on that one either. I agree with the neocons when they make the charge that American foreign policy has been weak and unassertive, not to mention criminally irresponsible, since Obama - that's true enough. So I often experience, when picking up the National Review or Commentary or Weekly Standard, the strange sensation of reading through one of their articles and finding it not so objectionable after all - at least, not as much as I had anticipated. 'Maybe the neocons aren't as black as they're painted', I say to myself.

Then I come to the one stumbling block which prevents full agreement: Munich. Hitler. WWII. Analogies to Neville Chamberlain's deal with Germany at Munich in 1938, and to an alleged Chamberlain appeasement policy, have been made countless times in neocon propaganda; the neocons just can't keep away from the topic.

Let's take a look at the latest piece by the classicist Victor Davis Hanson, one of the few goyish neocons out there (and incidentally a big opponent of illegal immigration into California, his home state). It attacks the Obama administration for its many failings, including its lamentable foreign policy and its neglect of the fundamental truths of statecraft:

Throughout history, it has not gone well for powerful leaders when they have been perceived as being both loudly sanctimonious and weak (read Demosthenes on Athenian reactions to Philip II), as if the nation’s strength enervates the leader rather than empowers his diplomacy. Worse still is when a leader aims to loudly project strength through rhetoric while quietly fearing to do so through ships and soldiers.

So far, so good. I haven't read Demosthenes on Philip II, but when it comes to that subject, I'm willing to take Hanson's word for it. I'm no classicist.

But then, here it comes:

Think again of Neville Chamberlain at Munich, who gave Hitler everything — including lectures on proper international behavior. Anthony Eden remarked at the time that British statesmen thought Hitler and Mussolini were like typical British elites with whom they could do business; the British diplomats mistakenly believed they could appeal to the dictators’ reason and common interests, and thus they were bound to be sorely disappointed.

This is wrong in so many ways.

From 1938 to 1939, Czechoslovakia was breaking up, in the same way that Yugoslavia was to nearly six decades later. The 1938 partition deal, in which Germany, Poland and Hungary got pieces each of Czechoslovakia, wasn't enough to forestall the inevitable.

Here's what John Mosier - not a Hitler fan - has to say in his Cross of Iron: The Rise and Fall of the German War Machine, 1918-1945 (2006):

On November 22, the Czecho-Slovak Republic officially became a confederation of Czechs, Slovaks, and Ruthenians, each group to have considerable local autonomy in its local areas. But by then the Slovaks were beginning to panic. Negotiations with Hungary had broken down, and on November 2, representatives from Germany and Italy met in Vienna and readjusted the boundary between Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary; the latter thus got back the roughly 600,000 ethnic Hungarians who had been stuck inside the Czech Republic at Versailles. Teschen was restored to Poland, and Germany acquired a small piece as well. The Slovaks, who had been hapless bystanders with no say in the foreign policy of the republic, saw that at this rate, they would end up again under Hungarian domination. ('Bloodless victories, or nearly so: toward a Greater Germany, 1935-1939')

The Slovaks then upset the applecart by demanding independence - a demand which entailed the breakup of Czechoslovakia:

While some Slovaks sought real independence, as far as the Czechs could make out, the Slovak idea of autonomy was, for all practical purposes, de facto independence. Thus in February 1939, as the Spanish civil war slowly came to a bloody end, the Czechs drew up a plan to occupy Slovakia. The plan was so secret that neither the Czech prime minister nor his minister of defense knew about it; it nonetheless existed. On March 10, a version of the plan was put into effect, and Prague attempted to name a new Slovak government. On the thirteenth, the Slovak leaders went to Berlin, because Hitler had agreed the day before to guarantee the new state’s independence (as it were). Without Slovakia, there was obviously no more Czecho-Slovak Republic, so events happened quickly: by March 15, German armored cars were in the streets of Prague. On that same day, the Ruthenians declared their independence, only to see Hungarian troops invading the country, with the tacit approval of Warsaw. (Ibid)

Perhaps the US, and Britain, should have gone to war, like Lincoln in 1861, and Serbia in 1992, to keep the country together? In the view of the neocons, yes: this would have 'stopped' Hitler. But Mosier injects a note of realism:

Although it soon became established in the West that Hitler had orchestrated all these events, the motivating tensions predated Hitler’s rise to power by decades. Considered from the point of view of diplomatic history after 1918, Hitler’s decision was harmless. The Slovaks had always (post–1918) wanted their own country, they were as entitled to one as anyone else, and Germany had every right to guarantee its existence and to insist that Hungary and Slovakia settle their differences peacefully. Hitler would insist on the same thing with Hungary and Romania, embellishing his credentials as a man who had unified Germany peacefully and had reversed the injustices of the Versailles and Trianon treaties without a shot being fired. From the point of view of the Germans, the Poles, the Slovakians, most Hungarians—and some Ruthenians—this was a perfectly logical development, and one probably viewed favorably (in private at least) by a good many foreign ministries in the West as well. For the French and the British public at large, however, the dismemberment of the Czecho-Slovakian Republic was the last straw. Again the complexities of Central European ethnicity were, for most people, not merely abstractions; they were daunting abstractions of the sort that only the professional diplomats of the previous century understood. The disappearance of an entire country, though, was concrete enough. It was rendered all the more so by the defiant “come and get us” speeches that Hitler had been making through the fall of 1938. (Ibid)

Germany, then, prevented war by acting as it did -  a war which Roosevelt and Churchill so dearly wanted.

The neoconservatives will counter this by pointing out that the Czechs lost any independence and self-determination as a result of the Slovaks getting theirs - (what later became) the Czech Republic was annexed to Germany and became Bohemia and Moravia. I agree in principle that's a bad thing when a country loses its independence and ceases to exist. But then I remember another the fate of another country - Palestine - which disappeared in 1948: what happened to it?

We know the answer: in 1948, Jews took over most of Palestine and forced the original inhabitants - who had been there for far longer than these newly-arrived Jewish 'settlers' from Europe - to leave; at the same time, they attacked Palestine's neighbours with a numerically superior army. They won, and literally overnight, Palestine became Israel. All traces of the original Palestinian nation were wiped out; the nation was replaced with a new, synthetic, Hebrew-speaking one.

Now, in 2016, the neocons - and Israel - are outraged with Obama's abstention on the UN resolution on settlements: they find the notion that Israel should be censured for taking whatever scraps of land that the Palestinians have left deplorable. When it comes to the Palestinians - and the ethnic minorities who lived in Czechoslovakia in the 1930s and who were oppressed by the Czechs - all the neoconservative principles of liberalism, freedom, fairness, decency, 'moral clarity' and the rest go out the window.

It's here that the anti-Semites step in and accuse neoconservatism of being a Jewish thing; the only real principle the neoconservatives by is, 'Is it good for the Jews?'. The neocons oppose National Socialist Germany because of its anti-Semitism; likewise, they support the state of Israel, and the dismemberment of Palestine, because they believe in old Talmudic prophecies to the effect that the founding of the Jewish state shall lead to the return of the Moschiah (the messiah) and the dominion of the Jews over all life on Earth...

The destruction of Palestine in 1948, and the ethnic cleansing of the Germans by the Czechs from Sudetenland from 1945 to 1948, happened a long time ago. It's the 21st century, and I'm prepared to let them go. But the neocons - and Jewish intellectuals in general - keep on bringing the past up again and again; worse, their ethnic self-interest, which can be barely restrain itself for a moment, keeps on appearing again and again, and inserting itself into the discourse.

Some of my nationalist friends believe that we shouldn't talk about the war; nor should we talk about Jewishness. I see their point: we shouldn't live in the past, and we shouldn't be taking up the worldview of the obsessive anti-Semites David Duke and Kevin MacDonald either. But what happens when the neocons and the Israel lobby - two extremely politically powerful groups - won't shut up about the two topics of the Hitler era and the State of Israel? When they have bent the most powerful man in the world - Donald Trump - to their will?

It's almost as though we can't escape the Jewish question. Perhaps Hitler's doctrines represent inescapable truths - even in this day and age.

An Australian nationalist SYRIZA?

　
I.
　
The answer - or part of the answer - to the problem of Zionism on the Australian Far Right came to me recently when I watched the famous six-part BBC documentary The Death of Yugoslavia (1995) online. Part one - 'Enter Nationalism' - chronicles the fall of communism in Yugoslavia and contains footage of two dramatic conferences. The first of these sees the rise to power of the 'nationalist' faction within the Serbian branch of the Yugoslav Communist Party, the other, the breakup of the Yugoslav Communist Party itself. Here the Yugoslav politicians stand revealed for what they had been perhaps all along: men of a nationalist and social democratic bent, who never fully subscribed to the communist ideology but joined the party out of expediency or a hunger for power or both. They had been forced, by circumstances, to swallow communism and submit to the procedures of the communist party, procedures which had been devised by genuine communists such as Tito. While all this was a rather unique political phenomenon - unique to its time and place - it was one which I felt had applications to Australian Far Right politics. Watching the documentary led me to think, speculatively, that we nationalists in Australia needed something similar to the Yugoslav communist party: a structure which would unite for the time being all the disparate groups and individuals on the Far Right into one and force them to abide by a common code of conduct, parliamentary procedure and ideological platform. Such a party would contain Zios and 'civics' in addition to genuine nationalists. The advantage of it would be that, in effect, the party and its conferences would give we nationalists a means of dealing with our enemies the Zio bosses. We would possess the means to bring them to heel. Recalcitrants who did not abide by the party rules would find themselves disciplined and even expelled, and because of the monopoly of the new party, any expellee would find themselves locked out, not just out of the party, but of the Australian Far Right as a whole.

Just as the more successful communist parties in Europe - SYRIZA in Greece, PODEMOS in Spain, Left Bloc in Portugal - achieved unity by bringing together all of the Far Left, my projected organisation would achieve unity by bringing together all of the Far Right.

On the Far Left, the communist parties which stay aloof and sectarian remain small and achieve little - the rigid and dour Greek communist party, the KKE, scored less than the Golden Dawn at the last Greek election. One of the arguments made by contemporary left-wing scholars is that the Russian communist party, for the first twenty years or so of its existence, operated just like SYRIZA or PODEMOS - as an all-encompassing party of the broad Left. The evidence seems to support that notion, and historical evidence probably will reveal that all the successful communist parties in history - including the Yugoslav - started out much the same way as SYRIZA or PODEMOS. It's probably the case that people of extreme left convictions gravitated towards the early communist parties, not necessarily because they had a Marxist disposition, but because they had nowhere else to go. In other words, these organisations, in their early days at least, functioned more as broad left-wing movements and not as parties, and so managed to catch more people.

Some of those on the Far Right of a sectarian bent - and I am a sectarian myself - would object to my proposal of a nationalist SYRIZA. They see alliances or collaborations as proof of one's weakness. To paraphrase the title of a chapter in Mein Kampf, 'The Strong is Strongest when Alone': strong groups don't need other groups. If you aim to be dogmatic and pure - just like Hitler or Lenin or Mao or Stalin - you need to make it a point of principle not to work with politicians of an opposing tendency. The NSDAP, or the communists, didn't succeed that way. Australian nationalists, then, shouldn't leave any room for Zios or civics.

This point of view is problematic because, historically speaking, the communists and the fascists did work with other groups and wouldn't have won power without them. The NSDAP collaborated with the German People's Party (DVP), a Far Right, conservative and bourgeois party led by the industrialist Hugenberg, in the early days of the National Socialist regime, and the votes of the DVP allowed Hitler's Enabling Act of 1933 - which gave the NSDAP unlimited power in the aftermath of the Reichstag fire - to pass. After the war, the German Communist Party formed a coalition with the German equivalent of the Australian Labor Party - the SPD (Social Democrat Party) - and a new party called the Socialist Unity Party (SED). And, like a good many post-war communist parties, the Yugoslav Communists gained office as part of a 'National Front'; the People's Front of Yugoslavia, which ostensibly ran Yugoslavia after the war, contained a total of eight non-communist political parties.

To return to our idea of a nationalist and Zio 'national' or 'united' 'front': in my opinion, something like it will come about of its own accord. Nearly all the organisations on the Australian Far Right at present are seeking registration as political parties, and, to my knowledge, are struggling to do so; none of them seem able of achieving the membership numbers of institutions such as the Liberal Party (80,000), the Labor Party (54,000) and the Greens (10,000). This is despite the fact that many Australians - hundreds of thousands, if not millions - agree with certain of the stated goals of the Australian Far Right (e.g., the desire to cut immigration). So, sooner or later the aspiring registrants will come to the realisation that only if they form a grand coalition of sorts will they attain the same numbers as, say, the Greens. They will need to follow the example of the Mediterranean neo-communist parties which have proven to be so successful.

Why don't the aspiring registrants see this already? The answer lies in Australia's Anglo-Saxon national character. We Australians show a predilection for the three vices of the Anglo-Saxons: 1) parliaments; 2) individualism; 3) competition. We adhere to the ideology of parliament, liberal democracy and elections because that's all we've ever known. The first instinct of any radical right-wing would-be politician is to form a political party which will compete against the others (in a kind of Darwinian struggle), run in elections and get a seat in parliament. Politics to an Australian consists of this and only this.

Now, while no-one can argue that bourgeois individualism of the Anglo-Saxon type hasn't achieved great things in the economic sphere - even Karl Marx admitted as much in his Communist Manifesto (1848) - it has proven to be disastrous in the political. For one, it is leading our country - and the West - to disaster through mass, non-white immigration, immigration on a scale hitherto unseen in history. Only a socialism and a collectivism which are the very reverse of the Anglo-Saxon individualist impulse can save the West now.

On that note, one of my main objections to Zionism and 'civicism' is that the Zio and 'civic' parties mean business as usual - a continuation of the policies that have gotten us into trouble in the first place. England, in the words of songwriter Ian Stuart, went from an empire to a slum because of its refusal to shut its borders, and England embodies the Anglo-Saxon ideals of liberty, individualism, parliaments, tolerance and competition. England - along with two other Anglo-Saxon nations - the US and Australia - waged a ferocious war against Germany as part of the 'United Nations'; as the victor of that war, it helped devise the humanist, internationalist, globalist and multiculturalist ideology of the Nuremberg trials (and today's UN) and imposed it on Germany and all the nations of the Western world - including itself. England, by dint of its ideology has ended up destroying itself - from being coloniser it has gone to being colonised, by India, Africa and Islam.

The Trump candidacy - along with European populist parties such as the Swedish Democrats, Wilders' Party of Freedom, and the Front National - represent a resistance to the post-Nuremberg new world order, even if they don't admit it; so does the Reclaim movement (Reclaim Australia, UPF, Aussie Infidels United, Rise Up!, Australian Defence League and the rest). But Reclaim has been infected: by Zionism and Anglo-Saxon individualism, and the humanism and multiracialism of the post-war era.

One thing Reclaim has done right - and this constitutes its only genuinely 'socialist' act - is to bring the working-classes together as a political unit. And this is precisely what Reclaim's enemies - the communists and the bourgeois political establishment - fear. As Hitler writes in Mein Kampf:
This class [the proletariat] does not include the worst elements of the community in its ranks. Rather the contrary is the truth: it includes the most energetic parts of the nation. The sophistication which is the result of a so-called civilisation has not yet exercised its disintegrating and degenerating influence on this class. The broad masses of this new lower class, constituted by the manual labourers, have not yet fallen a prey to the morbid weakness of pacifism. These are still robust and, if necessary, they can be brutal.

One can't have a revolution without the workers:
New champions are attracted to a cause by the appeal of great sacrifices made for its sake, until that indomitable spirit is finally crowned with success. For such a result, however, the children of the people from the great masses are necessary. They alone have the requisite determination and tenacity to fight a sanguinary issue through to the end.

Hitler remarks of the Pan-Germans, 'The Pan-German Movement did not have these broad masses as its champions and so no other means of solution could be tried out except that of entering parliament'. Further on that theme:
Faulty recognition of the inner driving forces that urge great movements forward led to an inadequate appreciation [by the Pan-Germans] of the part which the broad masses play in bringing about such changes. The result was that too little attention was given to the social problem and that the attempts made by the Movement to capture the minds of the lower classes were too few and too weak. Another result was the acceptance of the parliamentary policy, which had a similar effect in regard to the importance of the masses.

Like the communists, Hitler was very much concerned with gaining the allegiance of the workers. He understood, however, that communists had taken over the worker's movement - that is, organised labour - lock, stock and barrel; the workers, then, couldn't be reached that way. His political problem became one of bypassing the traditional communist bastion of the trade union in an attempt to appeal directly to the masses.

We nationalists in Australia find ourselves in a similar quandary. Simply put, we need the working-classes at the Reclaim rallies - the blue collars disdained by the Australian Left as 'toothless bogans' and 'lumpenproles' - but the Zio bosses stand in our way; they are determined not to allow any of the 'hardcores' - the nationalists and racialists - to reach the working-class attendees.

It's imperative that we surmount this obstacle. As Hitler writes in Mein Kampf (here sounding
somewhat Maoist):
A movement which has great ends to achieve must carefully guard against the danger of losing contact with the masses of the people. Every problem encountered must be examined from this viewpoint first of all and the decision to be made must always be in harmony with this principle. The movement must avoid everything which might lessen or weaken its power of influencing the masses; not from demagogical motives but because of the simple fact that no great idea, no matter how sublime and exalted it may appear, can be realised in practice without the effective power which resides in the popular masses.

So what's the solution?

Firstly, we nationalists to avail ourselves of the traditional communist method for reaching the masses: we need to form 'mass organisations', that is, front groups. Secondly, we need to jump on the anti-Islamic bandwagon and use opposition to Islam as a stepping stone for greater things.
We can achieve both by a) forming an anti-Islamic think tank (or 'hate tank', as one of my friends wittily puts it) and b) forming a rough-and-ready anti-Islamic street group (based primarily around social media) composed mainly of working-class people. Through the two fronts, we'll serve the same dish as the mainstream anti-Islamics, but it'll be anti-Islam without the Zionism, multiracialism, neoconservatism...

In addition to the above, we need to work on building unity amongst the nationalist and Zio groups. We do this by circumventing the Zio bosses and appealing directly to the rank and file. Furthermore, we won't make the demand that these organisations give up their separate existences; nor should we dissuade them from attempting federal registration. The main thing is to offer fraternal assistance and to offer to work as a co-ordinating center for groups and individuals of varying ideological persuasions.

Things may turn out well for this proposed co-ordinating structure; in time, it may even serve as the skeleton for a genuine mass party (as opposed to a sect or micro-party). The organisation may turn out to be the Australian nationalist version of SYRIZA; we could find a handsome and youngish man like Alex Tsipras to front it...

Finally, we need to concentrate on forming a federation composed of non-Zio Australian nationalist groups - the one proposed in the last article - and one built upon a platform of nationalist unity and 'No room for Zionism'. To negotiate with the Zios, we need to negotiate from a position of strength, and strength comes from unity.

All of the four proposed groups - the think tank, the anti-Islamic street group, the nationalist federation and the SYRIZA-type vehicle - need to be ordered the same way. The members (or delegates for the members) vote on a central committee for the organisation at a national congress and approves a constitution or set of bylaws. Membership of the organisation can be quite broad, as can the makeup of the central committee, which will serve as a plenary body of the organisation. The central committee goes on to elect a 'central organ', which serves as the editorial board of any publications and determines the ideological line of the organisation. Finally, a general secretary is elected.

One mustn't make the criteria for membership for any organisation too narrow: especially in the case of the mass organisations, we don't want to turn away interested parties; we need to appeal to a broad cross-section.

At the same time, a founding document - the constitution - must make clear, from the start, what the rules and responsibilities of the membership are, and be specific about the grounds for discipline and expulsion.

Astute readers will have noted the parallels between the above structure and those of the communist parties. Indeed, the communists adopted the simple tripartite form (central committee, central organ, secretary) for all their organisations. The government of the USSR itself was composed of a 'Central Committee of the USSR' or 'Supreme Soviet' (central committee), a 'Presidium of the Central Committee' (central organ), and a 'Premier' or 'Chairman' and his 'Council of Ministers' or 'Council of People's Commissars' (secretariat, here the prime minister and his cabinet). The 'Central Committee of the USSR' was elected by a 'Congress of the Soviets of the Soviet Union'.

I should emphasise here the simplicity and reproducibility of these structures. Communism possesses a beautiful simplicity, like Islam, and it's the simplicity which makes both doctrines so successful. As Hitler writes of communism:
Social-Democracy and the whole Marxist movement were particularly qualified to attract the great masses of the nation, because of the uniformity of the public to which they addressed their appeal. The more limited and narrow their ideas and arguments, the easier it was for the masses to grasp and assimilate them; for those ideas and arguments were well adapted to a low level of intelligence.

II.


The communist party serves as a microcosm of the communist state. That is, the state is run along the same lines as the party. Australian nationalists should keep this in mind: any future organisation - such as a SYRIZA-type organisation which will bring the nationalists and the 'civics' together, a 'National Front' - will constitute in miniature a future nationalist government.

This brings us to the topic of organisation. Marxist-Leninism strikes outsiders as a deeply theoretical doctrine, but what makes communism is not so much the theory as the organisation. In political terms, the theories of Marxism - dialectical materialism, surplus value, Mao's theorising on 'contradictions', Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution - don't count for much; what matters more is the set communist way of going about things.

What makes fascism - and in particular, German National Socialism - so different from other nationalist, racialist and Far Right ideologies is that fascism copies the communist methods. Hitler shares the Marxist-Leninist obsession with cadres, 'party training schools', and the necessity of highly deployable cadre / leader-types. (An example of the latter, from Mein Kampf: 'The movement should acquire the necessary funds to attract and train intelligent people who would be capable of becoming leaders... The personnel thus obtained could then be systematically employed according as the tactical situation and the necessity for efficiency demanded...').

But what makes Hitler different from the Marxists? One could point to the obvious differences in political theory: Marxists subscribe to egalitarianism, multiracialism, theories of class struggle and the rest, Hitler the opposite. But I think the most significant point of difference lies in the attitude. We know that communism is dogmatic, intolerant, fanatical, hierarchical, authoritarian; but communists pretend to others - and even to themselves - that the opposite is true. Hitler, on the other hand, says, 'Yes, the National Socialists are just as fanatical, authoritarian, etc., as the communists, but unlike them, we are proud of it!'. Hitler gives in Mein Kampf a long description of how the NSDAP works which, in fact, is an almost perfect description of a communist party works in reality:
The nature and internal organisation of the new movement make it anti-parliamentarian. That is to say, it rejects in general and in its own structure all those principles according to which decisions are to be taken on the vote of the majority and according to which the leader is only the executor of the will and opinion of others. The movement lays down the principle that, in the smallest as well as in the greatest problems, one person must have absolute majority and bear all responsibility.

In our movement the practical consequences of this principle are the following:
The president of a large group is appointed by the head of the group immediately above his in authority. He is then the responsible leader of his group. All the committees are subject to his authority and not he to theirs. There is no such thing as committees that vote but only committees that work. This work is allotted by the responsible leader, who is the president of the group. The same principle applies to the higher organisations - the Bazirk (district), the Kreis (urban circuit) and the Gau (the region). In each case the president is appointed from above and is invested with fully authority and executive power. Only the leader of the whole party is elected, at the general meeting of the members. But he is the sole leader of the movement. All the committees are responsible to him, but he is not responsible to the committees. His decision is final, but he bears the whole responsibility of it. The members of the movement are entitled to call him to account by means of a new election, or to remove him from office if he has violated the principles of the movement or has not served its interests adequately. He is then replaced by a more capable man, who is invested with the same authority and obliged to bear the same responsibility.

One of the highest duties of the movement is to make this principle imperative not only within its own ranks but also for the whole State.

Hitler then goes on to make an astonishingly frank admission:
Our movement must necessarily be anti-parliamentarian, and if it takes part in the parliamentary institution it is only for the purpose of destroying this institution from within; in other words, we wish to do away with an institution which we must look upon as one of the gravest symptoms of human decline.

No communist would ever speak like this. As stated before, communists like to portray themselves as liberal, pacifist, humanist, egalitarian, democratic - as 'Left'. Once you come up close to them, you learn otherwise; but they maintain the deception - and it is a deception - for a long time. They call their version of the Führerprinzip 'democratic' centralism.

One reason why they cling to the 'Left' standpoint and phraseology is that, originally, Russian communism sprang from German social democracy - liberal and democratic socialism - and could never quite shake off the influence - theoretical, at least - of its liberal and Western predecessor. The other reason is that communists, for most of their history, needed to hide their true intentions - and their standard operating procedures - from others who are more liberal and humanist-minded, especially those in the West. They needed to conceal themselves. To that end, they lived half-in, half-out of darkness. In contrast, the fascists sought the spotlight and announced their intentions, their standard operating procedures, plainly, frankly, proudly, to the world. You can find braggadocio, even arrogance, in Mein Kampf.

But now, it seems, the shoe is on the other foot: it's the nationalists and the racialists who need to hide. The roles have been reversed. Much of communism has gone mainstream, and Western establishment politicians today stand further to the left than they did ten or twenty years ago.

Regardless of this, we nationalists must push on, and must continue to organise - as the communists do, as Hitler did. Reclaim's critics on the Far Right attack them for their multi-cultism, their anti-racism, their lack of an outlook grounded in racialism and nationalism - true enough. But the racialist world view - or völkisch worldview, as Hitler calls it - doesn't accomplish anything unless it is given political form. Hitler gives a long exposition of the racialist idea in the chapter 'Weltanschauung and Party' in Mein Kampf, but remarks that it is doomed to remain a hazy, metaphysical abstraction unless it is made political. The ideas of Christ and his followers would have forever stayed religious, spiritual and metaphysical if the Catholic Church - and the later Protestant denominations - had not made them hierarchical, even political.
A general conception of life can never be given an organic embodiment until it is precisely and definitely formulated. The function which dogma fulfils in religious belief is parallel to the function which party principles fulfil for a political party which is in the process of being built up. Therefore for the conception of life that is based on the folk idea it is necessary that an instrument be forged which can be used in fighting for this ideal, similar to the Marxist party organisation.... [emphasis mine]

And to conclude:
Through this political doctrine it is possible to bring great masses of the people into an organisation which is constructed as rigidly as it could be.