'Madness & Doom': Trump 2024, American White Nationalists, and the War on the Living

I.

 

In an election year in America, even the most eccentric and isolated member of the dissident Right must acknowledge the existence of mainstream American politics, if only for a moment, and who knows, under pressure to remove himself from his self-imposed isolation, even if only temporarily, he may even concede that the outcome of the election will have a great bearing on the fate and well-being of white people in America. Drawing upon my knowledge of mainstream economics and politics, I will be writing here in order to help the dissident Rightist navigate American politics and arrive at a fixed position, but I do not intend to inveigle him into taking a ride on the Trump train, for the Trump campaign should not want the support of the American white nationalist - look at the harm that David Duke's endorsement, which was most suspiciously timed, did in 2015.

 

We know that in an election year, the left-wing media will do its best to associate in the public's mind Trump and 'white nationalism' to the detriment of the former; and that the same media will be making a false comparison. Race and immigration play an outsized role in the election of 2024, perhaps more than in any other election in recent history, but if we were to view the matter objectively, we shall see that white nationalism and MAGA travel along tracks that run parallel to one another but never intersect. 'White nationalism', 'National Socialism', 'Third Positionism', 'Tradition', and any other factional grouping of the dissident Right stand not to benefit politically from a Trump victory, and I think that the American dissident Right has finally comprehended this fact; the American dissident Right did not comprehend it during Trump's first term, a time when it had invested a great deal in Trump and when the investment did not pay off; and that disappointment is why for years afterwards bitter and disaffected members of the American dissident Right complained, and most angrily, that Trump 'didn't keep his promises' and that he 'did nothing'.

 

So, would a Trump victory in 2024 change anything in America - would it lead to a cessation of the depravity that Kevin Alfred Strom chronicles here? Maybe, maybe not; regardless, American mainstream politics now is an interesting subject in itself: it should be discussed, it should be examined in its own right. I here ask the 'extremist' reader for forbearance.

 

II.

 

The astute reader will see in this article the appearance of the 'rational markets hypothesis', which asserts that when all participants are put together in the same market on the same day they always make the right decision. According to the theory, an individual participant in the stock market may be wrong and spectacularly so; but when all the participants are pressed into an aggregate, the 'wisdom of crowds' emerges. Take, for example, the crash on October the 29th 1929: this was the most famous day in Wall Street's history; it was the day of the crash that precipitated the Great Depression. No doubt you could have found a single investor on that day who was quite bullish and at the same time quite ignorant, a man who made the wrong call (to avail ourselves of financier's jargon), a man who saw no reason to dump his stocks all at once. But that is one man plucked out of a crowd; the great majority made the right call. It was entirely justified in selling its stocks; in abandoning the market; and in holding a pessimistic view of America's future.

 

So why was it justified? The answer is to be found in the research of the publicist of supply-side economics Jude Wanniski, who contended that the market crashed on that day after a piece of dramatic breaking news, which was that the Smoot-Hawley tariff bill had passed the US Senate. I will not rehearse the story of the notorious bill; suffice to say that its passage plunged America into recession, and then, after President Herbert Hoover signed into law a series of brutal tax hikes, depression. Wanniski's point is that the market responded and responded rationally to bad news. The countervailing thesis is that the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) crashed on October 29th, 1929, for no reason at all, the market being irrational, the crowds possessing no wisdom.

 

Controversially, Wanniski extended the rational markets hypothesis to politics: an individual voter may be quite stupid, but when all voters, including the stupidest, are put together in aggregate on election day, they always make the right choice. For example, when choosing between two objectionable and lacklustre candidates A and B, voters will always choose theone who will do the least harm.

 

I remember Bob Bartley, editor of the WSJ editpage and my boss back then, asking me why I thought Jimmy Carter [in 1976] was winning the primaries when he did not seem to stand for anything, with his competitors complaining that he fuzzed and fudged all the issues being debated. I recall telling Bartley that if one candidate says, "Elect me and I will kill every fifth American," and another says, "I will kill every tenth American," and another says "every 15th," and another "every 20th," and then Jimmy Carter steps forward and says "I haven’t made up my mind. Maybe I won’t kill any Americans." The voters will of course pick Carter, as they did, going on to beat President Ford in the general election.

 

The electorate cannot be fooled any more than the market can, and it works with all the information, however incomplete that information may be, made available to it, and in essence Wanniski's theory is that, like the participants in the stock market, the electorate uses all the information it can gather, and it goes on to act rationally.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        

But if Wanniski's theory is true, how does it explain the presidential election of 2020? Voters knew in advance that Biden suffered from cognitive difficulties; that he was in poor physical health; that he and his family were corrupt; that he was a nasty, aggressive old man; that he was prone to outbursts of irrational anger, as dementia sufferers often are. And furthermore, they understood what the Biden platform entailed. Now in 2024, one must laugh and laugh maliciously at the Democratic voters in Denver, Colorado, and Chicago, Illinois, and Boston, Massachusetts, all of whom are complaining most vociferously about the consequences of the Biden immigrant invasion: the voters in these sanctuary cities have now got what they voted for - and in spades. And Wanniski's thesis is that they knew what they were voting for. The Biden package - tax hikes, environmentalism, Covidian mandates, open borders, transsexualism, a pro-crime policy that protects the criminal and punishes the victim - was hardly a secret. In addition, the electorate, which according to Wanniski understands economics better than any economist, would have known what the consequences of Bidenomics were. Nevertheless, Americans put Biden into office. He won 81 million votes, more votes than Obama, more votes than Hilary, more votes than any presidential candidate in history. Or did he? Perhaps we can rescue the Wanniski hypothesis by arguing that the electorate did not want Biden and that he did not win 2020; what happened was that the Democratic Party, the Far Left, Big Tech, and the Hollywood entertainment and media complex, carried out a coup against Trump. Biden was installed; he was selected, not elected.

 

To say the least, what happened was extraordinary; all American presidential elections had been free and fair up to that point excepting the election of 1864, which took place when America was chopped into two. Granted, there have been some extremely close elections - think of Nixon versus Kennedy in 1960 and Bush versus Gore in 2000 - but as I will argue, 2020 was not one of those.

 

So, what happened in 2020? Wanniski speaks of the 'rights of the minorities'. Being a family man and a New Yorker, he expounds the doctrine by sketching out the following parable. A family of five pile into a car and drive to the Hamptons or the Catskills on a vacation; on the way there, the youngest child, a little girl, becomes upset and agitated, yells and screams, and demands to be taken home. The rest of the family views the prospect of a trip as being neither nor there, and does not care all that much about it: it could easily out-vote the girl and proceed on, but if the trip is to be cancelled in order to assuage the girl, and keep peace in the family, and put an end to the girl's caterwauling - then so be it. The father turns the car around, the family drives home. The little girl stands in the minority; in a democracy she would be outvoted; but she possesses in this instance a weighted vote, that is, a vote that counts two, three, or more times more than a single.

 

The parallels between this and 2020, and indeed the entirety of Trump's first term, are obvious. Those suffering from TDS (Trump Derangement Syndrome) behaved like spoiled children. And unfortunately for Americans, the anti-Trumpers wielded most of the political power. Although they did belong to a minority, they did enjoy weighted voting privileges. On election night in 2020 and in the months leading up to Biden's inauguration in January 2021, they got their way; and Americans - except for the small minority who protested at the Capitol on January the 6th - allowed them to have it.

 

Wanniski gives a formal explanation of the theory in The Way the World Works (1979):

 

But while a politician can not satisfy electors who are diametrically opposed, neither can he ignore one class of elector or another, perhaps with the idea that because he can not possibly satisfy both, he will throw in his lot entirely with the one. Even when an issue can be settled by numerical voting, ninety-nine-to-one, the politician must attempt in some way to accommodate the one. At the extreme, if the issue settled ninety-nine-to-one is perceived by the one as in some way threatening his very survival or directly inviting his extinction, the one may resort to extralegal balloting to defend himself, perhaps even attempting assassination. In determining the consensus of the electorate, then, the successful politician does not view the electorate as a collection of numerical units, but as a bundle of individual interests each with a different set of intensities.

 

Now after three years of Biden, voters in the cities of Denver, Chicago, and Boston are experiencing buyer's remorse, and that places the Biden junta's survival in doubt. Carolyn Yeager observes, 'Even the sophisticated electoral cheating technologies semi-mastered by his Democrat party will probably not be sufficient to keep him [Biden] in the White House'; that was written in April 2023, and Biden's chances have hardly improved since then.

 

Rest assured, on election night 2024, history will repeat itself, and 2024 will look a lot like 2020: voting machines will mysteriously malfunction and flip millions of votes from Trump's column to Biden's, and after an order is given after midnight to stop the counting in seven swing states, millions of postal votes all for Biden will magically appear. But the difference between 2020 and 2024 is that the Democrats must defend everywhere. They cannot afford to lose one single traditionally blue state. And then there is the question of morale: the anti-Trump brigade who ousted Trump in 2020 will do their best to make sure that Biden 'wins' another term, but their hearts will not be in it, because after three years of Biden we can safely assume that they are quite demoralised and deflated.

 

III.

 

In 2020, Biden made history, or more accurately, broke with history, and to understand the rupture, let us look to the history, starting with the 30 presidential elections held from 1900 onwards. An outside observer who was ignorant of American political history could easily determine with a reasonable degree of certainty who was the winner of each election by knowing only handful of variables, and he could achieve this feat without knowing the actual outcome, i.e., without know who was declared the winner.

 

The first variable is this: who did the state of Ohio go to? From 1900, when the state went to McKinley, to 2016, when the state went to Trump, Ohio has gone to the winner 28 out of 30 times. And twelve out of 30 times Ohio, in conjunction with one of the two other states Iowa and Florida, has gone to the winner; and in 16 out of 30 times, all three states have gone to the winner. In short, the general rule is: if you win Ohio and either Florida or Iowa or both, you win the election.

 

Another variable we must account for is the increase in the number of voters voting for the incumbent's party. In the presidential election of 1928, Herbert Hoover, the presidential candidate of the incumbent party, which was the Republican Party, won Ohio, Florida, and Iowa, and at the same time won more votes than the Republican candidate Calvin Coolidge in the election of 1924, and Coolidge had won that election in a landslide. By improving upon Coolidge's vote, and winning the three key states of Ohio, Florida, and Iowa, Hoover was bound to win. And so, for the next hundred years afterwards, the pattern was set. The principle became that a presidential candidate who is an office holder running for re-election has won the election every time upon winning Ohio, Florida, and Iowa and at the same time improving upon the incumbent party's popular vote. This is true of Roosevelt in 1936; Eisenhower in 1956; Johnson in 1964; Nixon in 1972; Reagan in 1984; Clinton in 1996; and Bush 45 in 2004. As we can see, the electorate behaves in a consistent and predictable manner. 

 

This is why 2020 broke the mold. Trump improved upon the popular vote of the 2016 election, and he improved upon it by 12 million; the charge that in 2020 Trump had lost his base in 2020 does not stick; in 2020 Trump won all the votes that he had won in 2016, and he went on to win an additional 12 million. As well as that, Trump won Florida, Ohio, and Iowa handily (and in the polls for 2024, in Ohio he enjoys a double-digit lead). But in 2020, none of that sufficed to stop the electoral dynamo that was Joseph Robinette Biden. He won Hilary's 65 million votes and an additional 16 million. One of the great puzzles is where that 16 million came from: between them, Trump and Biden won more votes than there were registered voters.

 

The most important question of 2024 is whether the 16 million voters, if they ever existed, will be returning. I tentatively answer no: that in 2024 we will be seeing a dramatic shortfall in the number of votes for Biden. To repeat, we can hazard a guess that the Democratic Party and its anti-Trump base have by now become deeply demoralised. The evidence for that is all around us. According to the polls, Biden's approval rating has reached a record low, and in those polls, a majority of those asked if Biden deserves re-election answer in the negative. In most national polls, Trump is equal or ahead of Biden by a few percentage points. We can predict that if the momentum away from Biden and towards Trump keeps up, the Democratic Party base vote will collapse, which is to say that the 65 million who voted for Hilary in 2016 and Biden in 2020 will not be returning.

 

Students of American political history know that what counts more than the popular vote is the electoral college. In polls of the more decisive battleground states, Trump is pulling ahead. Supposing that Trump wins Arizona and Georgia and picks up Nevada (which has not gone to a Republican presidential candidate in 20 years), then the electoral college count approaches a near draw: the Republicans win 268 and Democrat 270, and that is even if Biden 'wins' Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. In such a scenario Biden only needs to lose one traditionally Democratic state, one that could be either be on the eastern seaboard, or in the south towards the border with Mexico, or in the Mid-West, and then - the election will be handed to Trump. It is within the bounds of possibility that angry residents of Chicago, Illinois, or Denver, Colorado, or Baltimore, Maryland, could turn on the Democrats. And so, the election stands on a knife-edge.

 

IV.

 

As well as the polls, two markets are predicting a Trump victory - the betting market and the stock market.

 

Interestingly, the odds of Trump being the next president reached a high in May 2022 and then crashed around the time of the November 2022 House of Representatives election; Trump's odds stood at their lowest in this period and DeSantis' at their highest.

 

The rise and fall of Biden's odds follow a different trajectory; they did increase in 2023 but never exceeded 39%. In contrast, as of the time writing, Trump's odds have never reached a higher level.

 

Some financial commentators assert that the recent rally in the stock market should be attributed to the likely prospect of Trump's return to office; it is pricing in that possibility, or to use financier's jargon, it is 'discounting', that is, it is carrying over the future into the present. And what lies in that future? The market sees all the familiar supply-side-isms, mainly tax cuts and deregulation. And it anticipates an increase in the production and export of oil, natural gas, and coal, and a decrease in the use of wind farms, solar panels, and electric cars; in short, it expects President Trump to repudiate environmentalism wholesale.

 

To understand the extent of the stock market's rallying, we need to use gold. In the supply-side doctrine, the value of anything can be expressed as a fraction or multiple of an ounce of gold, and to be included in that anything is the American stock market index. We have recourse then to the gold Dow, which is the DJIA index divided by an ounce of gold. If we look at a chart of the gold Dow, we see that the highest it reached in the past five years was 20 ounces, which is high, but nowhere as high as it was in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

 

 

We cannot explain every twitch and tremor in the stock market, but we can account for some of the big falls and rises. Without a doubt the big fall from 19 to 13 ounces in early 2020 can be laid at the door of the Covidians: the lockdowns, forced shutdowns of business, and forced layoffs, devastated the market. The gold Dow had recovered by early 2022, but then fell after the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian War in February 2022. By October 2022, the market had recovered from this mini recession, so why did it fall again? One can blame successive interest rates increases; these hurt the bond market and the commercial real estate market, and while the rate increases were small by the standards of the 1970s and 1980s, they were large by those of the 2020s.

 

 

And the reason for the fall of October 2023 is obvious: Hamas' raid, Israel's retaliatory offensive, and fears of a spread of a regional conflagration. After that came the Trump re-election rally, and it is no coincidence that at this point - October 2023 - that the betting markets graph shows Trump's odds overtaking Biden's.

 

The supply-sider Stephen Moore expresses scepticism towards the notion that the stock market is rallying because of Trump's improved performance in the polls and the betting markets:

 

Trump has made the case that the rise in the stock market in recent months is a result of the higher likelihood that he will be elected in November. I don't put too much stock in that claim. If the stock market tanks, is he responsible for that, too?

 

However, an analysis by ace investor Scott Bessent and a member of the Committee to Unleash Prosperity economic council finds that fluctuations in the stock market over the past year HAVE correlated positively with the betting market odds that Trump will win. Right now, he stands at just above 50%.

 

This relationship could be spurious, and of course, by far the biggest factor that drives stock valuations is profits.

 

Having said that, he does concede that Biden's economic agenda is poison:

 

One last piece of investment advice: Investors should pay attention to the Democratic agenda if they win in November. The Biden economic plan calls for doubling the capital gains tax, taxing unrealized capital gains and raising both the corporate tax rate and the dividend tax.

 

That is very bad news for sure for stocks. And THAT, you can take to the bank.

 

Now, this lends weight to Wanniski's rational market hypothesis. If the market is always right, and if it believed that Biden was going to 'win' in November, then it would be crashing right now, because there is nothing it dislikes more than what Biden is proposing.

 

IV.

 

One of the main reasons why the electorate seems to have turned on Biden is inflation, that is, Bidenflation.

 

 

This has been exported worldwide, and there is not a country that is not suffering from the highest inflation since the 1980s. Trump has vowed to reduce inflation, but the irony is that he and the Covidians he surrounded himself with in 2020 bear the main responsibility for it.

 

When taking the extraordinary decade of the 2020s into consideration, for the first time in recent history we see a global inflation that has not been brought about by bad money, i.e. by depreciating currencies. It is true that the dollar has depreciated against gold by over 55% in the past five years: in 2019, it took only $US1300 to buy an ounce of gold, and now it takes over $USD2000.

 

 

But the depreciation of the dollar, while harmful, occurred gradually over the course of five years and not all at once, unlike the sudden and shocking depreciation of the 1970s. No, the cause of the inflation of the 2020s can be traced back to what economists euphemistically call breakdowns in the supply-chain, which are what happens when millions across the globe are forced to stop supplying and exchanging their goods and labour because work has become somehow 'unsafe'. One cannot think of another time in history when global economic activity, and a good chunk of it at that, came to a halt because of government efforts to combat a virus.

 

Once a supply-chain has been broken in several places, it cannot be fixed easily. But we can return to normalcy by returning to what we had before 2020. And what was that? An absence of Covidian mandates, that is, regulations that prevent people from trading their production with one another; an increase in supply by cutting taxes on production; and little to no restrictions on the production and consumption of coal, oil, and natural gas.

 

We must fear a further depreciation of the dollar, which along with other currencies has a lost a great deal of value over the past few decades - it is hard to believe that 25 years ago gold only cost $USD250 an ounce and oil only $USD10 a barrel - but I think that in the current year central banks have realised the error of their ways and are not willing to devalue their currencies further.

 

Having said that, at the time of writing, gold has climbed past $USD2100 an ounce, which goes to show that one can never tell with the Federal Reserve, which, when every time in the past twenty years it has met with an economic quandary, has devalued.

 

V.

 

Instinctively, Trump wants to move America to the opposite place of where it is under Biden. The market recognises that and is responding accordingly. It does dislike Trump's tariff-hike threats, but it puts these to one side; any imposing by Trump of trade barriers, particularly barriers against China, will hurt no more in the 2020s than it did in the 2010s.

 

In one of the strange echoes of history, 2024 is revisiting 1980. Despite being aged 69, the always-smiling Reagan of the 1980 campaign conveyed youth, vigour, optimism, belief in America's future, and an irrepressible forward rhythm. And as the market discounted a Reagan victory, some economic indicators improved even before Reagan was sworn in: in the middle of 1980, before the election was held, the dollar firmed, and the price of gold collapsed: it fell from $USD850 an ounce, which is the highest it had ever been in history up to that point, to $USD300. The market anticipated that Reagan would win, and the prospect of a Reagan boom led to an increase in demand for dollars. The demand outstripped the supply, and so the value of the dollar increased. That is, the increase in the value of the dollar meant that one needed to spend fewer dollars to buy the same amount of gold. This foretold that inflation, which had plagued America and the world throughout the seventies, would soon wane. Relief was at hand, even though Carter still was in office. The phenomenon reminds us of the rally we have seen in the DJIA since October 2023.

 

The market looks to the future, but its knowledge of what will happen in that future is limited to the information it possesses at the time. In the sweet summer of 1980, it foresaw the Reagan victory, but it did not foresee the Reagan recession that would follow, a recession that was the worst since the end of WWII. Nowadays we look at the eighties through rose-coloured glasses, and we fail to understand how difficult it was for so many - particularly in the first two years under Reagan - and how we are better off now than then.

 

VI.

 

This brings up to the subject of national morale. In Biden's America, there are three nefarious forces working to lower it, and the first of these is Biden himself, a man of a gloomy mien, a man whose body and mind are deteriorating, a man who naturally enough has no reason to look forward to the future. During one of his typically rambling speeches at the campaign stops in the 2020 Democratic primaries, one of those in attendance was struck by the incoherence of Biden's talk but also by its extreme pessimism; Biden was preoccupied by the themes of decline, cancer, death. The second force, and one that a man of Biden's temperament was instantly attracted to, was Covidianism. During its zenith, Covidianism locked down millions with the intent of driving as many mad as possible, and if any one of the lockdown's victims were to take his own life - and a large number did - then the Covidians counted that as a win. Such nihilism and misanthropy met its match in that of the third force, the environmentalists. They want to drastically limit the number of air-breathers, preferably white-skinned ones; the environmentalists are uninterested in the carbon emissions of the denizens of Africa, China, India, and the Middle East. An ideology that is as destructive as the ideology of Covidianism, environmentalism in the 21st century is proving to be as dangerous as Freemasonry in the 20th.

 

The three forces have combined to make America a sad place to be. I know nothing more demoralising than the sight of three obese - and probably diabetic - African Americans Alvyn Bragg, Fani Willis, and Letitia James persecuting Trump and members of his administration. And all this while Democratic mayors, governors, district attorneys, and judges have turned not soft on crime but pro-crime. This is perverse. The present regime goes against nature, and such deviating cannot be sustained at least not for long, which is why Covidianism, the ultimate anti-natural ideology, burned itself out after a run of two and a half years.

 

 

VII.

 

Can we frame the conflict between Trump and Biden, Republicans and Democrats, as a conflict between capitalism and socialism? At first sight, that would make sense. Trump has worked most of his life in business, and big business at that, whereas Biden, Schumer, Pelosi, Harris, Feinstein, et al., have never worked a day in their lives in a real job. And since at least the 2010s, the Democratic Party has been in the grip of the radical Left, the six factions of which from 2020 onwards were: 1) Black Lives Matter; 2) 'woke' capital; 3) proponents of Critical Race Theory and other forms of academic neo-Marxism; 4) anarchists and antifa; 5) old-school communists; and 6) Social Justice Warriors (SJWs).

 

Covidians, who infiltrated both the Trump and Biden administrations, are the odd man out. Covidian practices were inspired by those of the Chinese, particularly in Shanghai, and these in turn were rooted in Chinese techniques that sought to engender what Mao called 'thought reform' and 'the washing of the brain'; if you want to read more on this unsavoury subject, click here. But despite the Maoist antecedents, the Covidians did not follow a particular ideology of either the Left or Right; they portrayed themselves as being pure technocrats who had abstracted themselves away from any ideological commitment, scientists who had moved beyond politics.

 

Nonetheless, if we are to delve further, we can find certain themes underlying the thought of the Democrats, the Covidians, and the Left, for when writing about Marx, Wanniski observes penetratingly that Marxism can only be valid when an economy is contracting, not expanding; it only holds true for states of economic crisis, of recession, depression. The classic problem faced by all communists after they had seized power was how to get the wheels of production turning again. They were unable to find an answer in the economics of Marx, because Marx wrote only on things going wrong, not right. It was not that the communist regimes were opposed to growth and expansion, only that they did not know how to bring these about. By the end of the seventies - when Wanniski published his book - Wanniski declared that Marxism, along with the two other prominent schools of economic thought Keynesianism and monetarism, had failed, but he warned that if the capitalists of the West proceeded on their present course, they would meet the same fate as the capitalists of the East, in particular the capitalists of the former Republic of South Vietnam.

 

In the conflict between capitalism and socialism, Wanniski found a division between the desire for risk, adventure, and entrepreneurialism on one hand, and the desire for safety, comfort, and caution on the other; we know on which side of the ledger the Covidians, for whom 'safety' was absolute and paramount, stood. Cults, too, prize security and safety before all else and forbid their followers from venturing into the outside world, and the man who escapes a cult often has difficulties adjusting to real life.

 

The exploring of these themes - 'Life', 'Death' capitalised - brings us close to the doctrine of vitalism. Half in jest, Nietzsche wrote that the sight of the ugly, the aged, and the infirm, lowers our vital energies; it saps our will to live. Nearly 140 years after Nietzsche made his famous remarks, we can see in them a grain of truth. In 2024, the sight of the Soviet-style gerontocracy in America depresses and enervates. And in addition, it encourages intergenerational resentment; the boomers will not stand down, they are hogging the trough. Biden epitomises this aspect of boomerdom. Part of the hostility expressed towards Biden by Democrats in a state such as Michigan can be traced back to Biden's favouring Israel in the current Israeli-Palestinian war, true, but also to the age gap between Biden and the anti-Israel protestors.

 

It is easy enough to find an instance of the prominence of the aged and infirm in American life; what of the ugly? The answer is it is all around us. Wind farms, transsexualism, fat acceptance, LGBTism in its more grotesque forms, AI art (especially the AI art of Google Gemini) - all of it is ugly. One of the worst things one can say about the Great Replacement is that it has made life in the West increasingly ugly; one must agree with this under the pressure of the facts, unless one in the spirit of an unyielding contrarianism argues that Palestinian diaspora protestors, the dysgenic trash that is Jose Antonio Ibarra, and the encampments of illegals in New York, Boston, and Chicago, are aesthetically pleasing, beautiful even. And perhaps our leftist does really treasure them, for one thing that we have learned after 2020 is that the American ruling class really does despise white Americans, that is, Americans, and really wants them gone, dead, replaced. And as goes America, so goes the rest of the Anglosphere; one can find the same sort of ugliness in Australia as well as America. And it spreads across an entire nation: the wind farm disfigures the country; the Great Replacement disfigures the city.

 

VIII.

 

American boomers are an enfeebling but also a conserving force. Trump for the life of him cannot understand how things have gotten to where they are now, and he wants to turn the clock back, to the good old days, to the way things used to be. Trump is old enough to remember the past, the America of Operation Wetback, the America before Hart Celler. Most importantly, he does not hate Americans, and he does not want to destroy. Critics of Trump will object to this assertion of mine and they will point to Trump's conduct in 2020; but, if we view the world events of 2020 and with objectivity, we shall that not a single major head of state in the entire world (and these states included Russia and Ukraine) refused the blandishments of the Covidians; all of them locked down their people, made them wear masks, and mandated the clot shots. Politicians who bucked the Covidian consensus, like certain heads of state in Africa, wound up mysteriously dead.

 

It is possible that these forces of darkness will 'win' once again. The subject of the 2024 election rarely comes up for discussion in the writings of the Americans of the dissident Right. The sole exception is VDare, which, four years after the fact, is countenancing the possibility that Biden may have not won 2020. In 2024, VDare is cultivating an atmosphere of pessimism and gloom: polls, betting markets, and stock markets be damned, 2024 is just like 2020, and the Democrats will use cheating to flip the states of Arizona, Georgia, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Michigan to Biden once again. America is due for another four years of Biden, and Biden's second term will be worse than his first, if that is possible.

 

If VDare is correct, Americans are faced with an insoluble paradox. To secure free and fair elections, America must ban postal voting, same-day registration, voting machines; it must enforce voter ID; and it must make a practice of the speedy counting of ballots and not allow counting to drag on for weeks and months on end. Such legislation would bring America's electoral system into line with that of other countries in the Anglosphere. But here is the rub: to enact these reforms, the Republican Party needs to win elections, and the Democratic Party will not allow it to.

 

Prudence advises caution, and perhaps we should be pessimistic about 2024. Perhaps Trump will win in a landslide, but the Biden junta will falsify election results once again; perhaps, even if Trump does get into office, he will not be able to make a difference. Either way, America's long national nightmare will continue. That is the default American dissident Right and white nationalist view. Who is to say that they are not correct? But we need hope, and living without hope is no way to live.

 

A Farewell to Normiedom? On the 1990s, the End of History, American White Nationalism and German Neo-Nazism

 I. 

Before Christmas, I commiserated with some of my friends in the movement and swapped stories about life under the lockdowns and mandates. I raised eyebrows when I declared that the past two years were perhaps the worst in Australian history. My argument was that one could point to, say, the Great Depression as being on the face of it a worse time, but even the Great Depression did not deprive one of freedom - the freedom to enjoy small pleasures and be a normal human being. Back then, if one could afford it, one could smoke and drink in a bar without a capacity limit, for instance - a bar in which one did not have to 'check in' with a QR code, present a 'digital passport' to the publican, or wear a surgical mask... When I put it this way, my friends agreed.

Given that we on the Far Right are living in a time of great crisis, we should be expected to scent an opportunity in it; surely we should be excited over our prospects? One cause for optimism is that many of those attending the Freedom marches are 'normies' who had been 'red-pilled' by recent events. But the evidence suggests to me that the answer to the above question is no: for at present the Far Right seems demoralised and despondent. 

And as to why, I think the answer lies in the fact that politics often disappoints - Far Right politics especially - but up until now the Far Right activist could always escape any discouragement and disappointment and seek passage from the 'red-pilled' world to the 'blue-pilled', from the world of radical Right politics to the world of 'normiedom'. But after 2020 that avenue has been closed off; the gateway to 'normiedom' has been shut, perhaps permanently. And perhaps, once the Covidians are through with them, the 'normies' will have been done way with altogether. 

II.

Usually around this time of year, I re-read Yockey's Imperium (1948), and I re-read this work, a profoundly spiritual one, so as to renew my faith. But this year I feel a reluctance to read it: I feel that it belongs to a past age - the age of dramatic politics - and that the difference between the past age and the present has become too large to ignore.

Imperium was written in 1947, and the 1940s, perhaps Europe's most tragic decade in a millenia, saw a great deal of drama. Some politicians (such as Stalin) seem to thrive in such a dramatic environment: they have an endless appetite for crises, confrontations, wars; for their politics is the politics of what Carl Schmitt calls the exception. 

After Stalin's death, the leadership of the Soviet Union and the communist world was handed to Khrushchev, a much duller man than Stalin - certainly a less confrontational one - and by the middle of the 1950s the countries of the Eastern and Western bloc had settled down to the task of peaceful economic development. They sought to rebuild their countries, many of which had been laid waste to by deprivation and war. But Mao rejected any politics of compromise and conciliation and he stood as an odd man out: privately the other communist heads of state were appalled by his extremism and immoderation. For in that period, non-dramatic politics held sway and Western leaders followed the same path as Khrushchev. The result of it was that, when one looks back on history the East and West in the 1950s, one spies at once on its surface a patina of dullness - even if one takes all the Cold War hysteria, nuclear-saber rattling, wars in the former Western colonies, etc., into account. Daniel Bell drew a similar conclusion in his The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties (1960): the sharp opposition between Left and Right had been muted; the politics of confrontation had been replaced by the politics of technocracy. 

It took time, but even Yockey came to acknowledge the truth of Bell's thesis. He had spent most of the decade building a post-war fascist international with links to the non-aligned regimes of the Third World - an international like that depicted in Frederick Forsyth's  far-fetched novel The Odessa File (1972). WWII veterans filled the ranks of these European organisations which perhaps in truth were nothing more than old soldiers' clubs. The members belonged to another time and one can intuit a recognition of this fact - at least at the subconscious level - in Yockey's writings as the decade drew to a close. His last essay, 'The World in Flames: An Estimate of the World Situation' (1960), does not exhibit as nearly as much a sense of self-assurance and grandeur as Imperium; Yockey here hovers at the edge of great world events; he is an onlooker, not a participant. In its undertone of ironic detachment I find an anticipation of postmodernism. And indeed, a connection exists between the sleepy 1950s and the postmodern 1990s - both of them decidedly dull decades from a political standpoint - and this explains in part why it was that the postmodernists alternatively paid homage and made fun of the 1950s.  

Yockey felt out of place in the 1950s and hated it. Nowadays we in the movement view the 1950s in a different light. Many white nationalists, race realists, immigration skeptics, et al., do not understand Yockey's objection to the America of the 1950s, for example: they see the America of that time as a white man's paradise and that decade as a golden age. To the white nationalist, statistics bear both these contentions out. William Pierce often remarked in his radio talks that America in 1950 was 90% white - something to be proud of. The Americans in this time kept both immigrants and negroes under wraps, and while it is true that desegregation began in earnest in the 1950s, many of the great cities in the north of America were majority white and remained so for the next two decades. 

Another reason for the divergence between the views of Yockey and the white nationalists is that the white nationalists show a pronounced tendency to laud the past at the expense of the present. In a review of the film House of Gucci (2021), Trevor Lynch writes that the film is a 'Meticulous, nostalgia-infused reconstruction of another era, this time the late 1970s to the mid-1990s, a time that seems impossibly glamorous, wholesome, and white compared with the present'. It is at this point that Pierce would take exception to Lynch; Pierce depicts America in the era of the 'Late 1970s to the mid-1990s' as a dystopian hellscape (he published the Turner Diaries, the ultimate dystopian novel, in 1978) but was forever waxing lyrical over the greatness and whiteness of America in the 1950s: a decade can be one white nationalist's hell and another's heaven. 

I agree with Lynch and disagree with Pierce. In part, this is because at the time of writing I would prefer to live in any decade except for the 2020s - I would even be prepared to travel back in time and live in the 1940s: one, I imagine, could live a good life then, provided one was able to dodge all the bombs and bullets. But the main source of my disagreement with Pierce is because I have for the past few months been watching episodes of a famous American daytime TV soap from the time of the late 1990s, and this delving into the recent past - even if it is a mythical and fantastical past - has prompted me to ask myself what possibly could have been wrong with the 1990s. An objective view of the decade would reveal in that decade we had it all. 

III. 

Unlike the 2020s, the 1990s were characterised by an absence of politics. Electoral politics was relegated to the background: the three presidential elections in that time (1993, 1996, 2000 (the 1990s as a decade came to an end, in my judgment, on September 11, 2001)) were dull affairs, and more or less, you could take or leave mainstream politics - it did not interfere with your life in any appreciable manner. 

This state of affairs came about because of the collapse of the Left in the years 1989 to 1991. For hundreds of years, the Right had functioned as a response, a reaction, to the Left; but with the disappearance of the Left came the disappearance of the Right. And that in turn led to the cessation of the political. 

After the end of the Soviet Union thirty years ago, the Left was decimated. The old school communist parties (including the Australian) were wound up for the most part. As for the other sectors of the Left - the anarchists and antifa - they lived at the fringes of society: there was no mainstream acceptance or even awareness of them. And as for Black Lives Matter, social justice warriors (SJWs), 'woke' capital - they did not exist. So: thirty years ago we lived in a world which was blessedly free (mostly) of leftism. 

But a serpent did dwell in this garden of Eden: academic neo-Marxism (known by many as 'cultural Marxism'). Critical Race Theory (CRT), Postcolonial Theory, Black Studies, Queer Studies, Gender Studies began to rear their  heads. Generally, though, this new tendency - labeled 'political correctness' by hostile conservative commentators - was confined to academia. And on occasion it was mocked and not feted (as it is now) by the media. 

By and large, the Left had been forgotten and what really stung the Left was the speed with which it had been forgotten. Only a few months after the dissolution of the USSR, race war was to take precedence over class war.  Ethnic wars broke out in the former Soviet republics and Yugoslavia - wars which claimed hundreds of thousands of lives - and intellectuals such as Bell pronounced these to be portents of the wars to come: wars henceforth were to be motivated not by ideology but ethnicity. This seemed to be an accurate assessment given that the move away from Marxism was permanent and irrevocable. Botched privatisations, IMF 'shock treatment', etc., may have plunged the economies of Eastern Europe and the former USSR into chaos, but there was never any question of a return to communism. 

It is this rather peculiar set of circumstances which explains much of the apoliticism of the period. On a personal note, at the time I took politics - mainstream politics - seriously. I read a number of books written by authors of the mainstream Left and Right (so as to be 'even-handed' and 'objective') and following the lead of my baby boomer parents, I read the newspapers, listened to the radio news and watched the TV news every day so as to keep up with current events. But at the same time, I had no fixed political convictions. I clung to a rather confused and incoherent collection of Left and Right ideas. Had I been pressed, I would have admitted that I was more interested in hobbies and popular culture than politics. In this, I was a typical 'normie'. I have since discovered how typical I was from reading Carl Boggs' classic work The End of Politics: Corporate Power and the Decline of the Public Sphere (2000): 

Why do so many Americans feel that politics has become irrelevant to their daily lives? Why is there so little public discussion of important social issues, despite unprecedented access to mass media and new communication technologies? This book delves beneath the sound bites and news headlines to explore the ongoing process of depoliticization in the United States. Attuned to the many contemporary trends eroding the public sphere, Carl Boggs illuminates the American retreat to an eerily privatized landscape of shopping malls, gated communities, new-age fads, rural militias, isolated computer terminals, and postmodern intellectual discourse. Yet Boggs maintains hope that current trends can be reversed, issuing an eloquent call for revitalizing politics, culture, and civic society. The paperback concludes with a new postscript on the movement against corporate globalization and the tumultuous presidential election of 2000.

IV.

In the nineties, the Far Right prospered and the Far Left did not, and in response to the burgeoning popularity of the Far Right, Boggs wrote a chapter on the proliferating Far Right movements of the decade. He regarded these as 'apolitical' - apolitical in the sense of being detached from civic society (and by that definition he was correct). 

What was my view of these 'apolitical' Far Right movements? For most of the nineties I was blissfully unaware of William Pierce's National Alliance, Richard Butler's Aryan Nations, Jared Taylor's American Renaissance, Tom Metzger's WAR. I was not exposed to their ideas; I was perfectly 'blue-pilled'. Perhaps for that reason I could enjoy with a clean conscience American TV shows such as Seinfeld, The X-Files, The Simpsons, Melrose Place (and lesser-known action TV shows such as Renegade, Pointman, M.A.N.T.I.S. and Fortune Hunter) like the rest of the sheep. 

I can imagine a white nationalist objecting to my consumption of this fare. The white nationalists would ask me in an accusatory tone: was I not aware that these TV shows were decadent garbage - and Jewish? Did I not know that David Duchovny, the star of the X-Files, was a Jew, that Mark Frankel, the star of Fortune Hunter, was a Jew? That the cast of Seinfeld were all Jews? (This is the standard white nationalist debating tactic; to pronounce something to be Jewish is to refute it, whether it is Jewish or no). 

Had I encountered these scolding white nationalists in the time of my innocence, I would have recognised them at once for what they were: killjoys. Pierce made America in the 1990s out to be unlivable when it was not. Pierce could always be counted on to bring the dark side of American life to your attention; he would always be regaling you with gruesome accounts of black on white atrocities such as the Wichita Massacre and the Knoxville Horror. But no rational American could be expected to live their lives in constant fear of being robbed, raped or murdered. But that was the outcome that Pierce and Taylor (author of The Color of Crime (1999)) apparently wanted. 

This is not to say that Pierce and Taylor did not provide value: of course they did. The question concerns what economists call opportunity costs: what would have benefited the average 'normie' c. 1995 - 'blue-pilling' or 'red-pilling'? The benefit of one cancels out of the other: this is the opportunity cost. 

The price paid for 'red-pilling' is that the 1990s-era state of mind - which was one of contentment and complacency - would have been spoiled for good. Pierce, a proponent of dramatic politics to be sure, opposed this 1990s mood, and surprisingly enough, he would have half-agreed with Fukuyama, who argued in an essay (and then a book) that while it is true that the the summit of human achievement had been reached by the 1990s, the peak had been attained only at the expense of foregoing of all heroism, risk and adventure. 'The struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one's life for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination, and idealism, will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands'. [Francis Fukuyama, 'The End of History?', The National Interest, Summer 1989]. To this, Fukuyama expressed reservations and Pierce, full-blown opposition. For what mattered to Pierce more than anything else was the 'Fame of a dead man's deeds' - the remembrance through the ages of a life heroically lived. 

V.

Fukuyama built his argument on Hegel - and Marx, a fact which outraged the Left. History, Fukuyama says, results from Man's 'thinking things through': Man only explores the full implications of an idea - such as Bolshevism - by living through an idea. After 75 years of living the Bolshevist idea, Man had come to the conclusion that the idea did not work: hence the end of socialism in Eastern Europe, China and the Soviet Union. In this Hegelian discourse, the operative word is 'end': Fukuyama takes up the Hegelian thesis that history is a story with a beginning, middle and end, and as such it cannot be properly understood until the end is reached. Hegel writes, 'The owl of Minerva [the goddess of wisdom] spreads its wings only with the coming of dusk'. 

One should not overestimate the influence of intellectuals: they do not determine all that goes on in the culture of a particular period of time (e.g., the 1990s). All the same, credit must go to where credit is due to Fukuyama and the French postmodernist thinkers. In the decade of the 1990s they alone succeeded in capturing the essence of the age. It should be not forgotten that thinkers such as Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard, and Baudrillard - all outcasts from the French Left - opposed Marxism for most of their careers and so naturally enough their ideas suited the post-Marxist era. 

Thirty years later, one intriguing possibility is that the ideas of Hegel and Fukuyama could serve as a means of illuminating one way out of our predicament. Covidianism has been forced upon humanity, much like Bolshevism, and is the product of a plan years in the making, much like Bolshevism; so Covidianism could be overturned, once Man has 'thought it through', that is, lived through the implications right to the end, much like Bolshevism. 

VI. 

The coming year will see a battle - perhaps the final battle - between what I call Covidian Man and what Fukuyama calls (after Nietzsche) the Last Man. I believe that the Last Man would win any such battle as he is in accord with nature whereas Covidian Man is not - Covidian Man is decidedly unnatural. 

Like any Far Right political activist, I have often come to lose my patience with the Last Man, the 'normie': his slothfulness and contentedness at times have made me despair of him so much so that I at have often considered dropping out of politics altogether. In one such dark period I was rescued from the slough of despond by re-reading Spengler and Yockey. I came to the realisation that the 'normie' had existed in every Culture prior to the Western. The 'normie' was with us in the days of ancient Babylon, Egypt, China, India; he is with us today; and he will be with us in the future. After our Western Culture perishes - like all the Cultures that preceded it - he will preponderate. The ruin of Western Culture will be inhabited by Nietzsche's Last Man, Spengler's Fellahin.

(It is this prediction of Spengler's that warranted, in the eyes of many, charges of pessimism). 

At the beginning of this essay, I intimated that that the Far Right activist occupies two worlds - the world of the 'red-pilled' and the world of the 'normie'. The cause of the activist's recent despondency is that our activist much likes the world of the 'normie' and he is sorry to see it go - he mourns its demise at the hands of Covidianism. On a personal note, my friends and I have many fond recollections of many happy hours spent in the bars and restaurants in the bohemian and 'normie' quarter of the city I live in; we spent those hours discussing politics and ideas while enjoying food and wine in a carefree and convivial atmosphere - like normal humans. All of these pleasures have been taken away by the Covidians. Are they gone for good? The Covidians say yes. According to them, the masks, hand dispensers, capacity limits, digital passports, QR codes, social distancing, working remotely, coerced injections, contact tracing, nasal swab tests, lockdowns, prison camps, etc., will stay in place forever and ever; certainly we cannot foresee any abeyance in the new year. No wonder then that so many in the movement have been driven to despair; the ground - the 'normie' ground - has disappeared beneath us. 

VII.

Something that is missing from today which was present yesterday is trust - trust in politicians, journalists, health officials, intellectuals, our peer group in other words. Only a few years ago we believed that the globalist elites - the Davos men - did not want to kill us or make us sick; we believed there was a lack of animus on their part towards us or at the least a lack of interest; and we believed that they were content to leave us alone. 

That trust can only exist if you believe that the universe is benevolent and means well by you. We find that optimism in evidence in many of the movies representative of the 1990s - one in particular being the  negro comedy Friday (1995). The movie is set in the suburb of South Central Los Angeles, but surprisingly enough, the suburb is not portrayed as a hellhole rife with gang shootings, etc.: the producers originally wanted a violent film but were persuaded by one of the stars, Ice Cube, to downplay any violence - a violent (and exciting) film, Ice Cube argued, would not have been true to life. In the completed movie, South Central LA comes across as a sunny, prosperous, happy place,and perhaps a little dull - certainly a place in which the Last Man lives. 

Spengler writes of the Cosmopolis - the World City - the city which appears with the onset of the old age of a Culture and which devours and incorporates all the suburbs, towns and countryside around it, making it all urban. The World City spawns copies of itself everywhere. This is why the suburb of South Central LA - in the 1990s, at least - resembles the outer suburbs of Sydney and Melbourne; and in much the same way, the fictional Mid-Western town portrayed in the daytime TV soap I mentioned earlier resembles any town in rural and regional Australia. The World City is omnipresent. 

One can criticise the Cosmopolis for its ubiquity, its homogeneity and its universality, but one must concede that in it, one could lead a life of freedom, one could enjoy the fruits of a consumer society and one could enjoy these - following the collapse of Marxism - without guilt. How life has changed today! By 2022, the World City had been turned into a giant prison. 

Perhaps - and this is a pessimistic line of thought - the free life of the World City contained the seeds of its own destruction. The cults and secret societies run by egalitarians, republicans, technocrats, intellectuals, free-thinkers, et al., only appear towards the end of a Culture's life and not its beginning. Furthermore, they only appear in the cities. Perhaps, then, it is the World City which bears the burden of guilt for giving us Klaus Schwab, Anthony Fauci, Bill Gates, George Soros... 

VIII.

Even so, who is it that shoulders the ultimate responsibility for the granting of the Schwabs and Faucis power - absolute power - over us? The answer is the 'normie'. 

Covidianism has met with a great deal of resistance - it has not had things all its own way - and a common theme in the polemics against it is the stupidity of the sheep who allowed, step to step, the Covidians to take over their lives. All activists against Covidianism have run up against the obstacles of 'normie' stupidity, gullibility and the rest; the 'normie' seems impervious to facts. When the 'normie' is told that the mask he wears everywhere looks stupid, and worse, is useless in protecting him against Covid, he shrugs - all that matters is that his peer group endorses it and makes it compulsory; likewise, when he is presented with proof that the injections will kill or incapacitate a fifth or third or half of their recipients, this means nothing to him, he will not be deterred at all from lining up for his seventh or eighth booster shot. But of course he will be the first to complain that he was not sufficiently warned should it finally be acknowledged, by the political and health establishments, that the injections are almost guaranteed to cause a compromised immune system, strokes, heart attacks and even death. 

In short, his conditioning has proven to be extremely strong and effective. Supposing that the Covidians were overthrown tomorrow, at least 50% of the population would continue to wear their masks. This really should not surprise us, seeing that that the former members of a cult have a difficult time shrugging off the cult's beliefs and practices. Exiting a cult physically is one thing, exiting it mentally is another; the latter can take years. 

The above does seem to go against my earlier contention that the 'normie', seeing that Covidianism is unnatural and destructive, rise up against it. But the contradiction can be resolved if we accept that yes, the 'normie' will revolt, but only after a period of time. And how long would that period be? It took Eastern and Central Europe forty years to do away with communism (another unnatural doctrine); earlier revolts, such as those in Berlin in 1953 and Hungary in 1956, were brutally crushed. But we should not speculate: we can scarcely tell if the anti-Covidian revolution will take four years or forty.  

Two lessons emerge from the two revolts in Hungary in the last century, that is, the revolt of 1956 and the revolt of 1989. The first lesson is that the Left does not change; the second lesson, that the Right does. As an example of the former, consider the fact that the revolts against communism in 1956 and Covidianism in 2021 were regarded by the Left to be at both times the work of a neofascist conspiracy. This shows that the Left has hardly changed its tune in the past 65 years. In contrast, the Right has changed its tune. A prime example is Viktor Orbán: this is a man who in his youth fought for freedom as an anti-communist activist; this a man who became one of the heroes of the 1989 revolution; but this is also a man who has now joined the ranks of the Covidians; this is a man who no longer fights against totalitarianism but throws in his lot with it. The Orban case shows that Covidianism corrupts and corrupts absolutely. One could hypothesise that other anti-communists activists from the eighties, activists who at the time were the darlings of the conservative Right, men such as Václav Havel and Lech Walesa - would have been corrupted by Covidianism as well. 

In his anti-communist days, Orban would have believed, along with Fukuyama and Fukuyama's mentor Kojève, in Hegel's 'cunning of reason'. This is the idea that Man possesses enough logical capability to arrive at the correct conclusion after 'thinking things through'. Following Hegel, anti-communist liberals such as Orbán and Havel in the 1980s took an optimistic view of human nature: they believed that Man was smart enough to see through Marxism and so would be smart enough to reject it. 

But to paraphrase Keynes, in the long run we are all dead, and the Covidians could, up until the time that they meet the same fate as the Eastern European communists in 1989, cause tremendous damage - and they have done so already. 

Besides which, some of us in the movement do not believe in the 'cunning of reason'. The dark thought has crossed our minds that perhaps the 'normie' cannot be relied upon to make decisions in his own best interest. As proof, we only need look at the history of the past two years. 

IX.

I have written here on the travails of the Far Left in the 1990s, and now I will touch upon those of the Far Right. 

Ironically, by the 1990s, German nationalism had become a victim of its own success. As a thought experiment, let us suppose that we were to take an old-school German National Socialist - one who had lived through the war - from 1955 and transport him in time to 1995. We would see at once that the man was an anachronism; the events of 1989 to 1991 had put him out of business. Deeply disturbed, he would be asking himself a number of discomforting questions. With the reunification of Germany and the destruction of communism, what use was there for National Socialism? Why should he continue to be a National Socialist? Why would his fellow Germans want to become National Socialist again? 

Perhaps our time-traveller would knuckle under and resign himself to life as a German 'normie'. He would learn to amuse himself by watching American trash television, dancing at the Berlin Love Parade and shopping at the Bonn malls. The last activity should occupy an important place in his new political world-view, for in Fukuyama's interpretation of Hegel's concept of freedom, freedom means freedom to shop. Acceding to this thesis, in the months before the fall of the Berlin Wall, the communist government of East Germany relented: it allowed Berliners from the Eastern half of the city to cross into the Western in order to shop. 

Our hypothetical National Socialist would, under the compulsion of events, be forced to navigate his way back to 'normiedom'. But I can imagine that many of the old fascists of his generation, men who knew and respected Hitler and lived through National Socialism - men such as Otto Remer, Otto Skorzeny, Léon Degrelle, Hans-Ulrich Rudel - would have objected. I would have found it interesting to debate post-communist politics with these men while they were in full possession of their faculties. To that end, a time machine would be necessary to pluck them out of the past and from a past in which they were young and vigorous - and hungry for political power.  

Debate matters here. In this modern age, we no longer believe in the divine right of kings and we expect politicians - even the most firmly entrenched ones - to argue the case for their legitimacy. Why should such and such a politician rule over us? The politician has to give reasons why and he must win over any sceptics and doubters. Even a politician who seizes through power through force of arms must devote  an inordinate amount of time and energy to persuasion and speech-making. See Castro, for instance, who like every successful communist revolutionary, won power not through the ballot box but a successful military campaign. Castro, a former lawyer, had to argue his case in the court of public opinion constantly. All politicians labour under similar constraints, even Neo-Nazi ones. So if we were to transport into the early nineties the young and vigorous Otto Remer of the early fifties, what arguments would he make for his being elected to office? Why should Germans vote for his Socialist Reich Party? My guess is that Remer's arguments would have fallen short; the sudden and abrupt changes in Germany and Eastern Europe would have revealed him to be a relic. 

This touches upon the question of the relation of the 'new' National Socialism to the 'old'. In a conversation fifteen years ago with a German nationalist who had met Remer, I argued that Remer's positions in the 1950s represented a departure from 'classic' National Socialism.  My friend dismissed the notion and referred to Remer condescendingly as an 'Old Nazi', and reflecting later and looking at photos of Socialist Reich Party rallies (which looked a lot like 'old' Nazi rallies) I came to the conclusion that my friend was right. 

Up to the 1970s, the German nationalist movement was filled with old Nazis who had new obsessions; these were Holocaust and WWII Revisionism. It is a knowledge and agreement with these that constitutes 'red-pilling': unless one is accordance with Remer's views on these, one is not 'red-pilled'. 

The great obstacle that the German nationalist - and we in the movement outside Germany - encounters when attempting to 'red-pill' the 'normie' is not hostility but indifference. He is not interested in the correct view of WWII or the Holocaust because he feels - rightly or wrongly - that the events of eighty years ago do not affect his life. And that is especially true today after two years of lockdowns. Why should he want to know the truth about the Holocaust when he has been unable to get a haircut for three months? 

The 'normie' often cannot see the wood for the trees. We can set ourselves the task of educating him, and in this educating him on the connections between the Covidians of today and the Masons of old; but it is more important that we exploit the openings that the Covidians have given us. They have made a rift in the social, economic and political structure. 

Like a good many observers, I find the behaviour of the globalist elites perplexing. Up until 2020, everything was going their way - the Great Replacement was proceeding along nicely, for example - and whatever they did met with the assent of the population. But in 2020, they undertook two actions that would endanger their position. The first of these was the ouster of an American president in a left-wing coup, the first in America's history; the second, the imposition of Covidianism across the entire world. In both instances, the elites broke with normality - and perhaps with the 'normie' as well. To judge by their actions of the last two years, it is as if the globalist elites, the neo-Masons, et al., have a political death wish: they want the 'normie' to turn against them - and terminate them with extreme prejudice. To that end they are doing everything possible... 

In 1969, Lord Russell of Liverpool published Return of the Swastika? The Rising Threat of Resurgent Nazism in Germany; Russell was one of the prosecutors at the Nuremberg war crimes 'trials', and twenty five years after the war, he finds that the Germans are not behaving to his satisfaction. Russell is filled with suspicion and rage; he excoriates the Germans - for their obduracy and also for their attitudes. He does not give one inch on the Holocaust story (and why should he, given the instrumental role he played in building it) and he rakes the Germans over the coals. What is interesting here is that both Russell and Covidians perceive their enemies in exactly the same way, their rhetoric takes the same tone. Reading Russell, we half-expect him to denounce the Germans for fomenting (to use a favourite pejorative term of the globalists) 'conspiracy theories'. In the parlance of 4Chan, too large a sector of the German population was 'based' and 'red-pilled' - that, in Russell's eyes, was their crime. 

The war crimes 'trials', the Morgenthau Plan, etc., and even Russell's propaganda were inflicted upon the Germans with the intention of continuing the war after the war. We in 2022 are approaching a state of war; abiding by Carl Schmitt's Friend / Enemy distinction, the globalists now see a large sector of the population as the Enemy. If Remer or any of the other 'old Nazis' were to return to the present, they would see that as a positive development; at last their Enemy has given them something to work with. 

American white nationalism: Will the wolf survive?

I.  The Marxification of the US conservative movement

It seems that the Epstein suicide scandal eclipsed the most three mass shootings - the news cycle in America is fickle and ephemeral - and to judge from recent news reports, the American public has already moved on from Epstein. But the political reaction to the mass shootings is worth analysing in depth because of what it reveals about American politics, and American dissident Right and white nationalist politics in particular.

The establishment American Right called for gun-grabbing and pronounced a fatwah on 'white nationalism' and 'white supremacy' soon after the El Paso shootings, and this was spear led by the National Review, the mouthpiece of Conservatism, Inc.:

The term 'white supremacy', if not invented by American communists, has been appropriated by them, and you can correctly infer - most of the time - that anyone who uses it in 2019 is either a communist or infected with communist ideas. (So far as the term 'white privilege' or 'white skin privilege' is concerned, we can be certain as to its provenance: it most definitely was coined by American communist groups - in particular, the neo-Maoist and Third World Marxist groups of the 1970s). Communists more or less control American political life, or at least, what I call the back end of politics, not necessarily the front end. For example, the candidates running in the Democratic Party primaries for the 2020 presidential election may not be card-carrying communists, but they are pandering to a base that supports communism and Marxism. (Given that many of the proposed Democrat policies (such as free healthcare for illegal immigrants) are unpopular with actual registered Democrat voters, the question is who are the candidates trying to appeal to: who is it that runs the Democratic Party?). As to why the conservatives of the National Review and similar publications are pandering to the Far Left, the answer is that these conservatives believe that they can cut a deal with the Left, much like the conservative Christian Democrats of East Germany, who you can read about here.

Anne Applebaum's book Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe, 1944-1956 (2012) details how the Christian Democrats and other conservative Central and Eastern European parties were absorbed into the communist political system during the postwar Soviet occupation, and, to add insult to injury, forced to take Marxist ideology on board - Marxism became part of their 'conservative' platforms. The US Republican Party seems, at present, to be undergoing a similar transition, but one would never guess from surface appearances alone that this Leftification is taking place. The Republican Party, and the conservative moment, spends much of its time denouncing socialism, and Trump - who is hated by the Left above all - follows their lead. This is why I said before that communists have taken over the back end but not the front.

II.  The three factions of American white nationalism

Ironically enough, American white nationalism forms one of the last bastions of conservatism and right-wing ideas in America: they are doing the job that the Republican Party and the mainstream conservative institutions should be doing but are not. With that in mind, let us look at the three main factions of the American white nationalist (or anti-immigrant nativist) movement and their relations to Trump, who is (according to the media) white nationalism's man in the White House.

The Trumpian Populists. The supporters of Trump still exist on the dissident Right, even though the impression on the dissident Right is that Trump has largely discredited himself. Trump will be going to the 2020 election with some awful metrics not in his favour: how many immigrants, legal and illegal have entered America, before the beginning of his first term and at the end; how many miles of the wall have been built; how many American jobs have been lost to immigrants, legal and illegal. Trump has performed poorly on all these except for, perhaps, the last - the job market may be finally moving in favour of the native-born. The question is whether or not one or more rays of sunshine suffice, whether they justify the Trump presidency. Judging by the numbers overall, Trump, if he had been an employee at his own organisation or a contestant on his own TV show The Apprentice, would have been fired long ago. The Trumpian Populists on the dissident Right will not abide by this, however, which reminds me of something the Jewish conservative Michael Savage said of Trump's followers - that they are akin to a cult. (Another irony: Savage, a Jew - and Jews occupy prime place in white nationalist demonology - stuck up for white people after Trump's recent condemnation of 'white supremacy').

The other two factions of white nationalism are divided when it comes to Trump and his re-election: on the one side are the Greg Johnsons, who run with 'Trump is all we've got' argument, on the other, the Hunter Wallaces, who are of the 'Punish Trump and Conservatism Inc. at the polls' school.

This brings us to the next faction of white nationalism: the genteel conservatives. In this category we find Greg Johnson (Counter-Currents), Peter Brimelow (VDare), Jared Taylor (American Renaissance), Kevin MacDonald (Occidental Observer), Steve Sailer (Unz.Org) and a few others who seek to make white nationalism 'respectable' and 'American'. They do not really seek to make great changes to America's social, economic, political structures: they only  want to return America to the days when it had a white majority, the time when it was last the 'historic American nation' - the America of 1960 or 1970 or even 1980. The genteel conservatives belong to the mainstream of the American conservative and nativist tradition, and for that reason, do not go near controversial topics such as Holocaust or WWII Revisionism. For example, Johnson is renowned for castigating European fascism (while simultaneously exploiting it thoroughly at Counter-Currents), and even MacDonald, anti-Semitic as he is, will not touch Holocaust Revisionism and German National Socialism with a barge pole.

The genteel conservatives are disappointed with Trump by and large, and a few (such as Johnson and Taylor) have openly denounced him.

The National Bolsheviks make up the third and final category. Hunter Wallace of Occidental Dissent leads this gang - other contenders for the leadership such as Richard Spencer seem to have disappeared into obscurity. When it comes to the Trump administration, Wallace takes the same positions as the Marxists. He preaches class war, e.g. he opposes Trump's tax cuts for 'the rich'; he opposes any US intervention in Maduro's socialist paradise; he opposes US intervention in Syria; (he wants the US to pull out of its piece of Syria and hand it over to the Russians; in much the same way, the US Left wanted to relinquish South Vietnam to the communists of the North); and, it goes without saying, he opposes American warmongering and interventionism while supporting Russia's. In the American National Bolshevik worldview, capitalism as a system is viewed as the enemy and economic and social policy must be directed towards the interests of the (white) working class. It follows quite naturally then that Wallace, along with many others of the National Bolshevik and Alt-Right faction of white nationalism, was strongly attracted to Andrew Yang campaign for the 2020 Democratic presidential nomination. Ideologically, the National Bolsheviks more less stand on the same side as the CPUSA in 1975 or 1985.

One may object that the comparison is invalidated by the fact that the CPUSA  championed busing and the like in the 1970s, and actively fought against segregation, Jim Crow, state's rights, for most of the 20th century. But this ignores the underlying racial dynamics in American communism at the time. An interesting and trenchant critique made of the CPUSA in the seventies and eighties was made by the Third World Marxist, 'anti-revisionist', New Communist Movement - the same movement that invented the concept of 'white privilege' - to the effect that by around 1970, the CPUSA had geared itself surreptitiously towards a class struggle on behalf of the white working class only. In practice but not in theory, the CPUSA had become the domain of Jews and blue-collar WASPs, and by way of contrast, the New Communist Movement had embraced black, Asian-American, Puerto Rican and Chicano nationalism and racialism. Unlike the CPUSA, the New Communist Movement understood that the identity politics of the 1970s presaged the future of American leftism, and so by the 1980s, the Movement had thrown its weight behind Democratic Party African-Americans running for office (the most famous of these being Jesse Jackson, who ran for the Democratic nomination in the presidential primaries of 1984 and 1988). This divide between the two communisms should be not be seen as a mere historical footnote: events have shown that the New Communist Movement won the argument: in leftist circles in 2019, a non-white, 'ethnic' communism rules the roost. The Gus Halls, for all their rote denunciations of 'racism' and 'white supremacy', belonged to old guard - which was mainly white, and Jewish - of US Marxism, and is to this tendency that the Wallaces and Spencers vibrate in sympathy with.

It goes without saying that the National Bolshevik faction repudiates Trump. The brilliant Wallace has written some of the best polemics against him - polemics which are witty and amusing.

III. A fourth faction?

Here belong the white nationalists who cannot be categorised, or at least, cannot be classified as Trumpian populist, genteel conservative or National Bolshevik. Because they do not belong to the big three, they lack political power and should be viewed as minor players on the white nationalist scene.

In this rag-tag collection of individualists, we get: the occult, pagan and Satanist nihilist types (Andrew 'Weev' Auernheimer and the Atomwaffen Division gang) who endorse violence and accelerationism; the bohemian and avant-gardists of the Alt-Left (see Robert Stark); the neo-pagans and conspiracy theorists (see the Renegade Tribune and the like). The nihilists and neo-pagans claim to be grounded in meat-and-potatoes National Socialism, whereas the Alt-Left are so far away from it - and traditional white nationalism - that they may as well be on another planet. Sometimes you can stray so far from your roots that you lose your moorings.

IV. The end of white nationalism

James Kirkpatrick of VDare writes that 'The Alt Right remained a coherent force even after Charlottesville until it was essentially crushed by government action, lawfare, defunding and deplatforming'. White nationalism could meet with the same fate. But it faces its biggest threat from forces which are internal, not external.

In politics, one needs to bow to certain realities, one of these being the fact that even the most elitist and aristocratic political movement needs to form a party, run in elections and win votes. To those ends, some nationalist organisations do better than others. The Alternative for Germany (AfD) at present leads the pack of German nationalist parties - its electoral success has left the National Democratic Party (NPD), Third Way and others in the dust. Likewise, the Brexit Party in the UK has become Britain's premier nationalist party and has eclipsed UKIP, which went astray following Farage's departure. (UKIP after Farage left the mainstream of British politics and descended into the murky netherverse of the British Far Right, to the level of the British National Party, Britain First and other now inconsequential parties).

Because of the unique structure of the American political system, a third party in America will never succeed; America has always been and always will be a two-party state. Anyone on the dissident Right, then, who wants to engage in politics must work with the Republican Party. (The communist Left instinctively this principle, i.e., that in the last analysis, one's best efforts should be made within the sphere of mainstream politics, which is why the Left has expended so much energy on infiltrating and corrupting the US Democratic Party and the UK Labour Party). The implication of this is that the dissident Right must get used to looking at the Republican Party as its own and struggle to wrest control of it from the hated donor class, which wants unrestricted non-white immigration.

In 2015-16 a miracle occurred: a Far Right populist and avowed nationalist undertook a hostile takeover of the Republican Party, won the primaries and then the presidential election. But after Trump's inauguration, the donor class faction of the party struck back and seemed to have taken control back from the civic nationalists and populists. Or perhaps Trump's heart was never in it in the first place. One can understand the disappointment of the American white nationalists. Yes, Trump should be praised for several of his initiatives (such as the proposed Public Charge law), initiatives which would have been unthinkable ten years ago, but so far, Trump has not performed up to expectations.

Imagine that you manage a large retail store and hire a store detective or security guard to apprehend shoplifters and other rapscallions, but despite an enthusiastic attitude, the new employee only delivers on 10-15% of what he promised at the interview - he does not meet his key performance indicators (KPIs, in today's annoying corporate jargon) at all. To make matters worse, the previous man who occupied that position - a skinny black homosexual who had attitude problems and hated the company - performed better when it came to certain metrics. (Obama had deported more illegals than Trump). By all rights, the new employee should be fired and replaced - but, say some of the store owners who are fond of him and praise him , 'He's all we've got'. Indeed, he is all you've got - and what does this say about Trump? The Republican Party? White nationalists in general? Given that the Tories under the new British prime minister Boris Johnson (who is ideologically sympathetic to Trump) seem to have gone back on their earlier promises to curtail immigration, one has to ask why the Anglo-Saxons find it so difficult to close their borders and why the Italians and Hungarians find it so easy?

The Far Left in the US and UK are playing a long game; they don't expect to win overnight. Any year now they can expect to take complete control, and this will happen, like the Czechoslovak communist coup of 1948, without a shot being fired. Time is on their side, but the clock is ticking for white nationalists, who want results and want them now.

When they don't get those results, white nationalists are inclined to give up, and are then faced with the question of what to do once a return to an American white majority no longer seems possible. This became one of primary themes of the discourse of Andrew Yang's white nationalist followers. We began to hear, on the Robert Stark radio show and elsewhere, talk of a 'post-America', that is, a post-white America. One compelling argument for Yangism, made again and again (see here for an example) was that 'White America is going down the tubes, so I may as well kick back and enjoy the decline - and pocket my $1000 a month UBI cheque'.The prevalence of that argument and its ready acceptance by many white nationalists indicate that by early 2019, white nationalists had become severely demoralised.

Such demoralisation ('black pilling', in chan speak) will lead white nationalism down some strange paths. Suppose you are a white nationalist, and out of a desire to hew to the center (or cowardice, or both), and you are willing to steer away from certain uncomfortable subjects out of fear that you will alienate 'middle America', among those subjects being Holocaust Revisionism and revisionism regarding America's involvement in both world wars; suppose that you find yourself in opposition to any sort of German nationalism, like Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and at the same time broadly supportive of any Polish nationalism, like Wilson and Roosevelt; suppose you have reached an uneasy peace with right-leaning Jews of the Israeli nationalist sort, Jews who applaud Bibi Netanyahu's highly effective 'anti-infiltrator' border wall; suppose you have reached a 'black pilled' state of mind, and now despair of Americans ever getting their country back from illegal immigrants (in the way Italy, Hungary and Israel seem to be doing); where does that leave you? The answer is, on the same page as the conservatives who never gave a damn about thwarting non-white immigration in the first place; that is, the anti-white nationalist, anti-fascist, anti-anti-Semitic conservatives - David French, Jonah Goldberg, Bill Kristol, John Podhoretz, Kevin D. Williamson-type conservatives, schmaltzy 'America is an idea' conservatives, Never Trump conservatives...