'Madness & Doom': Trump 2024, American White Nationalists, and the War on the Living

I.

 

In an election year in America, even the most eccentric and isolated member of the dissident Right must acknowledge the existence of mainstream American politics, if only for a moment, and who knows, under pressure to remove himself from his self-imposed isolation, even if only temporarily, he may even concede that the outcome of the election will have a great bearing on the fate and well-being of white people in America. Drawing upon my knowledge of mainstream economics and politics, I will be writing here in order to help the dissident Rightist navigate American politics and arrive at a fixed position, but I do not intend to inveigle him into taking a ride on the Trump train, for the Trump campaign should not want the support of the American white nationalist - look at the harm that David Duke's endorsement, which was most suspiciously timed, did in 2015.

 

We know that in an election year, the left-wing media will do its best to associate in the public's mind Trump and 'white nationalism' to the detriment of the former; and that the same media will be making a false comparison. Race and immigration play an outsized role in the election of 2024, perhaps more than in any other election in recent history, but if we were to view the matter objectively, we shall see that white nationalism and MAGA travel along tracks that run parallel to one another but never intersect. 'White nationalism', 'National Socialism', 'Third Positionism', 'Tradition', and any other factional grouping of the dissident Right stand not to benefit politically from a Trump victory, and I think that the American dissident Right has finally comprehended this fact; the American dissident Right did not comprehend it during Trump's first term, a time when it had invested a great deal in Trump and when the investment did not pay off; and that disappointment is why for years afterwards bitter and disaffected members of the American dissident Right complained, and most angrily, that Trump 'didn't keep his promises' and that he 'did nothing'.

 

So, would a Trump victory in 2024 change anything in America - would it lead to a cessation of the depravity that Kevin Alfred Strom chronicles here? Maybe, maybe not; regardless, American mainstream politics now is an interesting subject in itself: it should be discussed, it should be examined in its own right. I here ask the 'extremist' reader for forbearance.

 

II.

 

The astute reader will see in this article the appearance of the 'rational markets hypothesis', which asserts that when all participants are put together in the same market on the same day they always make the right decision. According to the theory, an individual participant in the stock market may be wrong and spectacularly so; but when all the participants are pressed into an aggregate, the 'wisdom of crowds' emerges. Take, for example, the crash on October the 29th 1929: this was the most famous day in Wall Street's history; it was the day of the crash that precipitated the Great Depression. No doubt you could have found a single investor on that day who was quite bullish and at the same time quite ignorant, a man who made the wrong call (to avail ourselves of financier's jargon), a man who saw no reason to dump his stocks all at once. But that is one man plucked out of a crowd; the great majority made the right call. It was entirely justified in selling its stocks; in abandoning the market; and in holding a pessimistic view of America's future.

 

So why was it justified? The answer is to be found in the research of the publicist of supply-side economics Jude Wanniski, who contended that the market crashed on that day after a piece of dramatic breaking news, which was that the Smoot-Hawley tariff bill had passed the US Senate. I will not rehearse the story of the notorious bill; suffice to say that its passage plunged America into recession, and then, after President Herbert Hoover signed into law a series of brutal tax hikes, depression. Wanniski's point is that the market responded and responded rationally to bad news. The countervailing thesis is that the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) crashed on October 29th, 1929, for no reason at all, the market being irrational, the crowds possessing no wisdom.

 

Controversially, Wanniski extended the rational markets hypothesis to politics: an individual voter may be quite stupid, but when all voters, including the stupidest, are put together in aggregate on election day, they always make the right choice. For example, when choosing between two objectionable and lacklustre candidates A and B, voters will always choose theone who will do the least harm.

 

I remember Bob Bartley, editor of the WSJ editpage and my boss back then, asking me why I thought Jimmy Carter [in 1976] was winning the primaries when he did not seem to stand for anything, with his competitors complaining that he fuzzed and fudged all the issues being debated. I recall telling Bartley that if one candidate says, "Elect me and I will kill every fifth American," and another says, "I will kill every tenth American," and another says "every 15th," and another "every 20th," and then Jimmy Carter steps forward and says "I haven’t made up my mind. Maybe I won’t kill any Americans." The voters will of course pick Carter, as they did, going on to beat President Ford in the general election.

 

The electorate cannot be fooled any more than the market can, and it works with all the information, however incomplete that information may be, made available to it, and in essence Wanniski's theory is that, like the participants in the stock market, the electorate uses all the information it can gather, and it goes on to act rationally.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        

But if Wanniski's theory is true, how does it explain the presidential election of 2020? Voters knew in advance that Biden suffered from cognitive difficulties; that he was in poor physical health; that he and his family were corrupt; that he was a nasty, aggressive old man; that he was prone to outbursts of irrational anger, as dementia sufferers often are. And furthermore, they understood what the Biden platform entailed. Now in 2024, one must laugh and laugh maliciously at the Democratic voters in Denver, Colorado, and Chicago, Illinois, and Boston, Massachusetts, all of whom are complaining most vociferously about the consequences of the Biden immigrant invasion: the voters in these sanctuary cities have now got what they voted for - and in spades. And Wanniski's thesis is that they knew what they were voting for. The Biden package - tax hikes, environmentalism, Covidian mandates, open borders, transsexualism, a pro-crime policy that protects the criminal and punishes the victim - was hardly a secret. In addition, the electorate, which according to Wanniski understands economics better than any economist, would have known what the consequences of Bidenomics were. Nevertheless, Americans put Biden into office. He won 81 million votes, more votes than Obama, more votes than Hilary, more votes than any presidential candidate in history. Or did he? Perhaps we can rescue the Wanniski hypothesis by arguing that the electorate did not want Biden and that he did not win 2020; what happened was that the Democratic Party, the Far Left, Big Tech, and the Hollywood entertainment and media complex, carried out a coup against Trump. Biden was installed; he was selected, not elected.

 

To say the least, what happened was extraordinary; all American presidential elections had been free and fair up to that point excepting the election of 1864, which took place when America was chopped into two. Granted, there have been some extremely close elections - think of Nixon versus Kennedy in 1960 and Bush versus Gore in 2000 - but as I will argue, 2020 was not one of those.

 

So, what happened in 2020? Wanniski speaks of the 'rights of the minorities'. Being a family man and a New Yorker, he expounds the doctrine by sketching out the following parable. A family of five pile into a car and drive to the Hamptons or the Catskills on a vacation; on the way there, the youngest child, a little girl, becomes upset and agitated, yells and screams, and demands to be taken home. The rest of the family views the prospect of a trip as being neither nor there, and does not care all that much about it: it could easily out-vote the girl and proceed on, but if the trip is to be cancelled in order to assuage the girl, and keep peace in the family, and put an end to the girl's caterwauling - then so be it. The father turns the car around, the family drives home. The little girl stands in the minority; in a democracy she would be outvoted; but she possesses in this instance a weighted vote, that is, a vote that counts two, three, or more times more than a single.

 

The parallels between this and 2020, and indeed the entirety of Trump's first term, are obvious. Those suffering from TDS (Trump Derangement Syndrome) behaved like spoiled children. And unfortunately for Americans, the anti-Trumpers wielded most of the political power. Although they did belong to a minority, they did enjoy weighted voting privileges. On election night in 2020 and in the months leading up to Biden's inauguration in January 2021, they got their way; and Americans - except for the small minority who protested at the Capitol on January the 6th - allowed them to have it.

 

Wanniski gives a formal explanation of the theory in The Way the World Works (1979):

 

But while a politician can not satisfy electors who are diametrically opposed, neither can he ignore one class of elector or another, perhaps with the idea that because he can not possibly satisfy both, he will throw in his lot entirely with the one. Even when an issue can be settled by numerical voting, ninety-nine-to-one, the politician must attempt in some way to accommodate the one. At the extreme, if the issue settled ninety-nine-to-one is perceived by the one as in some way threatening his very survival or directly inviting his extinction, the one may resort to extralegal balloting to defend himself, perhaps even attempting assassination. In determining the consensus of the electorate, then, the successful politician does not view the electorate as a collection of numerical units, but as a bundle of individual interests each with a different set of intensities.

 

Now after three years of Biden, voters in the cities of Denver, Chicago, and Boston are experiencing buyer's remorse, and that places the Biden junta's survival in doubt. Carolyn Yeager observes, 'Even the sophisticated electoral cheating technologies semi-mastered by his Democrat party will probably not be sufficient to keep him [Biden] in the White House'; that was written in April 2023, and Biden's chances have hardly improved since then.

 

Rest assured, on election night 2024, history will repeat itself, and 2024 will look a lot like 2020: voting machines will mysteriously malfunction and flip millions of votes from Trump's column to Biden's, and after an order is given after midnight to stop the counting in seven swing states, millions of postal votes all for Biden will magically appear. But the difference between 2020 and 2024 is that the Democrats must defend everywhere. They cannot afford to lose one single traditionally blue state. And then there is the question of morale: the anti-Trump brigade who ousted Trump in 2020 will do their best to make sure that Biden 'wins' another term, but their hearts will not be in it, because after three years of Biden we can safely assume that they are quite demoralised and deflated.

 

III.

 

In 2020, Biden made history, or more accurately, broke with history, and to understand the rupture, let us look to the history, starting with the 30 presidential elections held from 1900 onwards. An outside observer who was ignorant of American political history could easily determine with a reasonable degree of certainty who was the winner of each election by knowing only handful of variables, and he could achieve this feat without knowing the actual outcome, i.e., without know who was declared the winner.

 

The first variable is this: who did the state of Ohio go to? From 1900, when the state went to McKinley, to 2016, when the state went to Trump, Ohio has gone to the winner 28 out of 30 times. And twelve out of 30 times Ohio, in conjunction with one of the two other states Iowa and Florida, has gone to the winner; and in 16 out of 30 times, all three states have gone to the winner. In short, the general rule is: if you win Ohio and either Florida or Iowa or both, you win the election.

 

Another variable we must account for is the increase in the number of voters voting for the incumbent's party. In the presidential election of 1928, Herbert Hoover, the presidential candidate of the incumbent party, which was the Republican Pary, won Ohio, Florida, and Iowa, and at the same time won more votes than the Republican candidate Calvin Coolidge in the election of 1924, and Coolidge had won that election in a landslide. By improving upon Coolidge's vote, and winning the three key states of Ohio, Florida, and Iowa, Hoover was bound to win. And so, for the next hundred years afterwards, the pattern was set. The principle became that a presidential candidate who is an office holder running for re-election has won the election every time upon winning Ohio, Florida, and Iowa and at the same time improving upon the incumbent party's popular vote. This is true of Roosevelt in 1936; Eisenhower in 1956; Johnson in 1964; Nixon in 1972; Reagan in 1984; Clinton in 1996; and Bush 45 in 2004. As we can see, the electorate behaves in a consistent and predictable manner. 

 

This is why 2020 broke the mold. Trump improved upon the popular vote of the 2016 election, and he improved upon it by 12 million; the charge that in 2020 Trump had lost his base in 2020 does not stick; in 2020 Trump won all the votes that he had won in 2016, and he went on to win an additional 12 million. As well as that, Trump won Florida, Ohio, and Iowa handily (and in the polls for 2024, in Ohio he enjoys a double-digit lead). But in 2020, none of that sufficed to stop the electoral dynamo that was Joseph Robinette Biden. He won Hilary's 65 million votes and an additional 16 million. One of the great puzzles is where that 16 million came from: between them, Trump and Biden won more votes than there were registered voters.

 

The most important question of 2024 is whether the 16 million voters, if they ever existed, will be returning. I tentatively answer no: that in 2024 we will be seeing a dramatic shortfall in the number of votes for Biden. To repeat, we can hazard a guess that the Democratic Party and its anti-Trump base have by now become deeply demoralised. The evidence for that is all around us. According to the polls, Biden's approval rating has reached a record low, and in those polls, a majority of those asked if Biden deserves re-election answer in the negative. In most national polls, Trump is equal or ahead of Biden by a few percentage points. We can predict that if the momentum away from Biden and towards Trump keeps up, the Democratic Party base vote will collapse, which is to say that the 65 million who voted for Hilary in 2016 and Biden in 2020 will not be returning.

 

Students of American political history know that what counts more than the popular vote is the electoral college. In polls of the more decisive battleground states, Trump is pulling ahead. Supposing that Trump wins Arizona and Georgia and picks up Nevada (which has not gone to a Republican presidential candidate in 20 years), then the electoral college count approaches a near draw: the Republicans win 268 and Democrat 270, and that is even if Biden 'wins' Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. In such a scenario Biden only needs to lose one traditionally Democratic state, one that could be either be on the eastern seaboard, or in the south towards the border with Mexico, or in the Mid-West, and then - the election will be handed to Trump. It is within the bounds of possibility that angry residents of Chicago, Illinois, or Denver, Colorado, or Baltimore, Maryland, could turn on the Democrats. And so, the election stands on a knife-edge.

 

IV.

 

As well as the polls, two markets are predicting a Trump victory - the betting market and the stock market.

 

Interestingly, the odds of Trump being the next president reached a high in May 2022 and then crashed around the time of the November 2022 House of Representatives election; Trump's odds stood at their lowest in this period and DeSantis' at their highest.

 

The rise and fall of Biden's odds follow a different trajectory; they did increase in 2023 but never exceeded 39%. In contrast, as of the time writing, Trump's odds have never reached a higher level.

 

Some financial commentators assert that the recent rally in the stock market should be attributed to the likely prospect of Trump's return to office; it is pricing in that possibility, or to use financier's jargon, it is 'discounting', that is, it is carrying over the future into the present. And what lies in that future? The market sees all the familiar supply-side-isms, mainly tax cuts and deregulation. And it anticipates an increase in the production and export of oil, natural gas, and coal, and a decrease in the use of wind farms, solar panels, and electric cars; in short, it expects President Trump to repudiate environmentalism wholesale.

 

To understand the extent of the stock market's rallying, we need to use gold. In the supply-side doctrine, the value of anything can be expressed as a fraction or multiple of an ounce of gold, and to be included in that anything is the American stock market index. We have recourse then to the gold Dow, which is the DJIA index divided by an ounce of gold. If we look at a chart of the gold Dow, we see that the highest it reached in the past five years was 20 ounces, which is high, but nowhere as high as it was in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

 

 

We cannot explain every twitch and tremor in the stock market, but we can account for some of the big falls and rises. Without a doubt the big fall from 19 to 13 ounces in early 2020 can be laid at the door of the Covidians: the lockdowns, forced shutdowns of business, and forced layoffs, devastated the market. The gold Dow had recovered by early 2022, but then fell after the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian War in February 2022. By October 2022, the market had recovered from this mini recession, so why did it fall again? One can blame successive interest rates increases; these hurt the bond market and the commercial real estate market, and while the rate increases were small by the standards of the 1970s and 1980s, they were large by those of the 2020s.

 

 

And the reason for the fall of October 2023 is obvious: Hamas' raid, Israel's retaliatory offensive, and fears of a spread of a regional conflagration. After that came the Trump re-election rally, and it is no coincidence that at this point - October 2023 - that the betting markets graph shows Trump's odds overtaking Biden's.

 

The supply-sider Stephen Moore expresses scepticism towards the notion that the stock market is rallying because of Trump's improved performance in the polls and the betting markets:

 

Trump has made the case that the rise in the stock market in recent months is a result of the higher likelihood that he will be elected in November. I don't put too much stock in that claim. If the stock market tanks, is he responsible for that, too?

 

However, an analysis by ace investor Scott Bessent and a member of the Committee to Unleash Prosperity economic council finds that fluctuations in the stock market over the past year HAVE correlated positively with the betting market odds that Trump will win. Right now, he stands at just above 50%.

 

This relationship could be spurious, and of course, by far the biggest factor that drives stock valuations is profits.

 

Having said that, he does concede that Biden's economic agenda is poison:

 

One last piece of investment advice: Investors should pay attention to the Democratic agenda if they win in November. The Biden economic plan calls for doubling the capital gains tax, taxing unrealized capital gains and raising both the corporate tax rate and the dividend tax.

 

That is very bad news for sure for stocks. And THAT, you can take to the bank.

 

Now, this lends weight to Wanniski's rational market hypothesis. If the market is always right, and if it believed that Biden was going to 'win' in November, then it would be crashing right now, because there is nothing it dislikes more than what Biden is proposing.

 

IV.

 

One of the main reasons why the electorate seems to have turned on Biden is inflation, that is, Bidenflation.

 

 

This has been exported worldwide, and there is not a country that is not suffering from the highest inflation since the 1980s. Trump has vowed to reduce inflation, but the irony is that he and the Covidians he surrounded himself with in 2020 bear the main responsibility for it.

 

When taking the extraordinary decade of the 2020s into consideration, for the first time in recent history we see a global inflation that has not been brought about by bad money, i.e. by depreciating currencies. It is true that the dollar has depreciated against gold by over 55% in the past five years: in 2019, it took only $US1300 to buy an ounce of gold, and now it takes over $USD2000.

 

 

But the depreciation of the dollar, while harmful, occurred gradually over the course of five years and not all at once, unlike the sudden and shocking depreciation of the 1970s. No, the cause of the inflation of the 2020s can be traced back to what economists euphemistically call breakdowns in the supply-chain, which are what happens when millions across the globe are forced to stop supplying and exchanging their goods and labour because work has become somehow 'unsafe'. One cannot think of another time in history when global economic activity, and a good chunk of it at that, came to a halt because of government efforts to combat a virus.

 

Once a supply-chain has been broken in several places, it cannot be fixed easily. But we can return to normalcy by returning to what we had before 2020. And what was that? An absence of Covidian mandates, that is, regulations that prevent people from trading their production with one another; an increase in supply by cutting taxes on production; and little to no restrictions on the production and consumption of coal, oil, and natural gas.

 

We must fear a further depreciation of the dollar, which along with other currencies has a lost a great deal of value over the past few decades - it is hard to believe that 25 years ago gold only cost $USD250 an ounce and oil only $USD10 a barrel - but I think that in the current year central banks have realised the error of their ways and are not willing to devalue their currencies further.

 

Having said that, at the time of writing, gold has climbed past $USD2100 an ounce, which goes to show that one can never tell with the Federal Reserve, which, when every time in the past twenty years it has met with an economic quandary, has devalued.

 

V.

 

Instinctively, Trump wants to move America to the opposite place of where it is under Biden. The market recognises that and is responding accordingly. It does dislike Trump's tariff-hike threats, but it puts these to one side; any imposing by Trump of trade barriers, particularly barriers against China, will hurt no more in the 2020s than it did in the 2010s.

 

In one of the strange echoes of history, 2024 is revisiting 1980. Despite being aged 69, the always-smiling Reagan of the 1980 campaign conveyed youth, vigour, optimism, belief in America's future, and an irrepressible forward rhythm. And as the market discounted a Reagan victory, some economic indicators improved even before Reagan was sworn in: in the middle of 1980, before the election was held, the dollar firmed, and the price of gold collapsed: it fell from $USD850 an ounce, which is the highest it had ever been in history up to that point, to $USD300. The market anticipated that Reagan would win, and the prospect of a Reagan boom led to an increase in demand for dollars. The demand outstripped the supply, and so the value of the dollar increased. That is, the increase in the value of the dollar meant that one needed to spend fewer dollars to buy the same amount of gold. This foretold that inflation, which had plagued America and the world throughout the seventies, would soon wane. Relief was at hand, even though Carter still was in office. The phenomenon reminds us of the rally we have seen in the DJIA since October 2023.

 

The market looks to the future, but its knowledge of what will happen in that future is limited to the information it possesses at the time. In the sweet summer of 1980, it foresaw the Reagan victory, but it did not foresee the Reagan recession that would follow, a recession that was the worst since the end of WWII. Nowadays we look at the eighties through rose-coloured glasses, and we fail to understand how difficult it was for so many - particularly in the first two years under Reagan - and how we are better off now than then.

 

VI.

 

This brings up to the subject of national morale. In Biden's America, there are three nefarious forces working to lower it, and the first of these is Biden himself, a man of a gloomy mien, a man whose body and mind are deteriorating, a man who naturally enough has no reason to look forward to the future. During one of his typically rambling speeches at the campaign stops in the 2020 Democratic primaries, one of those in attendance was struck by the incoherence of Biden's talk but also by its extreme pessimism; Biden was preoccupied by the themes of decline, cancer, death. The second force, and one that a man of Biden's temperament was instantly attracted to, was Covidianism. During its zenith, Covidianism locked down millions with the intent of driving as many mad as possible, and if any one of the lockdown's victims were to take his own life - and a large number did - then the Covidians counted that as a win. Such nihilism and misanthropy met its match in that of the third force, the environmentalists. They want to drastically limit the number of air-breathers, preferably white-skinned ones; the environmentalists are uninterested in the carbon emissions of the denizens of Africa, China, India, and the Middle East. An ideology that is as destructive as the ideology of Covidianism, environmentalism in the 21st century is proving to be as dangerous as Freemasonry in the 20th.

 

The three forces have combined to make America a sad place to be. I know nothing more demoralising than the sight of three obese - and probably diabetic - African Americans Alvyn Bragg, Fani Willis, and Letitia James persecuting Trump and members of his administration. And all this while Democratic mayors, governors, district attorneys, and judges have turned not soft on crime but pro-crime. This is perverse. The present regime goes against nature, and such deviating cannot be sustained at least not for long, which is why Covidianism, the ultimate anti-natural ideology, burned itself out after a run of two and a half years.

 

 

VII.

 

Can we frame the conflict between Trump and Biden, Republicans and Democrats, as a conflict between capitalism and socialism? At first sight, that would make sense. Trump has worked most of his life in business, and big business at that, whereas Biden, Schumer, Pelosi, Harris, Feinstein, et al., have never worked a day in their lives in a real job. And since at least the 2010s, the Democratic Party has been in the grip of the radical Left, the six factions of which from 2020 onwards were: 1) Black Lives Matter; 2) 'woke' capital; 3) proponents of Critical Race Theory and other forms of academic neo-Marxism; 4) anarchists and antifa; 5) old-school communists; and 6) Social Justice Warriors (SJWs).

 

Covidians, who infiltrated both the Trump and Biden administrations, are the odd man out. Covidian practices were inspired by those of the Chinese, particularly in Shanghai, and these in turn were rooted in Chinese techniques that sought to engender what Mao called 'thought reform' and 'the washing of the brain'; if you want to read more on this unsavoury subject, click here. But despite the Maoist antecedents, the Covidians did not follow a particular ideology of either the Left or Right; they portrayed themselves as being pure technocrats who had abstracted themselves away from any ideological commitment, scientists who had moved beyond politics.

 

Nonetheless, if we are to delve further, we can find certain themes underlying the thought of the Democrats, the Covidians, and the Left, for when writing about Marx, Wanniski observes penetratingly that Marxism can only be valid when an economy is contracting, not expanding; it only holds true for states of economic crisis, of recession, depression. The classic problem faced by all communists after they had seized power was how to get the wheels of production turning again. They were unable to find an answer in the economics of Marx, because Marx wrote only on things going wrong, not right. It was not that the communist regimes were opposed to growth and expansion, only that they did not know how to bring these about. By the end of the seventies - when Wanniski published his book - Wanniski declared that Marxism, along with the two other prominent schools of economic thought Keynesianism and monetarism, had failed, but he warned that if the capitalists of the West proceeded on their present course, they would meet the same fate as the capitalists of the East, in particular the capitalists of the former Republic of South Vietnam.

 

In the conflict between capitalism and socialism, Wanniski found a division between the desire for risk, adventure, and entrepreneurialism on one hand, and the desire for safety, comfort, and caution on the other; we know on which side of the ledger the Covidians, for whom 'safety' was absolute and paramount, stood. Cults, too, prize security and safety before all else and forbid their followers from venturing into the outside world, and the man who escapes a cult often has difficulties adjusting to real life.

 

The exploring of these themes - 'Life', 'Death' capitalised - brings us close to the doctrine of vitalism. Half in jest, Nietzsche wrote that the sight of the ugly, the aged, and the infirm, lowers our vital energies; it saps our will to live. Nearly 140 years after Nietzsche made his famous remarks, we can see in them a grain of truth. In 2024, the sight of the Soviet-style gerontocracy in America depresses and enervates. And in addition, it encourages intergenerational resentment; the boomers will not stand down, they are hogging the trough. Biden epitomises this aspect of boomerdom. Part of the hostility expressed towards Biden by Democrats in a state such as Michigan can be traced back to Biden's favouring Israel in the current Israeli-Palestinian war, true, but also to the age gap between Biden and the anti-Israel protestors.

 

It is easy enough to find an instance of the prominence of the aged and infirm in American life; what of the ugly? The answer is it is all around us. Wind farms, transsexualism, fat acceptance, LGBTism in its more grotesque forms, AI art (especially the AI art of Google Gemini) - all of it is ugly. One of the worst things one can say about the Great Replacement is that it has made life in the West increasingly ugly; one must agree with this under the pressure of the facts, unless one in the spirit of an unyielding contrarianism argues that Palestinian diaspora protestors, the dysgenic trash that is Jose Antonio Ibarra, and the encampments of illegals in New York, Boston, and Chicago, are aesthetically pleasing, beautiful even. And perhaps our leftist does really treasure them, for one thing that we have learned after 2020 is that the American ruling class really does despise white Americans, that is, Americans, and really wants them gone, dead, replaced. And as goes America, so goes the rest of the Anglosphere; one can find the same sort of ugliness in Australia as well as America. And it spreads across an entire nation: the wind farm disfigures the country; the Great Replacement disfigures the city.

 

VIII.

 

American boomers are an enfeebling but also a conserving force. Trump for the life of him cannot understand how things have gotten to where they are now, and he wants to turn the clock back, to the good old days, to the way things used to be. Trump is old enough to remember the past, the America of Operation Wetback, the America before Hart Celler. Most importantly, he does not hate Americans, and he does not want to destroy. Critics of Trump will object to this assertion of mine and they will point to Trump's conduct in 2020; but, if we view the world events of 2020 and with objectivity, we shall that not a single major head of state in the entire world (and these states included Russia and Ukraine) refused the blandishments of the Covidians; all of them locked down their people, made them wear masks, and mandated the clot shots. Politicians who bucked the Covidian consensus, like certain heads of state in Africa, wound up mysteriously dead.

 

It is possible that these forces of darkness will 'win' once again. The subject of the 2024 election rarely comes up for discussion in the writings of the Americans of the dissident Right. The sole exception is VDare, which, four years after the fact, is countenancing the possibility that Biden may have not won 2020. In 2024, VDare is cultivating an atmosphere of pessimism and gloom: polls, betting markets, and stock markets be damned, 2024 is just like 2020, and the Democrats will use cheating to flip the states of Arizona, Georgia, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Michigan to Biden once again. America is due for another four years of Biden, and Biden's second term will be worse than his first, if that is possible.

 

If VDare is correct, Americans are faced with an insoluble paradox. To secure free and fair elections, America must ban postal voting, same-day registration, voting machines; it must enforce voter ID; and it must make a practice of the speedy counting of ballots and not allow counting to drag on for weeks and months on end. Such legislation would bring America's electoral system into line with that of other countries in the Anglosphere. But here is the rub: to enact these reforms, the Republican Party needs to win elections, and the Democratic Party will not allow it to.

 

Prudence advises caution, and perhaps we should be pessimistic about 2024. Perhaps Trump will win in a landslide, but the Biden junta will falsify election results once again; perhaps, even if Trump does get into office, he will not be able to make a difference. Either way, America's long national nightmare will continue. That is the default American dissident Right and white nationalist view. Who is to say that they are not correct? But we need hope, and living without hope is no way to live.