Manual for the Radical Nationalist, Part II: Keeping a Group Together

I am pleased to report that, since my post, In Praise of Neo-Stalinist Doctrinairism, things have been going well for my group. Why is this? The answer is, my understanding - of how to organise in politics - increased. As to how it increased, I'll explain presently... Before I do, though, I'll note - for the sake of other nationalists who are trying to work in a group or party - that questions of organisation, management, leadership, and so forth, are different in politics than they are in fields of human endeavour. At first sight, it seems that running a political group is like running any other organisation - e.g., a trade union, a business, a bowling club, an army, whatever. But this isn't the case. Politics operates according to laws which are unique to it. The character of a political group depends on its fundamental political philosophy, which needs to be articulated and made explicit - time and time again. That philosophy encompasses everything in a group: it not only determines the objective of a group (e.g.,  a 'dictatorship of the proletariat') or its relations to rival groups and ideologies, but its internal organisation as well. In other words, theory determines practice. Some groups and parties, of course, get by with very little theory: e.g., your average conservative or social democratic party, or parties like Mussolini's PNF, or the German NSDAP... Those sorts of parties run like a smooth, well-oiled machine, with very little internal dissent over policy and objectives. For newish groups in the nationalist movement, though, a great deal of theory is necessary, and, what's more, this must be articulated, made explicit, in the form of a constitution and a party program. Without clarity, internal disagreement will fester, and the group will shrivel up and die - or, most likely, split apart...

In the past few months, I have read around 15 (!) books written by communists from the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc: it's been an invaluable education, politically, ideologically, intellectually, and an experience I recommend to all my fellow nationalist intellectuals. In truth, I enjoy, these days, reading these books more than nationalist material: I learn something new, every time (even if I don't always get something useful), whereas, if one sticks to the nationalist corpus - usually, the 'New Right' and 'Conservative Revolution' authors (Schmitt, Evola, et al.), one comes to a dead halt, sooner or later... (I speak, of course, after ten years of reading these 'approved nationalist authors').

As I mentioned before, 80% of the problems in the nationalist movement come about because groups can't last for long: because of the (near-inevitable) clashes of personalities, a group falls apart in short order. This is quite unlike conventional politics. Take, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, which has been around since 1935 and has been operating under tremendous state oppression. They are, at present, on the threshold of political power in Egypt: but, even supposing that the Mubarakist military strikes back, and denies them legislative and executive power - well, the Brotherhood won't be defeated. They'll simply make a tactical retreat and prepare for the next offensive. In nationalism, though, this doesn't happen: compare the Brotherhood to One Nation or the British National Party - a real 'party machine' just never really existed there. Nor were they, or any other prestigious (prestigious in the nationalist world, that is) parties ever on the threshold of 'seizing power' in the past forty years. The German NPD, for example, has been around since 1964, and is incapable of winning federal representation. (Yes, a nationalist in Germany faces a tough assignment: but it can't be tougher than Mubarak's Egypt, or Assad's Syria). As for the non-parliamentary nationalist groups, these tend to form into small, extraparliamentary grouplets (just like the radical Left) and fall apart fairly quickly (just like radical Left). I've seen a few good groups, overseas, come and go, based on a progressive, anti-capitalist ideology (influenced by the German Frei Nationalisten groups), which got off to a good start but broke up in mutual recrimination. (You know that they've broken up when you go to check their websites, and find that they're all down, and have been so for months; and you hear gossip, on the nationalist grapevine, that the group fell apart after such-and-such an internal dispute).

Why can't such groups - that is, progressive, anti-capitalist nationalist ones - stick together? I think the answer is simple: anarchism. Trotskyite and Maoist groups are heavily influenced by anarchism - hence their tendency to split and subdivide into smaller and smaller groups - and so are the anti-capitalist groups on the Far Right: the Freie Nationalisten are more or less a German nationalist version of the neo-anarchist Autonomen groups. Anarchism is prone to splitting, divisiveness, sectarianism, lack of sustained action towards socialism: anarchism, because of lack of mutual agreement on a constitution and a democratic, party-like structure, leads to hierarchy, authoritarianism and individualism (surprisingly enough). The conventional charge against Marxism is that it leads to hierarchy and a lack of democracy, whereas anarchism is free, non-hierarchical and democratic: but, in truth, it's the other way around - that's the conclusion I've drawn from the literature on the subject. At any rate, Marxist-Leninist theory - for all its many faults - provides a skeleton, a structure, for a left-wing group. Without it, left-wing groups degenerate into neo-anarchism - and end up falling apart. That's what's happening to the once-promising Occupy movement in America.

(This is the conundrum of the Left in America: they'll only get anywhere if they form a communist type party, with the old democratic centralism, Leninist discipline and the rest; but obviously, this has already been tried there a thousand times in the past hundred years. Obviously, the old Marxist-Leninism is unsatisfactory to the modern American Left, which is why it opted for the New Left in the sixties and now Occupy. But without Marxist-Leninism, the American Left can't get together even the beginnings of a disciplined offensive against American capitalism. It's a catch-22. In my opinion, the only way the American Left can break out of the vicious circle is to go back towards the old party methods of organisation, but adopt racialism, anti-Semitism and nationalism as an ideological platform and embrace the white working-class American. But that, of course, will never happen...).

So, it's the lack of Marxism which explains the failures of the nationalist groups, in Europe and elsewhere, which have adopted anti-capitalism. In the end, it gets down to the class-content of one's ideology: which class do you, as a nationalist group, represent? If you're going to be an neo-anarchist type group, you'll end up gravitating towards a representation - of the classes traditionally attracted to anarchism, viz, the lumpenproles, and the peasantry. (We don't have peasants any more in the West, of course, but we do have lumpenproles - among the the poor students and punks who live in squats and eat charity food, who are a declassé social group and who seem to make up the anarchist and Antifa formations). It's not that these types are undesirable people (they are): it's that they are not the right fit for Far Right nationalism. We have to recall the fascist parties of our forebears, the parties of Hitler, Mussolini, Mosley: the class composition was working-class - the disciplined white European working-class (particularly the German, which was extolled by Marx, Engels, Lenin). True, many of these men were indigent, out of work, in straitened circumstances - but they were still of the working-class. They didn't lower themselves by dropping out of their class, in the way that quite a few students have (here in Australia and Europe): viz, the students have renounced their petit-bourgeois origins (many Australians students come from middle-class families, as do many British students) and descended, on the rungs of the ladder, to the level of the lumpenproletariat.

This is important to nationalism, because so many of nationalists one encounters are precisely from the same class - the petit bourgeoisie. The tendency for that class - especially at the fringes of politics, i.e., at the extreme Left or Right - is to gravitate towards a freakish individualism, an excessive 'subjectivism', of 'me-firstism', where one's tastes, preferences, self, dominate over the 'objective' (that is, politics, economics, class). Nothing wrong with subjectivism and individualism, of course. But these have to be put to good use: to the pursuit, in a straight line, of an impersonal goal, which is, of course, the communist or fascist state, Marx's 'dictatorship of the proletariat', whether it be a red dictatorship or a brown dictatorship... In this regard, the amazing thing about the pre-war fascist movement in Europe was that these men and women organised themselves, in a socialist and Marxist-Leninist way, without paying attention to Marxist theory! They were influenced by Lenin, and Marx, to an incredible degree: but you will (hardly ever) find a fascist politician or intellectual quoting Lenin or Marx or Stalin in support of their positions. Which is why I define fascism as a kind of pre-reflexive Marxism: that is, a Marxism without theory, a Marxism which doesn't think of itself as Marxist...

As to why the fascists were like this... The answer is, they absorbed communism into their bloodstream, by osmosis. It was part of the air that they breathed. Soviet communism, under Lenin and then Stalinism, was a viable alternative to liberal democracy. When people of my generation think of Soviet communism, they, of course, think of the decrepit communism of the 1980s - of Brezhnev and his (soon-deceased successors) and the 'young' Gorbachev. But, back in my great-grandfather's time, Soviet communism really was something. Someone on the Far Right had to acknowledge it: one couldn't escape it, or the effects on people's lives. It was like the iPhone, or Twitter, or Facebook (all of which I despise)... We moderns - we Westerners in the year 2012 - can't understand this. Hence, we have to re-educate ourselves. We have to go through the necessary stages before we can duplicate the success of the old, European, working-man's movement of the 1920s and 1930s which was fascism. In other words, we must learn to be Marxists and socialists before we make ourselves to be fascists. Which leads to a kind of over-compensation: one has to go full-tilt to Marxist-Leninism and take on board all it has to offer - in terms of political economy, politics, philosophy. We simply can't suck in Marxism from the air and absorb it into our bloodstream, in the way that Hitler, Mussolini, Primo de Rivera did - for the simple reason that, in 2012, communism, much less a viable Stalinist, Soviet communism, is no longer with us.


So, nationalist intellectuals need to embrace Marxist theory. 'But what of all the faults in that theory?'. Well, of course there are faults; but, in the end, these don't matter. It seems that every day, on the front page of some respectable newspaper, an announcement will appear (from some respectable scientist) that the Earth isn't warming as rapidly as the environmentalists claim; or that the Earth is cooling; or that 'greenhouse gases' weren't as responsible for that warming as once thought; or that the warming isn't going to be disastrous as once throught... These scientists aren't in the pay of Big Oil, or neoliberal think-tanks, either. Despite this countervailing evidence, however, environmentalism keeps marching on its way; more and more useless, environmentalist legislation - to 'combat global warming' - will be introduced... Pretty much communism went the same way. Trenchant criticisms of Kapital, made as early as the turn of the century, had zero effect. The fact that millions starved to death in the Ukraine in the early 1930s, or in China in the early 1960s - that wasn't a disproof of Marx's theory.

(What did make a difference to Marxism was the collapse of the USSR in 1991 - and the backsliding of China after 1979. But that's a story for another day).

But to return to fascism: the difference between Bolshevik Marxism, and the socialism of the fascist kind, was not only on the national question, but on the extent to which a socialist government, a revolutionary government, should abolish property.

One can say, on this point, that the fascists were right. Perhaps the communist governments went too fast - and this is a retrospective criticism - in getting rid of property altogether; perhaps they would have survived longer, had they not been in such a rush to introduce socialist property relations... Perhaps man could be steered away from capitalist property relations towards socialist ones, but this 'steering' would take a hundred years or more. This sort of thinking, of course, is 'right-wing', even 'revisionist' and 'social democratic' of me: but the capitalist, liberal democrat and bourgeois system is still here, while the USSR isn't. So, who is right and who is wrong?

But this, in turn, raises a number of questions: one of them is the fascist 'line' on capitalism and private property. In Hitler's speeches, we find him lauding private enterprise and individual initiative in one speech (before one audience, usually a business audience), and then praising socialism and the German worker the next (before a different audience). Overall, we do find a consistency in Hitler's day-to-day policy - which is, I argue, a 'Left' policy - but from speech to speech, pronouncement to pronouncement, an inconsistency. The same goes for Mussolini. The anti-fascist Left will use Hitler's pronouncements on private enterprise to prove that he was a neoliberal - which is nonsense. But then, the Left has a tendency to go by what a man says, and not what he does. By his actions, Hitler wasn't a neoliberal; his immediate successors, in the post-war Bonn republic, were (Ludwig Erhard is one of the gods in the pantheon of neoliberal-approved politicians). The fact is, in the day-to-day running of the country, or in the contesting of an election, a politician will occasionally contradict himself. Mussolini and Hitler did this to an alarming degree. But the Left does it as well. Many years ago, I stumbled across a quote from Lenin (in the first pages of the anti-communist compilation, Marx Refuted: The Verdict of History (1986), edited by Colin Wilson and Ronald Duncan) from 1917 in which he declares he is 'No longer a Marxist'. One has to consider the context of such an extraordinary statement. But, suffice to say, the Soviets would have obscured such a statement from the historical record: that is, everything written, or said, by Engels, Marx, Lenin, Stalin, was presented in order to give readers a portrait of men who were fully consonant in thought and deed - for every single day of their lives. When, in reality, such a thing is not possible...

But this is not an excuse for inconsistency. On the contrary, a nationalist group should strive for the utmost consistency: its press releases, articles, transcribed or recorded speeches, etc., should be fully consonant with the principles and positions as outlined in the constitution and party program.

All this talk of economics brings us to another point. Would, or should, major nationalisations take place under a Far Right government? Critics of socialism argue that widescale nationalisations 'destroy the economy' and 'reduce the confidence of foreign investors', etc., etc. Communist governments, operating under the constraints of Marxist ideology, view capitalist property relations as 'the exploitation of man by man', and so are bound, by that view, to abolish all property (the USSR, of course, abolished all property except at the local, market garden level). The conservative anti-communists argue that this policy led to economic ruin. But it is possible for a country to do well, in 2012, with a nationalised economy - to a certain extent. The UAE, for instance, doesn't have income, corporate, value-added, capital gains, or sales taxes: the country is about as tax-free as one can get. The UAE's revenue comes from state-owned oil. Oil-rich countries like Iran, with a state-owned oil sector, though, don't do well - possibly, this is because of an extensive corporate, sales and income tax regime, with rates cutting in at low thresholds of income (inflation, brought about by loose monetary policy, in Iran only increases the 'bracket creep' effect, in which Iranians are pushed into higher and higher progressive tax brackets through inflation). The point is, one can envisage, then, a UAE-type arrangement in Australia, in which the mining and resources sector is state-owned, while all taxes are, in effect, abolished.

But one should not be hamstrung to such a policy. One wouldn't think it, but one of the tenets of Marxist-Leninism is that communist leaders should not be bound to an economic policy which has been devised (as I have just done) in abstraction, a priori, separate from existing reality. Marxist-Leninism does justify discretion on the economy. In this regard, it is flexible, fluid, organic... It castigates the 'Left' communists who demand that such-and-such an economic scheme (which was devised a priori) be introduced, as a matter of principle, even if the existing realities don't call for it. This is what the Marxist-Leninists call 'dogmatism'. And it is this 'dogmatism' which is one of the distinguishing traits of Trotskyism and Maoism. (But, it should be said, the line between a mad, 'Left-adventurist' and 'dogmatic' scheme, and a good, proper, socialist one, is thin: how are we to distinguish between, say, Stalin's collectivisation program in the Ukraine, and Mao's crazed, 'adventurist' Great Leap Forward?).

Marxism's organic approach is what separates it from the 'utopian' forms of communism. 'Utopian' communism devises abstract, a priori schemes for social reform, and demands that they be imposed, from the top down, and all at once. Marxism, on the other hand, believes that reality is gradually inclining towards socialism - that's the tendency in the economic and social arrangements of the world today - but these tendencies may end up zig-zagging: that is, there may be a sudden spurt towards socialism, and then a turning away from it... The goal of the Marxist political leadership is to divine the existing tendency and work with it, and not against it.

The essential thing is that there will be struggle between the existing tendencies - the one towards capitalism and away from socialism, and vice versa. Marxism is the metaphysics of struggle.

Nationalists should take this metaphysics on board. Many of them exhibit surprise that there is a struggle, that there is a terrible fight, in politics. Some profess to be bemused by present-day policy on immigration, for example: 'Why doesn't' Romney and the US Republican Party see sense on non-white immigration, and just ban it? But, according to Marxism, there must be a struggle: a fight, a battle, will be necessary. Marxism is a close cousin of Darwinism, of course, and it's not for nothing that Hitler named his memoirs, 'My Struggle'...

Golden Dawn, Dialectics and Making a Nationalist Revolution

There has been a great deal of jubilation, in nationalist circles, regarding Golden Dawn's electoral success (7% of the vote, translating into 21 seats), and horror from the liberal establishment (no horror, though, regarding the success of the main Greek Communist Party, which won 8%). At the same time, a few comrades have told me that such success for a radical nationalist party - which is unashamed of its fascist, neofascist and right-wing authoritarian roots - wouldn't be possible here in Australia or indeed in any other Western European country (or colony): it's only in the East of Europe that the radical parties - the Jobbiks, the Golden Dawns - can win seats. That is, the sad reality is that a nationalist party has to go down the populist route (i.e., the Breivikist/Wilder-ist route) to achieve electoral success in the Western half of Europe. The electoral schema is, for nationalists in Europe at present: Zio-populism for the West, neofascist radicalism for the East, and for Germany, in the center, nothing at all (no nationalist party of any stripe can make much headway in Germany, at least not at a federal level). So there are certain peculiarities, on the Continent, which prevent a radical Far Right party taking off in the Western half.

On top of that, it is pointed that the Greeks suffered from extremely high levels of non-white immigration prior to the election: according to the liberal German news agency, Deutsche-Welle, 128,000 illegals came to Greece in 2010 alone, and according to the UK tabloid The Daily Mail, a 100,000 illegals entered in the 12 months to February 2012. Greece's geographical position as the gateway to Eastern Europe has led to it being inundated with immigrants from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Ethiopia, etc., so much so that the liberal democratic government of Greece, even before the election, began work on erecting a six-mile, 13 feet high, double razor-wire wall along the border. Even so, that was shutting the stable door after the horse has bolted, and the presence of hundreds of thousands of non-white immigrants has led to the de facto ethnic cleansing of the majority white Greek population in certain urban areas. This awfulness, combined with Greece's economic straits, has led to a decisive nationalist vote.

In short, then, a 7% vote for a nationalist party 'won't happen here', in Australia, because (what the Marxists call) the 'objective conditions' aren't right: yes, white Australians are being gradually forced into minority status, in the urban and suburban areas, thanks to mass Chinese and Indian immigration; but they aren't in the sorry position of the Greeks, and certainly, economically, they are nowhere as badly off.

Is this fatalism and determinism warranted? Or is it unjustified? In order to arrive at an answer to that question, let's consider a few key theses: we have to get a clear exposition of the problem - the problem faced by nationalism - before we can get around to solving it.

Here are a few defining characteristics of the Golden Dawn:

1.  It has a mainly working-class, proletarian class composition;

2.  It is a radical party;

3.  It has authoritarian, anti-liberal, anti-parliamentarian leanings, and gravitates towards 'extraparliamentary opposition', i.e., activism on the street, demonstrations, and so forth;

4.  It is anti-capitalist, and opposed to the financial hegemony of the international bankers.

This last point is especially important: modern-day liberal democracy in Europe represents, to a certain extent, the 'dictatorship of finance capital'. Banks which have invested heavily in French, Greek, Spanish, Irish, Italian, etc., debt, stand to suffer if the value of this debt plummets (they will be breaking the international banking rules regarding a strict equity-to-asset ratio, which I won't detail here); certainly, they will see a loss on the value of that debt, if the governments miss out on one or two or three of their regular interest payments. Debts, such as mortgages, are assets for a bank, and just the way that the value of a mortgage (for a bank) will fall, if the borrower starts missing out on his payments, so will the value of a French government bond fall if the French government misses on its payments. Such is the power of the banks in Europe, they can compel the EU and Germany to enforce a strict 'austerity' regimen to ensure that all the interest payments from Greece, Italy, France, etc., are promptly paid and in full - even if that austerity regimen means tax hikes, cuts to welfare, etc., which end up destroying those countries economically. (This, of course, leads to a vicious circle: a country with 25% employment and zero economic growth is unlikely to reap in much of tax revenue, and so will be less likely to be able to pay its interest bill). The sensible thing would be, of course, for the Greek and other afflicted governments to default, and skip one or two payments until things improve - as they inevitably will. But it's axiomatic, for the EU and Germany, that the banks have to be insulated from losses, i.e., write-downs on the value of their bond holdings.

It goes without saying that such a policy hurts the Greek working-class: and the peculiar thing about the above defining characteristics of the Golden Dawn is that they are true of the communist parties, and, historically, the fascist parties of the 1920s and 1930s. What we have, in Golden Dawn, the Greek communist KKE and the splinter-communist Syriza, is a surge towards socialism - radical socialism - if we could define the above 1)-4) as being 'socialist'. The conventional wisdom is that socialists of one stripe or another will do well during a period of economic downturn, and the election results in Greece and France this year bear this out.

There are, of course, real differences between the Far Right socialists, and the socialists of the Far Left. The main difference is on the question of immigration. To explain this, we will have to backtrack a little, and look at some recent social history.

Since the 1960s, Europe - and the West - has been ruled by a dominating clique, which has manifested itself in politics, journalism, academia, entertainment. The intent of that clique has been to eradicate the majority white population of every white, European country and replace it with non-whites drawn from the Third World. Liberalisation of immigration from the Third World, mass indoctrination of the white populace with the virtues of 'multiculturalism', 'diversity', being nice to minorities, etc., have been put to use for that purpose. The end result of mass immigration is that whites, in cities from Oslo to London to Athens, are slowly being pushed out of the lands they have lived in for hundreds, if not thousands, of years: and this is the goal of the anti-white clique. They want, for instance, for a country like Sweden to be a wonderful smorgasbord of diversity: Afghans, Iraqis, Somalis, Kurds, Chinese, Pakistanis, will occupy Sweden from coast to coast, while the Swedes themselves will be reduced to a minority, living in the forests and mountains of the far-flung rural areas (until the cities, bulging to the brim with immigrants, expand and reach those areas too). It is a process of replacing one race by another. Non-white countries such as Kenya, Japan, Guatemala, of course, aren't expected to undergo the same process: 'diversity' is a unique gift - or punishment - reserved by the white man, to pay him back for centuries of colonialism and exploitation of the Third World. The colonies of Europe - Canada, South Africa, Argentina, Australia, New Zealand, the USA - are especially deserving of punishment, because, to the anti-white clique, their existence represents an obscenity: these countries were founded on the enslavement, rape, despoliation and dispossession of the natives, who were at a far higher level of moral and spiritual attainment than the white settlers.

Of course, the anti-white clique won't achieve the 'maximalist' (to borrow a Trotskyite term) program of wiping the white race out altogether. But they will manage to increase the non-white populations of the cities of Europe (and the European colonies) to bursting point, and thus, proportionally, reduce the white populations to a minority there. This is already happening in the traditionally white working-class towns of Bradford, Birmingham and Leicester. (Ideally, the whites should be ethnically cleansed at gunpoint: just as what happened to the Germans of Eastern Europe in the late 1940s, the Palestinians in Palestine in 1948, the various Balkans ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavian provinces of the early 1990s. But that can't happen, of course, so the anti-white clique resorts to other means).

It's a grim scenario, of course, especially given that none of the élites in the West (who are the custodians of the destiny of their countries) will or can do anything about it. The mainstream liberal media is beginning to acknowledge, of course, that this process is taking place, and is cautiously suggesting that the policy should be stopped for the time being; but acknowledgements and suggestions are no substitutes for doing, i.e., none of these conservative critics are willing to fight to have their views enforced, and none of them can even suggest voting for the parties (such as the BNP) who make opposition to immigration a priority. It's become clear that conservatism just doesn't have the strength, morally, intellectually, physically, to 'defend the West' at this crucial juncture. This is shown by their policies: the conservative government of the Tory David Cameron was elected, in part, on his pledge to cut British immigration to the 'tens of thousands', but immigration into Britain is even higher than when he took office.

Amazingly, conservatives turn into mush liberals when it comes to immigration. While American conservatives are prepared to invade Iraq and Afghanistan, drop bombs on Libya, water-board Arabs, cut welfare spending to 'balance the budget', they just won't countenance the deportation of illegal Mexican immigrants (it would 'break up families') or even cut off all the public housing, health care, education and other benefits which, in part, serve to induce illegals to stay in America.

As for the Left, well, they are completely out of the loop. The truth is that while the present-day ideology of the anti-white clique seems, on the surface of it, to be left-wing - with all its ranting and raving over the 'crimes of colonialism', its declarations that the 'white race is the cancer of history', and so forth - it is something totally new in the annals of the Left: we don't find a hint of it in Lenin, Bakunin, Marx, Engels, Trotsky, the Fabian socialists, Samuel Gompers and so forth. Conservatives like to blame modern-day multiculturalism and multiracialism on the 'Cultural Marxism' of the 'Frankfurt School', but one really can't find an endorsement of ethnic cleansing (of whites), any rationale, in the works of Adorno, Marcuse, Fromm, Walter Benjamin (one does find the standard-issue liberal bilge, regarding the rights of oppressed Negroes in the American South, of course, but that's another thing entirely). Likewise, where, in the offical Soviet communist manual, The Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism (1963), is the suggestion of such a policy? There is the demand, by the communists, for 'revolutionary violence' in that manual (and in Soviet and Maoist propaganda from that time), but no demand for the disappearance of the French from France, or the British from Britain.

The Left, today, could be expected (given its ideology) to defend the interests of the white-working classes in the West and elsewhere: undoubtedly, the policies of the anti-white clique have caused great suffering to the traditional constituency of the Left (statistics show that 9/10ths of British jobs created in the Blair-Brown years went to immigrants, for example). But this isn't the case: the Left simply refuses to see any suffering. The Left believes that there is an infinite font of resources in the West - jobs, housing, education, health care, etc. - which should be shared, gratis, with the entire Third World; there's an infinite capacity which should be given to everybody. What's more, if we in the West take in immigrants and put them up in public housing, and on welfare benefits, we'll be giving them a better life - and protecting them from becoming child soldiers, or, if they are female children, from having their genitals mutilated. Those on the Right, who say that there aren't enough resources to go around, or that the immigrant groups will continue to practice female genital mutilation and honour killings (no matter what country they are living in), are just mean, nasty and horrid people.

In addition to all that, both the Left and Right are aesthetically blind. They don't see, they don't perceive, they don't understand, the concept of human degradation. There is something tremendously ugly, and sad, about immigrants sneaking into Britain, from across the Channel, by clinging to the undersides of lorries, by hiding themselves in garbage containers in trucks, or trucks carrying vats of chocolate; there is something tremendously ugly about immigrants (of a certain ethnic group I won't name, due to political correctness) of going about Melbourne, wearing ill-fitting, shabby clothes (which look as though they were stolen from the back of a barrow), sleeping, 20 people to a house, five people to a single bed, cheating utility and phone companies by not paying their bills, shopping, with their arranged marriage (and possibly co-sanguinary) wives, in the junk shops and haggling over the smallest dollars and cents... To a certain extent, life, when it gets to that level, is not worth living: these people degrade the quality of life in the West, and they are degrading to the human spirit. 'What, "spirit"?', say our establishment politicians: 'The only "spirit" I believe in is that of the Anglican Church, or the Catholic Church, which accepts all races equally, especially brown ones: your "spirit" sounds to me quite fascist'.

And so we are, in the West in 2012, at an impasse.

All of the above explains why, despite their turn towards socialism in the recent elections, the French and the Greeks didn't give complete victory to the socialist Left. As Gilad Atzmon shrewdly points out, it's strange how the Left embraces Palestinians expressing Palestinian nationalism, but can't abide by a Frenchwoman who expresses French nationalism - Marine Le Pen. But this is because, I argue, that the Left now accepts, along with the Right, all the presuppositions of the anti-white clique.

Given all this, it has become clear, to me, at least, that the West needs to adopt the most uncompromising and radical measures to save itself in its current predicament. I mean this well and truly: 'radical' comes from the Latin word radix, meaning 'from the root', and we need pull up the existing political, economic and social structures from the roots. In practical terms, this means - for Britain - the suspension (perhaps permanent) of parliament and democratic elections, the ascent to power of a new, nationalist-minded élite, and the conversion of the existing British constitutional system away from constitutional monarchy and towards a republic. In turn, the power of the City of London - Britain's financial hub - will have to be curtailed, for the future nationalist politicians simply can't be subject to the whims of the global bond and stock markets.

In any real 'dialectical' change, or evolution, the Marxists argue, the new order has to contain traces of the old: it is, in short, a 'sublation' - the present order contains the seeds of the future, within itself, and so revolution is a matter of bringing out the possibilities and making the new order sprout and grow. There is a clean break, but, at the same time, it is not the case of an old order (e.g., constitutional monarchy, liberal democracy, capitalism) being swapped for something unrelated and arbitrary. The white British simply won't convert, en masse, to fundamentalist Islam and ditch liberal democracy for Islamic theocracy: the tendencies, cultural and historical, towards radical Islam simply aren't there in the British people (whereas, in the case of the Egyptian people, they are). Whereas what I am advocating for the British is there. Britain was a republic, for ten years, under Cromwell, and parliament was suspended during his reign. But, aside from the historical precedent, the British soul, British history, British culture, contains within it radical socialism - a socialism which could form the basis of the new constitutional order. And it must, because radical ideologies such as Islam aren't an option.

The same goes for Australia: 'white man's socialism', the socialism of the old Labor Party, and the old Australian 'bush' nationalists, is still there within us, deep below the surface. But, in order to implement it, it needs to be Europeanised: not only does it need to be Marxianised, it needs to be fascist-ised. In other words, it needs to take into account recent (and by recent, in this case, I mean within the last hundred years) political and intellectual developments on the Continent.

Marx's Kapital doesn't contain the blueprint of a future communist order, as readers of it know: it attempts to describe the existing state of affairs and portends a clean break from them - the ruptures which will lead to the birth of a new order. But it doesn't describe how things ought to be, and this is one of the problems faced by the new rulers of communist regimés: where were the prescriptions, in Marx, for the new order, how would we know what socialism looks like? Engels, it is true, predicted the disappearance of money, etc., under socialism and communism, but, in general, communist theory always hedged its bets when it came to the future. It was 'dialectical', which is to say, the changes would come about organically and develop out of the old. In contrast, the so-called Utopian socialists devised detailed schemes, and drew up blueprints, for the future socialist order and how the communities in that order would live. Henceforth, the schemes would be imposed without taking circumstances and limitations into account. It was the flexibility of Marx's 'scientific' socialism, in contrast to the apriorism and inflexibility of his scheme-making 'utopian' socialist forebears, which gave it a main advantage. And this is something we nationalists, in 2012, ought to imitate.

In short: in politics, we are like painters and sculptors, who have to work with the materials we are given. We can't go beyond the given. At the same time, as revolutionaries, we recognise the need for a clean and decisive break. Revolutions make use of the existing material - the cultural, historical, economic and political tendencies - to hand. At the same time, they are brought about by élites, minorities, standing on the outside of the prevailing order. No politician, no matter what ideology, accepts the existing facts 'as they are', otherwise, he wouldn't be in politics. So, revolutions are made, they are brought about. It is our task, as revolutionary nationalists, to manufacture the conditions for revolution.

That doesn't mean that we can ignore the 'objective conditions'. One only has to recall the case of Che Guevera, who went about 'making revolution', half-cocked, in Congo and Bolivia, and failing miserably because he out-and-out ignored the 'objective conditions', didn't bother to investigate what the working-classes and peasantry in those countries were about, and so forth. A more recent example of (what the Marxists call) 'left-adventurism' is the anti-globalisation riots - the black bloc anarchists who go around assaulting police and smashing the windows of Starbucks and McDonalds - and the Occupy movement. (One really can't blame the anarchists or the Occupiers for their spontaneous disorders, given that conventional Marxism has failed the Left so dramatically). In other words, we mustn't think that inducing riot, rebellion and insurrection, leading to armed conflict - just as see in the Arab world right now - automatically adds up to revolution, although such things can, of course, occur naturally in the midst of a revolution.

The good news is that the white peoples of the West are gradually waking up to the fact that they are being shafted by the anti-white clique. They are being told, around the clock, by the establishment media, intellectuals and politicians, to pay no heed to their ethnic dispossession, but, as recent electoral events in Europe show, they are no longer listening. But they are a long way from revolting. Mainly this is because the nationalists and the Far Right have to get their house in order.

Part of the problem is that we, in our economic thinking, gravitate, by force of habit, to ideas which show a petit-bourgeois propensity. How many times do we hear a nationalist say, 'Oh, I agree with you, companies like Goldman-Sachs are bad, globalisation is bad, all the companies listed on the DJIA or the All Ordinaries Index are bad - big business, corporations, global conglomerates, are all bad. But the small proprietor, the white middle-class, the subsidised EU-farmer - we mustn't hurt them! We must go back to small business: artisans is what we need. We must have more handicrafts...'. Such thinking is reflective of traditional anarchism and socialism (the pre-Marxist 'utopian' socialism), and the petit-bourgeois class origins of such thinking, and it still holds an enormous allure for the Far Right today. It's something to be avoided, an alternative is needed. Really, such splendid experiments in socialism such as Herman Goering's Four-Year-Plan, and his Hermann Goering Steelworks, would never have gotten off the ground with such thinking.

I myself don't have an economic plan, and don't think nationalists need one. At the same time, we must have a complete break from the existing political, social and economic order, and that entails a rejection, or revision, of the existing capitalist system. The success of Golden Dawn is a step in that direction: despite their stated economic platform, they are a symptom of the ruptures and upsets predicted by Marx in Kapital. Perhaps they are a sign of the new socialist order as well.