Wednesday, November 7, 2012

Barack Obama, Political Zombie

Sometimes the worse thing you can do to a politician is give him a second term, and this is one of those times. Obama knows this. He didn't look like a winner on this campaign, and he didn't on victory night. His facial expression was, 'What the hell have I gotten into?'. Likewise, many an American voter will wake up tomorrow and say, 'What the hell have we done?'.

The problem is that Obama is out of ideas, and the economic and political problems which were there, at the start of the election, haven't gone away and won't go away. What will he do about unemployment? Anaemic growth? The weak dollar? Rising costs for food staples, oil and other commodities? Perhaps he'll try a program of 'stimulus', fuelled by public works and deficit spending - no, that's been done. Or devalue the currency some more: QE4, QE5, QE6... But that's been done.

The only thing left for Obama to do, when it comes to the economy, is to hike taxes - on income tax, capital gains, dividends, estate tax - and remove the tax loopholes on the Alternative Minimum Tax. Obama desperately wants this because of 'fairness'. But the House of Representatives isn't controlled by the Republicans, so, he won't be able to do that. He's the closest thing to a dead man walking: a lame-duck president who has a four-year term to sit out. Obama's second term will be 2008's mouldering corpse. Eventually - it will take a couple of days - even the dimmest liberal media commentator will see this...

(As we know, the big cuts on dividends, capital gains, income tax, etc., were introduced by Bush Jr., and they are set to expire - that is, be replaced by higher tax rates - in January 2013, unless Congress acts. If the higher rates take effect, it will be the biggest tax increase since Herbert Hoover's in 1931 - the tax hikes which, the supply-side commentators argue, caused the Great Depression. The markets are understandably jittery about such a prospect. With any luck, the legislators will muddle through, and come up with a compromise, as they did late last year. But it's just possible that Obama will get the 'fairness', i.e., the tax hikes, he's been asking for, simply because of the fiscal cliff).

Many reasons are being put forth as to why Romney didn't win. The supply-siders, such as John Tamny, will say that Romney didn't endorse a return to the gold standard (in fact, he did promise to set up a Gold Commission, which was more than Obama did); the 'liberal' Republicans - which is about 98% of the party leadership - will say that Romney should have reached out more to Mestizo voters (despite the fact that Mestizo voters didn't cast the deciding vote); American nativists, Far Rightists, racialists, white nationalists, will say that Romney should have campaigned against illegal immigration and thus 'energised the base' of white Republican Party voters more. Some blame the trade unions, and others make dark mutterings about taking the vote away from women, who, supposedly, voted for Obama in droves.

I don't have the answer. Except that I observe this: Afro-American voters vote for Obama because he's one of them - he's their man. The mainstream media notes this, and more or less acknowledges that the Democrats, and Obama, will take the black vote for granted. This is even though the Afro-Americans are suffering under Obama. (Similarly, black South Africans will vote for the ANC, even though life, for them, is bad under ANC; Mugabe's tribe voted, and continues to vote, for ZANU-PF...). Whites, though, are held to a different standard of morality: they aren't mean to vote for a Romney because he's white. No, they are morally obliged to vote for Obama.

In contrast to the liberal media, the right-wing media tells white Americans (and Hispanics and Afro-Americans) to vote for Romney because Romney and the Republicans will 'restore the republic as intended by our Founding Fathers', because they restore 'liberty and free markets, as intended by our Founding Fathers', and similar such nonsense. In other words, they are meant to vote 'conservative' on the basis of abstract and universalist principles. In reality, Afro-Americans, and Mestizos, don't abide by such principles. They play by the rules of tribalist politics, identity politics.

Supposedly, the white nationalists are meant to abide by a tribalist, ethnicist politics. By that reasoning, they should have endorsed Romney. The leaders of white nationalism and American Far Right nativism should have told their followers - and they do have a sizable following - to do all they can for Romney, to get out there and vote for their man Romney, and despite the fact that white Americans won't necessarily be better off under Romney.

But these leaders (and I won't name names) didn't. They smirked, they sneered, they talked Romney down, they told their following that 'Voting changes nothing', 'America and the white race are doomed', 'Things have to get worse before they get better', 'Democracy and politics are a farce', and on and on.

AFRO-AMERICAN: Votes for Obama because he's black;

WHITE NATIONALIST: Don't vote for Romney, he's not pure enough, 'Voting changes nothing', 'Romney and Obama are the same', race doesn't matter.

To repeat: Afro-Americans are suffering under Obama. They are suffering under his economic policies, and his immigration policies - immigrants are consistently snapping up most of the jobs created under the Obama Administration, and taking them from white and Afro-Americans. But they vote for their man. I can think of one or two of Romney's policies which would have had a positive effect on the lives of white Americans, but that's besides the point: someone who's white, and who promulgates racialist, ethnicist and identity politics, should have endorsed Romney, and done everything in their power to get him elected - because he was white.

Quite a few white American 'conservatives' vote Republican because of dog whistle signals - they pick up on, subconsciously, the fact that the Republican Party is the party of the married white person who owns a home or has a mortgage (as Steve Sailer points out). I'm sure that there's an enormous anger, among that segment of the American population (which is quite sizable), against the Obama voters and supporters: the college students, the Jewish-American hedge fund managers, the fat cat public sector unionists, the hipsters, the Hollywood actors and directors, the rock stars like Bruce Springsteen, the stupid soccer moms, the homosexual journalists at The New York Times, The Washington Post... Were I a white American 'conservative', my first impulse would be to approach one of these Obama voters and say, 'F*ck you, for making my life, and the lives of my countrymen, that little bit harder for the next four years'. The same goes for all the Australians, Canadians and Europeans who support Obama.

But really, I can't castigate these Obama-supporters: they are, after all, voting according to type, just as much as the African-Americans, who want their 'Obama phones', are. No, it's the white nationalists, the movement purists, in America, who deserve the anger.

White nationalism really is a contrived, ahistorical, abstract and universalist ideology. In a way, it's a form of Christianity: one is obliged to unconditionally love one's brethren, simply on the basis of their race, and ignore any unique ethnic, national and regionalist features. Such an enterprise is doomed to fail, of course, and historically, has never been enacted. Perhaps this is why white nationalism is so purist and aloof from the doings of the real world. Because it is so abstract, and doesn't take into account political realities, it counsels its followers not to engage in politics, in any shape or form.

America is a weak country under Obama, and for that, European nationalists should be grateful. Had Obama the gumption of a Franklin Roosevelt or a Winston Churchill, he would have invaded Greece and Hungary by now to 'stop fascism' by stamping out the Golden Dawn and Jobbik; he would have also loudly remonstrated with Germany and told it to stop bullying its fellow European nations (or perhaps, solicitously, offered those bullied nations some Marshall Plan-type aid - to get them on their feet again). But America (and Israel) have lost all interest in Europe, and will only pay attention if and when Germany starts inclining on the same path as Greece and Hungary. But by then it will be too late. We nationalists can pray and hope.

As for the American whites, well, they'll have to start looking at the political possibilities - outside of libertarianism, conservatism and white nationalism.

Sunday, October 7, 2012

The Undeserved: a Post-Mortem of the Obama Presidency

Nationalists and racialists, in general, don't pay much attention to elections. But I have been fascinated by the current presidential race, especially by the Obama-Romney debate. I read the transcript, watched the whole thing (one and a half hours long) and read every news article and piece of analysis on it... Why? Because the turning of the tide, in politics, is always interesting: how one can become a political winner - within the context of a US presidential race, or a Politburo leadership struggle - or a political loser, within the space of a few hours, reveals a lot about politics and the leadership process - and the masses who help put these leaders in power. In elections in which an incumbent is defeated, the masses - and the media - are infected by a sort of euphoria, especially when it becomes apparent that the victory of the challenger is assured. (I remember reading a biography of Carl Schmitt, describing the incredible scenes of jubilation, in the streets of Berlin, after Hitler's ascendancy to the chancellorship. In his diary, Schmitt wrote, wonderingly, how he saw a carnival atmosphere, and how everyone, from all works of life - including streetwalkers - were ecstatic...). It's hard for even a misanthrope like myself not to get caught up in the hype. I was very glad to see the back of John Howard, in November 2007, even though I didn't think much of Rudd; I was glad, too, to see McCain and the loathsome Republicans thrown out in November 2008, although I had doubts about Obama's economic program (I remember thinking to myself, 'But what's he going to do, once he gets into office?'). Even in 2000, I hoped that Bush Jr. would win over Al Gore, because I didn't think I could endure life on this planet with the prissy, sanctimonious and pompous Gore as President of the United States.

I'm sure that these are the same feelings as many in the American electorate, and one, after a while, develops a 'nose' to see how the Americans will vote. It was fairly obvious to me, at the time, that the 'young' and 'progressive' Bill Clinton would win over the elderly, stentorian George Bush Sr. in 1992; likewise, that Obama would win over the semi-senile John McCain in 2008. As for incumbents, it was fairly clear, at the time, that Bush Jr. would win over John Kerry (an ageing Jewish-American with a grey Beatle wig and a tedious manner of speaking); and that the (at the time) switched-on, pro-growth Bush Sr. would win over Michael Dukakis (a dull, grey little man). (Sometimes one has to wonder how the party machines, for both the Republicans and Democrats, throws up such mediocre candidates who are clearly unelectable: McCain in 2008, Bob Dole in 1996, Dukakis in 1988. The answer to that is: often it's the case that there's no-one else).

Since my last post, I've re-read the opening chapters of Wanniski's The Way the World Works (1978) to gain a better understanding of his political model, as well as some old articles of his (on the 1980 and 1984 presidential campaigns). I'm awestruck: I don't think anyone understood, as much as Wanniski, the mechanics of elections, leadership selection and the liberal democratic political process (and, by extension, the political process in non-liberal states - e.g., communist one). Although I'm repelled, of course, by Wanniski's liberalism, Afro-Americo-philia, anti-Germanism and anti-Nazism and the rest, I try not to let that get in the way. His models and theories don't explain everything about politics, race and culture, any more than Marx's do; but we must use them as a kind of overlay - that is, we have to ask ourselves, 'How can such-and-such a political phenomenon be revealed, in the light of Wanniski's model', and see what the answer is.

In the Wanniski model, the electorate has a wisdom greater than the sum of its parts: given the choice between two (often unpalatable) alternatives, it chooses the best one. It should be thought of as a deaf-mute, who can only communicate by sign-language and gesticulating (in the same way that one does in the party game of charades). It instinctively prefers a candidate of the A-type, but, when A isn't to be found, has to choose between two other candidates, B and C. Because B is a little more like A than C is, it goes with B. What if the two candidates in question are not B and C, but are the equally unpalatable D and E? Again, the electorate will make the right choice, all things considered: perhaps E shows signs of not being as unpalatable as D.

The job of the politician is to be the interpreter of the deaf-mute electorate's desires - which are signalled, to him, by, not only the results in elections, but by opinion polls, the reactions of audiences at rallies and speeches, letters to the editor, personal attacks on his character (leading all the way up to assassination attempts, which, according to Wanniski, can convey the desires of a certain segment of the electorate).

Wanniski explains the process by using the economic concept of marginality as an example. 'The last straw that broke the candidate's back' - that's the marginal straw. We could say that the addition of that straw was at the margin - the point where change takes place. Were that last, marginal straw endowed with consciousness, it wouldn't be able to understand why, precisely, its addition broke the camel's back. But were the previous thousand or so pieces of straw, plus the marginal one, all endowed with consciousness - then it would understand. As it is for the straws, so it is for the voters, who, together, form a 'group mind' (and which, like that marginal straw, doesn't recognise itself as part of a totality).

Wanniski's theories explain why it is that the House of Representatives, in the US, goes to the Democrats when the President is a Republican, and vice versa: the electorate is, through its voting, trying to balance things out. In the last (2010) Australian federal election, the Labor government was returned to power as a minority, with an electoral majority of just one seat. Wanniski would say that, obviously, the electorate was sending Prime Minister Gillard and Labor a message: we want you in, but don't make any radical changes, like Rudd (the former Labor Prime Minister) did with his mining tax proposal. With the Labor government hanging by a thread after the election, it was presumed (by the electorate) that Labor wouldn't feel as though it had the mandate to undertake any unpopular experiments.

We in Australia know what happened, of course: Labor went ahead and forced through the unpopular, environmentalist carbon tax through parliament and the senate (where the Greens had the deciding vote), despite promising, before the election, not to do so. As a result, Gillard's popularity plummeted and Labor is facing wipeout at the next election. Wanniski would say that the electorate wants to punish Gillard for her broken promises and for ignoring the message of the 2010 electoral results. (Had she shelved the mining tax, and ignored calls for a carbon tax, she'd be a lot more popular than she is now). Labor's only consolation is that the opposition leader, Abbott, who is the leader of the conservative Liberal-National coalition, is even more dislikable, on a personal level, than Gillard is. (Abbott has recently embarked on a media campaign to make himself more 'likable', to humanise himself in the eyes of the electorate: whether he succeeds or not (and nothing can make this odious little man likable or popular) is another story altogether. It's possible he may be deposed in a party coup).

I think most mainstream analysts get all this - how the electorate operates like a hive-mind (Wanniski, famously, said that Washington, and Congress and the Senate, represent the brain of America). What's more controversial is Wanniski's thesis that the electorate understands economics, perfectly, and what's more, is supply-side in its orientation. It wants a supply-side leader, but, if it can't have one, will choose a socialist who will focus on wealth distribution and shielding his constituents from the effect of economic calamity.

Wanniski's doctrine on this point helps explain the rise of Obama in 2008.

From the supply-side point of view, the financial crisis of 2008 can be explained by the phenomena of monetary deflation. In the lead-up to the summer of 2008, Bernanke flooded the markets with liquidity - US dollars - which led to a depreciation of the US dollar and a dramatic rise in the price of land and other commodities (including gold, which went up from $USD275 an ounce in 2001 to $1000 an ounce). All of this was redolent of the 1970s, when the US - and the world - went off gold and experienced a massive inflation. In that decade, the prices of gold, oil, land and other commodities rose into the stratosphere. Accompanying this was a big expansion in investment and lending (as banks tried to offload a rapidly-declining US dollar and pass it on to someone else, as though it were a hot potato). But the day of reckoning came. In both inflations - the 1970s inflation and the 2000s - there was a sudden reversal of course. In the early 1980s, the Fed suddenly withdrew liquidity - or didn't provide it at the rate it was being demanded - and, as a result, the price of gold, oil and other commodities collapsed. (Gold went from $USD850 an ounce to $US600 and then $USD300). The big oil-producing nations like Iran and Iraq, and the big commodity producers like Chile and Australia, went temporarily bust. Similarly, in the deflationary summer of 2008, commodity prices collapsed (gold went from $USD1000 an ounce to $USD700 an ounce) and so did the real estate speculators, mortgage holders and banks which had plowed enormous amounts of money mortgage-backed securities. All of this happened under the watch of a Republican, George Bush Jr. - who was a supply-sider when it came to tax cuts, but, when it came to monetary policy, was a Keynesian or a monetarist (in all fairness, he wasn't the one deciding monetary policy - Bernanke was).

The defeat of the Republican Party in 2008, then, was inevitable. Seeing that none of the candidates for the Democratic and Republican nominations, in 2008, understood - or appeared to understand - supply-side monetary policy, it was natural that the presidency should go to a socialist who would devote his attentions to welfarism and wealth redistribution.

The supply-side tax cuts, which the Republican Party traditionally specialised in, wouldn't help solve the problem: only supply-side monetary policy would. Seeing as the latter wasn't on offer, the US electorate, understandably, chose the lesser of two evils. Obama's economic platform demanded tax increases - a roll-back of the Bush Jr. tax cuts, and an increase of the capital gains tax rate from 15% to 28% - but the electorate discounted this, perhaps feeling that Obama would be unable to implement his tax hikes (in any case, it was right).

But, in the words of John Tamny, after the 2008 financial crisis, Bernanke 'doubled-down' on his inflationary monetary policy. Perhaps recognising that the problem was deflation, he set about to injecting huge amounts of liquidity into circulation. But he ended up over-compensating, stepping on the gas pedal too much. With QE1, QE2 and now QE3, gold has risen to hitherto unknown heights: last year it reached a record high of $US1889 an ounce.

Perhaps Bernanke wanted to trigger off another banking or real estate bubble. Wanniski observed that the economic model of the monetarists relies on something he calls 'money illusion'. The central bank engineers a devaluation, thus bringing about a rise in prices. The general public sees prices rise, and thinks that these are due to a real increase in the national wealth, a real boom; it thereby goes out and spends and produces more, and increases its economic activity. If the central bank tries the same thing twice, however, the general public will see through the deception and recognise the second round of price rises as being mere inflation. In other words, it will see that these rises are due to nominal, not real, factors: that is, that the rises come about from printing money, not economic growth.

At any rate, things have stayed rather flat since Bernanke began his 'quantitive easing', and none of it has had the desired economic effect. The same goes for Obama's enormous deficit-spending on public works, etc., deficit-spending for the sake of it, all designed to 'pump-prime' the economy in the Keynesian manner.

Obama is possibly the most anti-supply-side Democrat President of all time. Wanniski praised Carter for reducing the capital gains tax rate from 35% to 28% in 1978, and Clinton for cutting it from 28% to 20% in 1997 (and cutting taxes on Roth-IRAs). Kennedy, of course, was a supply-side icon for his huge Reaganesque tax cut plan of 1963, which saw a reduction in the top rate of income tax from 91% to 70% and in the rate of corporate tax from 52% to 48%. (Ironically, Kennedy's tax cuts were blocked by 'fiscal conservatives' in Congress, and didn't pass until 1964, after his death, at the urging of Lyndon Johnson). In other words, Kennedy, Johnson, Carter and Clinton were, in the words of Wanniski, 'pro-growth' and nascent supply-siders. Obama, on the other hand, has vociferously fought for huge tax increases - and may get his way soon (hence the upcoming 'fiscal cliff). Kennedy began his presidency with a mild leaning towards socialism, but, after encountering a stubborn recession, began contemplating supply-side remedies. Perhaps the electorate believed that Obama would undergo a similar conversion. But he didn't.

What does all this add up to? It adds up to a Democrat who, economically, is a clone of George Bush Jr. when it comes to monetary policy, but unlike Bush Jr. and Clinton, is anti-supply-side on fiscal policy.

What of the foreign policy? Again, it's a continuation of Bush's failed policies. Prior to the 1970s, the Anglo-Saxons ruled the Western world: America was the dominant power, with Britain acting as a 'junior partner'. The story of America, after the 1970s, is the displacement of Britain from the position of 'junior partner' by Israel, and then, finally, a reversal of 'senior' and 'junior' positions by the late 1990s: Israel became the senior partner, America the junior partner. Obama has continued in that vein, as will Romney, of course, if elected.

If we were to assess Obama from the Jewish-Israeli viewpoint - as a good little goyische tool of Jewish-Israeli and Jewish-American interests - we find that Obama hasn't done much good, foreign policy-wise. As a statesman of the Judeo-Anglo Empire, he was meant to have expanded American and Israeli hegemony, but didn't. (I don't consider the assassination of Bin Laden as a foreign policy 'success', because I don't think that that assassination was real - I think it was a hoax. Unlike Ghaddafi, we never got to see Bin Laden's body). Libya was a success story of sorts, but Libya, post-Ghaddafi, is highly volatile - as we have seen after the recent murder of the US Ambassador (who, ironically enough, posed for photographs next to Ghaddafi's corpse (no-one posed next to Bin Laden's corpse)). Obama has been criticised by "conservative" (that is, maniacally pro-Israeli) Jewish-Americans for not being sufficiently enthusiastic about bombing Iran. (The same "conservatives" have been mostly quiet on the withdrawal of troops from Iraq - even they see that the Iraq mission was a failure). This doesn't mean, however, that Jewish-Americans, on the whole, don't vote Democrat and won't vote for Obama this November.

In politics, one can't please everybody. Obama's foreign policy platform was more or less Bush-ite, but he managed to portray himself - to the liberals, pacifists and college students who voted for him - as a dovish anti-neo-con. Weren't they fooled! But, if you vote for a Democrat or a Republican in the 21st century, you're putting yourself in league with the devil. The Democrats and the Republicans are now the war party, just as Roosevelt and Churchill were in the 1930s, and, like Roosevelt and Churchill, they are willing to go to war for Jewish causes... (I couldn't give two hoots, of course, as to whether or not a grubby Afghan or Pakistani militant gets killed by a drone plane, or if Iran's reactors get bombed; but I do feel that the American voter, in 2012, should know what he's getting into).

But to return to the topic of the economy. The Bush Jr. years have reinforced the lesson that supply-side fiscal policy is no good without supply-side monetary policy. Carter signed off on a sizeable capital gains tax cut in 1978, but was undone by the Federal Reserve, which proceeded to devalue the US dollar all the way up to $USD850 an ounce of gold in 1980. Clinton was fortunate that, in 1997, when he signed off on his capital gains tax cut, the Reserve had been keeping the US gold dollar price more or less stable since 1982, and continued to do so (more or less) through his second term, which saw a huge economic boom. Bush Jr's tax cuts in 2003, however, weren't as effective as they could have been because, like Carter, he was undermined by bad monetary policy by the Federal Reserve. A state can have the best fiscal policy in the world - with low taxes which give incentives to produce, and, what's more, are easy to pay - but if that state has a central bank which wants to emulate Zimbabwe, or the early Weimar Republic, and embark on a destructive course - then that state will suffer.

Belatedly, the leadership élite of the US has begun to recognise this. Certain of the élite is beginning to express its disquiet with  Bernanke's 'quantitative easings'; some are even beginning to suggest that the answer to America's monetary problems may be a return to gold.

The trouble is, however, Obama, who may help deliver a fiscal whammy. The fact that Obama wants this so badly really makes him uncharacteristic. As can be seen from the US political history recounted here, for the most part, presidents - even Democrats - are biased towards supply-side tax-cutting, and the Democrat presidents tend to be centrist and pro-business. Obama isn't, though: he's well to the left of Bill Clinton.

The question is, why? Not why is he left-wing (as opposed to centrist), but why was he selected, by the Democrats, as a presidential candidate? Normally, the Democrat president would be a centrist type who, while probably not being able to do much, wouldn't have run up such a deficit and wouldn't have gone after the Bush Jr. and Clinton tax cuts with such zeal. Left-types like Obama exist in every liberal democratic party, and indeed, are necessary - they are a complement to that party. But they are usually kept in the background. Obama, of course, was pushed to the fore - by the Democrat party machine, and by the voters in the 2008 primaries.

Another remarkable thing is that Obama is such a non-entity, politically and intellectually speaking - as evinced by his performance in the debate, he doesn't seem to have much energy or enthusiasm for the top job - and really can't work with other people (during the debt deal in late 2011, Nancy Pelosi reportedly put him on mute during a conference call, so she and the other Democrat negotiators wouldn't have to put up with his droning voice). In other words, he doesn't have the necessary skills to be the leader of the United States (and, for his entire adult life, hasn't showed any evidence of much leadership in any capacity). On top of that, he doesn't respond well to criticism, mainly because - unlike Bush Jr., or Clinton - he's never received any, at least from the mainstream media.

The conservative blogger (who writes for the US anti-immigrant site VDare) Steve Sailer penned a biography of Obama, America's Half-Blood Prince: Barack Obama's "Story of Race and Inheritance" (2008), before Obama was elected (he wanted America to know what it was getting into). In it, he outlines these character traits of Obama's, which, finally, the mainstream commentators are beginning to pick up on. (We now see analyses with titles like, 'Does Obama really want this job?'). One of Sailer's theses is that Obama marketed himself, consciously, as a black politician white liberal voters would feel comfortable with. In the (perhaps apocryphal) words of Senator (later Vice-President) Joe Biden, 'He's the well-spoken one we've been waiting for'. Obama (along with his wife) got where they were mainly through affirmative action. What's more, he hasn't been criticised as roundly as prior presidents (or scrutinised) because journalists and commentators are terrified of being called 'racist'.

Wanniski had some good things to say on affirmative action. He believed that having ethnic minorities on the board of one's organisation could be useful, in that it exposed that organisation to the minority point of view. Which is reasonable enough. There are 34 million Afro-Americans in the US, and no president, or party, can afford not to take them and their interests into account. (In an ideal white nationalist world, there would only be white people in the US: but, as it is, any liberal democratic politician has to deal with this sizeable minority).

But, having said that, were it the case that Obama occupied his job only because of affirmative action - that would be an injustice. It's not that his being there prevents a good, more well-qualified, white person from doing the job: I don't really have any pity for any white, or Jewish, Democrat candidates who were passed over in favour of the black guy. No, it's that Obama received what he has without deserving it, he doesn't merit it. Sailer raises that point, again and again: had Obama not been black, and the 'right kind' of black (that is, a black politician acceptable to white voters), he wouldn't have gotten the job. (Obama is meant to be an 'intellectual', but the evidence shows that all he's ever written or thought about was race (as Sailer chronicles at length). He, like a good many other black 'intellectuals' (e.g., Touré), can't write on anything except race. The Jewish-American leftist, Leni Bremmer, observed that the great Jewish Zionist-nationalist Vladimir Jacobtinsky couldn't write on anything except Jewish matters. Given that only a small proportion of humanity is interested in such things, Jacobtinsky's thought was bound to have a small appeal. In other words, it was boring to most people. The same goes for the writing of the Obamas and Tourés).

After the debate, liberal commentators are beginning to realise that their idol has feet of clay. And it's possible that the 'first Black president' may be the last - at least for the time being. Sailer argues that Obama represents the zenith of Afro-American political power in the US: Obama will be the equivalent of David Dinkins (the mayor of New York from 1990 to 1993), who was the first and only Afro-American to hold that office (New York has only elected whites and Jewish-Americans since then). Sailer mischievously observes that liberal whites have become a little tired of having Afro-Americans as their favoured, pet minority, and may soon take up the cause of an even more suffering, put-down-upon people - gays (which helps explain the recent push, by liberals, for gay marriage). (Given that reasoning: Obama, according to rumour, is a homosexual - perhaps he could boost his political career by divorcing Michelle and coming out of the closet?).

But this brings us to the question why Obama isn't good enough. The subject of Afro-American incompetence is a touchy one, to say the least. In the liberal narrative, Afro-Americans have always been as good as whites, in any capacity, but have always been held back by racist whites, who don't regard Afro-Americans as equals, have built up myths of white racial superiority, and don't recognise the sterling virtues of Afro-Americans. But the recent debate performance has given this liberal narrative a drubbing. Not that, for liberal white commentators, it's beginning to unravel: no. But they are beginning to confront Obama's deficiencies, and perhaps are thinking, to themselves, the naughty thought: 'A white guy wouldn't have done as badly as that'. (One conservative blogger for The Washington Times remarked, sneeringly, that to say Obama was as bad as Carter in the debate of 1980 is an insult to Carter). Hence the amusing on-air breakdown of liberal journalist Chris Matthews over Obama.

I was struck, in watching the debate, by how Romney appeared to be a headmaster scolding a disobedient pupil (Obama) in his office (with Obama staring at his feet, glowering and nodding); or how Romney appeared to be a judge in court sentencing some malefactor. Other people have picked up on this - and the racial overtones. As the liberal commentator Henry Porter writes, in The Guardian (where else):

That the president is black, that he seemed dog tired and often glanced at his notes when Romney was speaking had an uncomfortable but rarely acknowledged resonance in the US. I am sorry to have mention this, but the contrast between the black guy, momentarily off his game and looking downwards, and the white guy, all crisp, clear-eyed and on top of things, will register in the subconscious of an electorate that is far from being free of racism. ['Has a disillusioned Barack Obama lost the will to win?', The Guardian, 07/10/2012].

The fact that millions of Afro-American politicians are prepared to vote for a candidate because of his race, is not "racist", of course: race-based voting is only racist when white people do it. But let's not go into that... We know how unfair and unjust the anti-white brigade (of which Porter, and the entire staff of The Guardian, are members) is.

John Tamny wrote an attack on Romney after the debate, chiding him for not being sufficiently neoliberal and supply-side (see 'Presidential Debate: Romney Started Slow, Then Thoroughly Beat Obama'), which missed the point. Romney sounded Wanniskian enough (especially when he declared that the only way to boost tax revenue was to boost growth, and employment, and he showed himself to be concerned about inflation, which he recognises - unlike Obama or Bernanke - as a problem). But the debate wasn't a lesson in supply-side economics, or a sermon on neoliberalism, markets and so forth: it was about (rather dry topics such as) Obamacare, Medicare, Bowles-Simpson, Dodd-Frank and waiving tax deductions (I found Romney's position on tax to be mostly incomprehensible, as did, I'm sure, most viewers). The main thing is that Romney repositioned himself, and had taken Wanniski's advice and started listening to the electorate - all of it. Porter sees this:

But whatever the subliminal traffic of the debate, there is no doubt that Obama conceded important territory by allowing Romney to stake a claim for the presidency as a unifying figure, the candidate who, despite his privileged background, tax records, offshore bank accounts and the export of American jobs to China, could heal the rift in American politics.
Romney sold his record as governor in Massachusetts, where he worked with a large Democrat majority, as the qualification for ending the logjam in Washington: he was the man to walk across the aisle and do business with the other side.
While incanting the creed that espouses individual choice and enterprise over big government and centralised authority, Romney shifted to the centre ground and simultaneously implied that Obama was, in fact, the divisive figure of US politics. A successful completion of this move may be as dangerous to Obama as the spooky invocation of Ronald Wilson Reagan. [Ibid.]

The point is that, to be a leader (in the US, or China, or wherever), you don't need to be a supply-side economist (like Tamny is), but a listener - and someone who can 'work with the other side' (that is, the representatives of the side of the electorate which didn't vote for you). One of the common complaints of average Americans (when interviewed on TV) is that Washington is full of obstructionism, logjam-ism, 'partisan gridlock', and so forth. A leader who can untangle that Gordian knot is far more desirable, and acceptable, to voters than one with an excellent fiscal and monetary policy. This is why the men with impeccable supply-side platforms - men like Herman Cain, Rick Perry, Tim Pawlenty - are passed over in favour of the Romneys. Americans, in 2012, will only vote for a Republican who is a bland centrist like Gerard Ford. Romney, with his recent repositioning, fits the bill nicely. Someone like Newt Gingrich, who antagonises people even within his own party, and who doesn't change (the way Romney does) in response to negative feedback, doesn't fit the bill.

What does all this mean for nationalism? Edward S. Rubenstein has been writing an interesting series at VDare.Com, suggesting that the majority of jobs created, since the start of the Obama administration, are being snatched up by immigrants and taken away from white and Afro-American people. He uses the official US Household Survey (which breaks down the data by ethnicity). His latest instalment, reflecting Friday's US unemployment numbers, is here. Romney will be under pressure, from both the Left and Right, to give a blanket amnesty to the 11.5 million illegals in the US, and to invite more legal immigrants ('skilled' immigrants, that is, Indians) to live there after they finish a degree (exactly the same system which led to a tripling of the Indian population in Australia after 2004). Not that Romney needs pressuring: he's a multi-culti maniac like the rest.

At present, the polls (which have been confused and confusing for this election) suggest a tight contest, like Gore and Bush Jr. in 2000, or Kennedy and Nixon in 1960, which could go either way. I would very much like to see Obama lose, because I want to see the back of him - and I would enjoy the outrage and disappointment of the white liberals who support him. (Indeed, the title of Porter's article implies that it's not that Obama wasn't good enough, it's that we weren't good enough for him. Obama, if he does depart the vale of tears which is the US presidency, will be yet another victim of white racism).

The well-being of a kingdom depends on its king. The demeanour, the persona, of a ruler has an effect on his subjects... Australia is part of the Judeo-Anglo Empire. One has to ask what the effects on the American national psyche (and the Western psyche) have been, for the past four years, of having a diffident, withdrawn, closeted homosexual as a ruler, whose 'soaring rhetoric' doesn't add up to that much, who looks down his nose when addressing people, and who is an Afro-American - an ethnic minority group which, traditionally, is not enamoured of white people like myself.

I often find, when interacting with Chinese, Indian and African immigrants - even ones my own age - is that their appreciation and understanding of the white Western culture is shallow. They can only discuss the most recent and superficial things - e.g., Twitter, Facebook, the sports game, the latest multiplex blockbuster movie - and, if they do like Western pop or rock music, they only know the very latest pop and R & B tunes (not for them the Beatles, the Stones or the Eagles). It's the same with the likes of Obama - I only have things in common with him that I do with Kanye West or Oprah Winfrey, which is not that much at all. Whereas other, past presidents, I have, at least, a shared cultural past: Clinton and Bush Jr. escaped, like my father, the draft, Bush Sr. was a WWII pilot, like my grandfather. Clinton's favourite band was Fleetwood Mac, Bush Jr's favourite song, Van Morrison's 'Brown-Eyed Girl'...

It's for this reason that I just can't warm to Obama. The fact that he's made a career of opposing himself, ideologically, culturally and intellectually, to evil racist whites, only reinforces this.

Saturday, September 22, 2012

Romney or Obama '12? American Jews, the Euro and a Return to Gold

'Carthage must be destroyed': I've always, so long as I've been a nationalist, subscribed to the notion that 'America must be destroyed'. (I mean, by 'America' what I call 'The Anglo-Judeo Alliance' (America, Israel, the United Kingdom)). In the 1930s, after the election of Roosevelt, the US, the UK and Jewish-Americans entered into a sinister alliance, which proved to be the most destructive and malevolent force in the history of Western civilisation up to that time; the alliance, as we know, started (and finished) WWII, laid waste to Europe, enslaved the Western half and gave over the Eastern half to communism... We nowadays assume that America was always liberal, anti-"racist", anti-German, pro-Israel and pro-immigrant, but that wasn't the case: America only took that turn comparatively recently, in the past eighty years after Roosevelt. (Likewise, "The West" has only been liberal, pro-Israel, etc., since 1945). We in the West are still in the grip of three men - Roosevelt, Churchill and Churchill's friend and political accomplice Chaim Waizmann - who have been running the show, in effect, since the 1930s. It's this sinister alliance which has been at the root cause of all the problems in the West since then. Which is why I look at anything that sets today's America - Roosevelt's America - back with untrammelled glee.

Having said that, there are two Americas: there is today's America - the America of Wal-Mart, Zionism, anti-depressants, Afro-Americophililia which venerates Martin Luther King Jr. as a secular saint - and the 'old', good America of the immediate post-war period, which is portrayed by the TV series, Mad Men (2007-2012). Paradoxically, it's the old America - which was run by handsome, immaculately-groomed WASPs like Don Draper - which bombed German cities, occupied half of Germany, cut German rations below starvation levels, and tortured and hanged Germans at Nuremberg, and it's the old America I prefer to today's. I wouldn't like to live in 1962, of course - I don't think anyone of my generation could survive a day without mobile phones or the Internet or DVDs - but, in the old America (and old Australia) of 1962, I would have lived in an ethnically-homogeneous society. America, right now, is suffering - from its defeats in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, from Obamanomics, from enormous Mestizo immigration, from blighted cities like Detroit, from geopolitical decline - but this isn't the same America that enforced the Morgenthau Plan, and it's not the America of WASP scions Don Draper, Bert Cooper and Roger Sterling (who would have been horrified by Obama). If there were any justice in the world, the old America should be the one suffering, not the new, but such is life.

The question is, who should, in the upcoming US presidential elections, a nationalist support? Who do we want to win? Who will (inadvertently) help the nationalist cause the most?

After September 11, it became clear that the perpetrators of the attack (whoever they were) had gauged American psychology beautifully. The perpetrators sought to provoke America and give it the impetus to undertake rash, precipitous action - i.e., invade a country like Afghanistan, which they couldn't possibly hope to conquer (at least, by using their standard conventional-warfare tactics) and thus give it its second Vietnam. The results, in 2012, are better than could be expected: two lost wars, and on top of that, America's proxies Israel and George lost a total of three wars. It would take a very skillful leadership to negotiate one's state to an improved power-position, in spite of such a succession of military defeats, or perhaps really good luck (America won half of Europe off the Soviet Union, nearly fifteen years following its catastrophic defeat in Indochina). America, fortunately, doesn't have that skillful leadership. Military defeats have led to a geopolitical decline, a loss in power and prestige. America has lost Nicaragua, Bolivia and Venezuela (which are now firmly in the anti-American camp), longtime enemies Russia and China have become stronger, and long-suppressed Germany and Turkey are, incredibly, beginning to resume their natural leadership roles (perhaps, at this rate, even Japan may awaken after its seventy-year slumber). This is quite a fall from the late 1990s, when America (and Israel) were at the peak of their political and economic strength.

The reason why this is important to nationalism is because the internal policy of a country - e.g., the ideology of its leadership - is largely determined by external geopolitics. Fascism, in the 1920s and 1930s, would never have gotten off the ground without the example of Germany and Italy, and the fact that Western Europe has been so liberal democratic, so pro-Zionist, for seventy years comes about from the Allied victory in 1945. Were the Allies - that is, Churchill, Roosevelt and Waizmann and their spiritual heirs -  to suddenly become geopolitically weak, then the ideology of Europe would change. Just as Libya, Syria and Egypt, in the absence of the Arab secular socialism of Ghaddafi, Assad and Mubarak, stand in danger of turning towards the most extreme (Salafist) Islamism - Europe could turn to Far Right conservatism and fascism.

The Left understands this process very well. Both Mao and Lenin attributed the success of communism in their countries in part to China's and Russia's military defeats at the hands of the Japanese and Germans respectively. Without the displacements brought about by war, China and Russia would probably have remained non-communist. In the case of Europe and Germany, it's all about getting the boot - the American jackboot - of one's neck. Once that boot is removed, Europe can breathe a little more freely, and then start behaving like itself.

In order for German nationalism - and by nationalism, I mean the ideology of the German NPD, the DVP, the Freie Nationalisten and others - to succeed, certain fundamentals must be in place. Germany has to be strong again. And what is good for Germany, in this case, is good for Europe and all of the West.

In the post-WWI, Weimar period, Germany was stronger, politically, more sovereign than it was now (surprisingly enough). America, which was largely responsible for the Allied victory, had no interest in occupying Germany and making Europe a permanent vassal (although it did interfere by breaking up the Austro-Hungarian Empire, giving Poland its independence, and so forth). As a result, Germany, France, Italy, Britain, were largely left to their own devices. France quickly became the ascendant power on the Continent (much to the alarm of Britain) and pushed Germany around quite a bit; but, all the same, Germany was never as pulverised, demoralised and brainwashed as it was after 1945. After Hitler's ascent to power, of course, Germany became steadily more powerful, more sovereign, and resumed its old, traditional role of The German Bully. It goes without saying that this would never have happened had the Allies been as brutal and repressive in 1918 as they were in 1945.

Which helps explain why nationalism, in Europe, can only be achieved in stages. I've always thought that the likes of the NPD were too ambitious for this reason: I want to say to them, 'Hang on a minute, Germany has been under Anglo-Judeo occupation - politically and mentally - for the good part of seventy years; and now you want it to become a great, powerful and sovereign nation, like it was in WWI and WWII, and the Weimar era, and thus bring down the wrath and enmity of the USA and Israel upon your heads'. One has to walk before one can run. Fortunately, Germany is beginning to walk. Prior to 2011-2012, Germany was part of that amorphous entity called 'Europe', that is, the EU, and if there was a sovereign state in the EU, it was Brussels. Now, of course, Germany has leaped to the forefront and de facto owns the Continent.

It's as though a long-running company - let's call it Western Civilisation Holdings, European Division - had a CEO who all of a sudden became sick and unable to perform his duties (interestingly, Forbes had a recent article, 'New York Times proves Clint Eastwood correct - Obama is a lousy CEO', 03/09/2012). The members of the board get together and discuss the worsening situation: 'It's evident that we need a new CEO to replace this one. Who is there? Why not that Fritz guy? He can do the job... In truth, there's no-one but him who'll take it on anyway'. Fritz is a former CEO, who was demoted a long time ago in an internal coup following a scandal - a man of great competence and skill, who is known for being hard but fair, capable of getting the job done, but something of a bully. If you want Fritz, you have to obey him unconditionally, and overlook his abrasive manner, his guttural way of speaking. The board decides: 'We've no choice! Fritz it is'. And Fritz resumes his old position, without barely batting an eyelid - it's as though he never was away. Formerly, there was resistance to him, but now, because of the extent of the crisis, there is none. Fritz doesn't gloat over his return to power; Fritz is where he is because, in part, he's not the type to gloat. Instead, he sits down with the board members, opens the company's books, and recounts, in a pedantic fashion, the company's rather dire fiscal position, and the harsh measures needed to remedy it...

Today's Germany, and its liberal democratic politicians, of course, are far away from being nationalist. But at least it is slowly clawing its way back to its position in 1918, when the Kaiser abdicated and German liberals and communists instituted the Weimar Republic. Things in politics take time - it's taken Germany seventy years to reach its current position...

The same could be more or less said of Turkey, and who knows, maybe even Japan will grow a backbone. To me, however, the main concern is Europe - as Kevin MacDonald says, 'The [nationalist] revolution will begin in Europe', and I think that things, as they are in Europe, are progressing nicely. My only fear is a resurgence in American strength. One can never say never in politics, and it's possible that the Anglo-Judeo Empire may come roaring back. In other words, the match is still ongoing, and one shouldn't call the match at half-time. In this instance, however, I'm not willing to be prudent, and I think that America (and Israel) are down and out. They aren't going to have the streak of luck that they had in the 1980s, with the resurgence of America under Reagan, the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and then the Soviet Union - and the surreptitious abandonment, by its enemies China and Vietnam, of the communist project.

The fate of America has implications for Australia, of course. Australia has never been a sovereign nation: prior to the 1930s, it was a vassal of Britain, and then, when America began its big acquisition of European states - Britain, France and Poland - the British subsidiary, Australia, came under American ownership. The absence of sovereignty is not necessarily a bad thing: small states, like Romania, or Belgium, have traditionally been content to let a bigger country run things, and let's face it, not every country wants to be a leader. But when the sovereign power, the 'protector', of Australia, is the Anglo-Judeo Empire, then Australia has problems. Jewish-Americans determine America's foreign policy (and, by extension, Australia's) and a large part of its internal policy as well. This wouldn't be a problem if Jewish-Americans were a race of super-beings, but the fact is that they're not. White people make mistakes - it was a series of mistakes by President Herbert Hoover which brought about the Great Depression, and the ascent of Roosevelt, and his Jewish-American 'advisors', to political power. But (so the classical anti-Semite thesis runs), Jews, in the long run, tend to make more mistakes than white people.

Which brings us back to the problems of economics. Many advocates of supply-sideism believe (correctly) that America's, and the West's, economic problems today are largely the result of America, and the world's, abandonment of the gold standard and the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in 1971. They are perfectly right in this, I believe, and had America been still on gold, the 2008 financial crisis (and its aftermath) would never have happened. But the supply-side analysts are mistaking the effect for the cause. One has to ask: why did America abandon gold? It had stayed on gold for a hundred years prior to 1971, out of a belief that abandoning gold, and undertaking a system of floating exchange rates, would lead to inflation, disorder and ruin (as it did during the American Civil War, when America (briefly) abandoned gold). My thesis is that Nixon broke up Bretton Woods, and left gold, largely at the urging of his (Jewish-American) economists, and what's more, stayed off gold because of those same economists (initially, he put it about that the abandonment of gold was a temporary measure, but, after he announced, in 1973, that the float was permanent, he oversaw a huge stock market collapse - which was, in real terms, the worst collapse in value since 1929). We know the results, of course, of Nixon's decision: monetary chaos and disorder (which led to, among other things, the creation of the euro). The reason why Nixon, and subsequent US presidents, didn't reverse this decision was because Jewish-Americans occupied all the positions of power and influence - in finance, economics, journalism, academia and so forth. Classical anti-Semitism says that Jews will make the wrong decisions, again and again, more often than not; it also says that Jews prefer chaos to order. It's almost as though they gain a pleasure and delight in flushing a country down the tubes, while not being consciously aware that they are doing so. (Indeed, when they lead a country, as they do America, they will blame its travails, not on themselves and their bad decisions, but on external circumstances of which they have no control; what's more, they will make problems out to be more difficult than they actually are; and claim that these problems are, ultimately, insoluble).

America's progress, economically, under Obama has been an interesting textbook study in Keynesianism: to whit, Keynesianism has been tested under near-perfect laboratory conditions, and been shown not to work. Obama has devalued the currency against gold, just like Roosevelt did, and instituted a huge program of public works and deficit spending, like Roosevelt; he has also sought to raise taxes - like Roosevelt - to an astronomic degree - he hasn't achieved this goal yet, but may, if he gets his way and allows the Bush Jr. tax cuts to expire and levies new taxes (we can see his proposed tax hikes from this article from the Wall Street Journal):

It's enough to make a supply-sider choke. Obama wants these tax increases because he's an instinctive socialist, of course, but mainly, he wants them because he's a Keynesian. The old New Deal / Keynesian doctrine was that the economy was driven by consumer spending. Because the poor spend their money more than the rich (who have a tendency to save), the rich have to be taxed and their wealth redistributed to the poor - who will go on and spend it. (At the same time, interest rates have to be driven down, so that people will save less and spend more). All this is designed to bring about 'full employment' - something which is conspicuously absent under the Obama administration.

Bernanke, of course, has been the partner in crime, monetarily, with Obama. The Keynesian monetary doctrine is that the currency has to be devalued until it's a worthless peso, in order to bring about an inflation, 'lower interest rates', 'boost exports' and 'create jobs' (not that the policy of devaluation has done much good for Zimbabwe). The US Federal Reserve has succeeded spectacularly in implementing devaluation: since 2000, the US dollar has been devalued, against gold, by nearly 800%. (In contrast, Roosevelt devalued the dollar from $USD20 a gold ounce to $USD35 - a devaluation of 75%). Bernanke's third round of devaluation - or 'quantitative easing' - will, no doubt, devalue the dollar even more. (Because the global economy is so interconnected, other currencies - such as the Australian dollar, the pound and the euro - will have to be devalued in tandem). More rising commodity prices, more chaos, more political upheaval in the Middle East and the rest of the world, more US economic stagnation...

So what will the US presidential election bring? The founding text of supply-side economics is Jude Wanniski's The Way the World Works (1978), which is to supply-sideism what Keynes' General Theory- (1936) is to Keynesianism. Wanniski was a journalist by trade, not an economist (although he was tutored, in the supply-side doctrine, by two professional, academic economists, Robert Mundell and Arthur Laffer). One consequence of this is that half of Wanniski's great work is devoted to his unique musings on politics, in particular, electoral politics, or what he calls his 'political model'. The supply-sider, John Tamny, gives a capsule summary of it:

In The Way the World Works, the late Jude Wanniski’s classic 1978 book which explained how economies grow and contract, he introduced an electoral model that remains controversial to this day. Put plainly, Wanniski argued that the electorate always gets things right, or in his words:
“…the electorate as a whole is wiser than any individual member in understanding its interests, it is wiser than any economist or group of economists.”

No doubt many readers are scratching their heads in response to the above, but as Wanniski put it to the late William F. Buckley (paraphrase), “You’re likely smarter than every individual inside a packed football stadium, but collectively those individuals are smarter than you are.” The wisdom of crowds….
The logical response is that if the electorate is so smart, why then did it foist on us ghastly presidents of the Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter, George W. Bush and Barack Obama variety? Isn’t the electorate instead overemotional, and too impassioned to vote the right people into office? Readers would have a point, but going back to Carter’s election, and really long before that, the electorate has gotten it right every time. We may not have always liked the end result, but the electorate has always been right.

['Jude Wanniski's Electoral Model Points To a Slim Romney Victory', Forbes, 16/09/2012.]
In the Wanniski electoral model, the electorate's wisdom is greater as a whole than in the sum of its parts, and pretty much has what the economists call 'perfect information', which Wikipedia summarises as thus:

In microeconomics, a state of perfect information is assumed in some models of perfect competition. That is, assuming that all agents are rational and have perfect information, they will choose the best products, and the market will reward those who make the best products with higher sales. Perfect information would practically mean that all consumers know all things, about all products, at all times (including knowing the probabilistic outcome of all future events), and therefore always make the best decision regarding purchase. This is physically impossible, however, as the Bekenstein Bound provides a physical limit to the amount of information that can be stored in a given physical system (in this case, a market participant). Still, perfect information is a common assumption in economic models because it allows mathematical derivation of desirable results. ['Perfect Information', Wikipedia]
In its collective wisdom, the electorate is an economist, and what's more, a supply-side economist. When it comes to elections, then, it prefers a politician who is a supply-sider. But when such a candidate isn't available (and more often than not, they aren't), the electorate will go for more of the same - or a socialist who will redistribute wealth to the suffering...

 Tamny does a good account of recent US electoral history, in the light of this model, and makes the interesting point that Obama really is the reincarnation, economically, of George W. Bush:

Readers can cite the long list of errors made by Obama since his election, I’ll agree with many of their criticisms, but the reality is that absent egregious errors of George W. Bush’s own making, there’s no President Obama today. Republicans can wail that they don’t recognize what the U.S. has become (funny because Obama extended the Bush tax cuts, followed Bush’s lead on the bailouts and nosebleed spending, reappointed Bush’s Fed appointee in Ben Bernanke, and doubled down on Bush’s weak dollar policies), but the reality is that policies given us by admittedly clueless Republicans gave us Obama. Of course in doubling down on Bush’s policies of dollar debasement, heavy spending and bailouts, along with his own personal disaster in the form of Obamacare, President Obama was disciplined by an all-knowing electorate.

Unbeknownst to Obama, Bush handed him the opportunity of a lifetime in the form of an economy that was on its back. Here it can’t be stressed enough that when economies are recessing, they are healing themselves. The greater the downturn the greater the recovery, and that’s the case because the greater the downturn, the more the healing that is occurring. If Obama had sat back and done nothing upon arrival in Washington, he would today be presiding over a nice recovery. And then if he’d sat back and done nothing while adopting Reagan/Clinton dollar policies, he’d be presiding over the kind of boom that would have him on the verge of a Reagan style victory circa 1984.
But as we all know, Obama wasn’t immune to the “do something” illness that endangers the political health of nearly every politician, and because he wasn’t, he proceeded to try and fix an economy that would have fixed itself if left alone. The pro-growth policy in Obama’s case was to be Clinton-like with the dollar, and then do little else. Obama reversed the latter playbook, he’s as a result presiding over a sick economy that should be strong, and as the electorate dislikes failures, Obama’s days in the White House are numbered. [Ibid.]
Tamny is, of course, quite disappointed in Romney, as are many supply-siders, Republicans and conservatives, but he still believes that Romney will be the winner:

Indeed, Obama’s only hope for a voter reprieve lies in his opponent, Mitt Romney. Oblivious to the historical truth that Americans consider themselves winners soon to be among the 1%, Romney has pursued his own version of class warfare with targeted tax cuts, China bashing that plays to society’s losers in a nation of winners, and an alteration of Obamacare that fails to remove one of its most offensive aspects: mandated insurance for those with pre-existing conditions.

Put plainly, Romney doesn’t understand an electorate that is seeking a growth message. The electorate is dying to fire Obama, history says it will given its aversion to failures, yet Romney’s timidity with regard to policies actually meant to grow the economy point to a close win for Romney when it should be a rout. Wanniski’s electoral model says so. [Ibid.]
I will say that, by supply-side standards, Romney's tax policies pass muster, as the above table shows: in 1986, Reagan cut the top rate of income tax to 28%, which is what Romney wants to do. The Republican Party thoroughly understands supply-side fiscal policy. The trouble is that the Republicans don't fully appreciate the supply-side doctrine on monetary policy, and the 'bad' monetary policy (i.e., massive dollar devaluations) swamps the 'good' fiscal policy. As Tamny observes:

Bush partisans point to the ’03 tax cuts, and while it’s true that those cuts were the only smart major legislation achieved on his watch, they were more than blunted by the above-mentioned mistakes, not to mention the Bush Treasury’s weak-dollar policies that revealed themselves on day one in the form of the much lamented Paul O’Neill. The list of errors by Bush (think steel and softwood lumber tariffs,  Ben Bernanke,  Harriet Miers, Obamacare designer John Roberts?) could surely fill a book, but with space in mind, his saving grace in 2004 was that the horrors of his dollar policies had not quite hit the economy yet, plus we were at war. The electorate unhappily gave him another shot; one it presumably came to regret.

Indeed, by 2006 so disgusted was the electorate with Bush that it handed control of the House and Senate back to the Democrats. Amid this handover, an economy sapping rush into housing was taking place thanks to a weak dollar that forced limited capital away from future seeing companies a la the Reagan/Clinton era, and into the tangible inflation hedges of yesterday. To remember what the housing boom was like one need only refer to the Gilder quote from earlier about the Carter years, but needless to say it slowed economic growth enough that mortgage payments from overextended borrowers seeking shelter in homes started to come in late, or not at all. [Ibid.]
The supply-siders, however, did achieve a victory insofar as Romney - at the urging of the supply-side wing of his party - has promised a 'Gold Commission' to investigate the feasibility of a return to the gold standard. The Reagan administration launched a Gold Commission in 1981, and because the Commission was dominated by monetarists (advocates of a Bernanke-like policy of floating exchange rates and devaluations), it came out against a return to gold. The supply-sider Brian Domitrovic, however, makes a convincing argument that the mere fact of a Gold Commission frightened the Federal Reserve into tightening monetary policy and ending the devaluation of the US dollar. Who knows how a second Gold Commission will turn out if Romney is elected.

I don't like Obama, Bernanke, Paul Krugman and the legions of monetarists and Keynesians very much. I'd like to see their economics thrown into the dustbin of history, and see the election of a US president who will bring back gold, who will show gold to be superior to the present system, and thus refute the nay-sayers and reduce them to an impotent rage. This is despite the fact that any revival of fortunes for America (and the Judeo-American Empire) would be against my own best interests as a nationalist. It's a purely intellectual exercise...

Romney is a nice enough fellow, but a bland creature - a LDS Mormon (that is, a non-polygamist Mormon) whose only motivation in life has been to make money. He is financed by the shadowy Jewish-American (and maniacal Israel-Firster - he has dual citizenship with both the US and Israel) Sheldon Adelson, and can be expected, of course, to carry out a pro-Israel foreign policy (including bombing Iran, if need be) once elected. Which really doesn't mean that much, in real terms: it doesn't portend Armageddon for the enemies of Israel and Jewry - Israel hasn't won a war since 1982. It will be the same old Roosevelt-Churchill-Waizmann gang (with Netanyahu playing the role of Waizmann), but much less powerful, geopolitically speaking. In other words, more of the same.

Like Reagan (and Hitler), I believe problems often have simple solutions. Europe has to go first towards nationalism, and then the rest of the West will follow. In order for Europe to 'go nationalist', a certain number of prerequisites have to be met. The euro has to be fixed to gold, and Europe has to achieve a certain level of economic self-sufficiency (a goal which can be reached - Europe's oil needs can be satisfied by Norway and Romania, also, oil can be imported from Russia). After that, the millions of Muslim, Indian and African immigrants can be persuaded - nicely - to leave. It's then that a certain number of important lifestyle questions can be addressed. Europe's cities need to go car-less, and much, much needs to be done for animal rights. Europe also has to enact a program of public education, warning its youth about the dangers of the homosexual lifestyle... Then there's a need to introduce the death penalty (for serious sexual crimes). But the economics has to be taken care of first. Luckily, Europe is moving, ever so slowly, towards self-sufficiency and a separation from the Anglo-Judeo global economic order, and towards Hitler's 'New European Order', or (the German ideologist Naumann's) 'Mittel Europa'.

What's the goal of all this? To ensure good lives for we white Westerners, and our children and grandchildren. America and Israel (and possibly Britain) will object, furiously, to the 'New Europe', but, over time, America and Britain (and Australia, New Zealand and Canada) will lean towards following the European example.

Tuesday, August 28, 2012

The Menace of Unity: To Uniform or not to Uniform?

Much of the nationalist political struggle isn't about impressing one's ideas on 'ordinary people' (however they may be defined), but about positioning oneself and one's ideology in relation to other nationalist groups. One does that in a number of ways. One can write articles and books explaining why one's 'line' is different from the other fellow's (in much the same way Lenin did for most of his political career, churning out endless treatises on why a rival Marxist theoritician's path was the wrong path, or why such-and-such a faction in the Russian socialist movement were bounders and blockheads). It's a useful and extremely important exercise - Lenin's diatribe writings have stood the test of time and are still used, by the contemporary Left, today. But there are other, more subtle, and more practical means: one of these is the multi-denominational event, when a bunch of nationalist individuals and groups turn up to listen to one another's speeches, or just socialise. The question is, how is one to stand out? Suppose you are hosting other nationalists at some venue, like King Henry VIII receiving some foreign dignitary (the King of Scotland, or the French Ambassador) in the TV show The Tudors (2007-2010). Your first duty is to impress upon them the power of your organisation. That means festooning the back wall with a giant banner with the logo of one's group, wearing a special, very distinctive t-shirt and cap with one's logo, and maybe even going so far as wearing tie-pins, belt buckles and rings with one's logo. That sounds excessive, but I can name at least three or four nationalist tendencies and groups which do a roaring trade in a range of nationalist, Far Right and racialist paraphenalia associated with their particular group. Skinheads will go to the extent of having jacket patches and even tattoos with their group symbols. All of this 'visual propaganda' serves the purpose of sending a variety of messages - unspoken messages - to the groups of the opposing tendencies.

As I wrote in my last post, the nationalist scene is awfully competitive in some Western countries. The question is, how does a group stand out? How does it leap ahead of the pack? Forget chopping and changing one's ideology to appeal to a mythical 'Joe Normal': how does one get noticed by Joe Normal in the first place? How does one distinguish one's group from all the other groups?

I'm not an expert, by any means, on Hungarian Far Right politics. But I'm willing to believe that, ten years or so ago, there were a variety of Hungarian nationalist groups and parties on the scene. Jobbik, for the time being, has crushed them all. Its ideology is uncompromising, extreme, inflammatory, unapologetically anti-Semitic and pro-fascist (that is, pro-Arrow Cross, the great wartime Hungarian fascist party). We all know the clichés of modern political science (first popularised by Hitler in Mein Kampf) to the effect that the masses only like blacks and whites, extreme polarisations: they don't like subtle politics. What's more, they want The Truth with a capital 'T': and, in Hitler's politics, that means saying downright inflammatory and offensive (usually offensive to x ethnic group) things which stand to get one in trouble, while lauding oneself for one's courage and even foolhardiness. ('There's just something about me: I must speak the truth, even if I go to jail for it'). The Hungarian masses, certainly, don't want soft soap from a Far Right Hungarian nationalist: they want to hear about how the Jews, homosexuals and gypsies are poisoning Hungarian life, and they expect to hear it from that nationalist politician alone (no liberal democratic politician, no matter how "conservative", will dare a word against Jews, gypsies and homosexuals). Similarly, while there must be "moderate" Islamist parties in Afghanistan, somehow it's the Taliban which rises to the top (in occupied Palestine, it's Hamas, in Lebanon, Hezbollah). And, on the Left, the Third World is littered with the wreckage of socialist (but not Marxist) parties which were passed over in favour of the communist ones. Fascism, Islamism, Communism: three brutally simple, and durable, doctrines.

But, in addition to having a frank, uncompromising, extremist ideology, Jobbik had another ace in the hole, and that was the Magyar Gárda. This was a militia - an unarmed militia - composed of men who wore uniforms resembling those of the Arrow Cross. The Magyar Gárda, to me, looked perfectly inoffensive: their get-up had a quaint Central European feel about it - except for the military boots, you could be forgiven for thinking that they were peasant herdsman who lived in the mountains... But their appearance drove the liberal media and politicians into a frenzy. Footage was shown, on TV, of the Magyar Gárda marching, with headlines like 'The Rise of the Far Right in Europe' - these were reports portending all sorts of calamities. Really it just a bunch of men marching in uniform (but not in the armed forces, or the police), but, to go by the liberal media, you could be forgiven that the sky had caved in.

We see the same phenomenon repeated elsewhere - e.g., with the treatment of the Patriots of the Ukraine, another paramilitary-type group. And, no doubt, if a similar uniformed (or half-uniformed) bunch of nationalists were to appear in Britain, the liberal establishment would go into a frenzy, and demand that the old 1936 law against the wearing of uniforms 'for political purposes' be dusted off and applied again. (Some nationalist commentators argue that the English Defence League does break the uniform law. In their view, the fact that the EDL hasn't been jailed only proves that the EDL are in collusion with the state).

Why is this? The reasons are twofold, in my view.

The first reason is the fact that there is a sort of uniform. White Western people aren't mean to wear uniforms of any kind: they are meant to, aesthetically, 'Do their own thing' and 'Be an individual'. Muslims, to be sure, are allowed to dress the same, or nearly the same. Hijabs, Chadors and Burkahs all help conceal a Muslim woman's individuality and mark her out as belonging to a particular ethnic and religious group. The same goes for the austere dress of the Haredim, the ultra-Orthodox Jews (then there are the moderately religious Jews, who wear kippahs but don't wear black 19th century clothes, like the Haredim). In the West, negating one's own individuality, by dressing the same way as the fellow next to you, is really, really dangerous - if the negator is white. This sort of self-negation suggests that you don't put your own unique tastes and preferences first: instead, you put them second, to something else - collectivism.

The second reason is the militarist discipline - the fact that these outfits, boots, etc., look military, and that the marchers are acting in a unified, disciplined way (which is what a march is). Again, the liberal establishment disdains this and abominates it as a sort of collectivism. Men (especially white men) concentrated on a single purpose, a single goal, subordinating themselves, like rowers in a rowing race, and acting in a unified, harmonious and even mechanical way: that's dangerous. It may even lead to socialism, and hence, following Hayek's book, The Road to Serfdom (1944), serfdom. Hayek's book was a impassioned, brilliant defence of 'Anglo-Saxon liberties' which were, at the time of writing, being challenged by the Communist and Fascist alternative. Hayek's fear was that the collectivisation and planning of the war effort would carry on in to peace time, after the successful conclusion of the war, in the Anglo-Saxon countries... What is socialism but the mechanisation and militarisation of peacetime activities, e.g., economic ones? Another, unspoken fear of the Hayeks is - what if such a system actually works? Now, in 2012, we have plenty of evidence that it doesn't work: if the East Germans - the most disciplined, self-subordinating, efficient and 'Prussian' of all the peoples of Europe - couldn't make communism and the planned economy work, well, no-one can: certainly not Cubans or North Koreans! But you never know...

Aside from that angle - that 'Fear of marching white men is really a fear of socialism' - it's also a reaction that is purely aesthetic. The typical establishment liberal finds the sight of Jobbik-style marchers more disgusting than, say, the sight of two gay men kissing.

At any rate, fighting against the white man's desire to subordinate oneself to a group is a lost cause. We have plenty of subcultures - Goth, Emo, skinhead, metal, and so forth - based on a visual and aesthetic conformity. But even outside that, there's the trade unions...

The latter example is a particularly illuminating one. For around about two weeks now, construction workers in the CFMEU and other unions have been blockading the building site of a department store building in the Melbourne Central Business District: among their litany of complaints is that the construction company - Grocon - won't let union members identify themselves, on site, by allowing them to wear union patches on their jackets or stickers on their helmets. Symbols (and the feeling of belonging that these symbols give them) are important to these men - important enough to lose pay over. This morning, acting upon a court order brought against the strikers, by Grocon, mounted police attempted to break the blockade. (See the picture above). Some poor horses were punched, and some of the strikers were pepper-sprayed... (The TV news footage shows a bemused Chinese immigrant woman staring out of a McDonald's window at the goings-on: all the strikers, and the policemen, were white). The media gleefully recounted that it was like the 'good old days' of the industrial militancy of the 1970s and early 1980s. (I saw two bearded student types, one of them waving an Industrial Workers of the World flag: anarcho-syndicalists, trying to associate themselves with this episode of militancy?).

I pass the building site, and now the strikers, every day on my way to work (I had a union flier thrust into my hands one day). These men are real blue-collar: they seem to be of a particular type - Aussie, middle-aged, often overweight, and they smoke and swear a lot. But what is striking is that they dress more or less alike: they wear a kind of semi-uniform. It's a long way from neofascism, but we have to remember that fascism emerged, originally, from anarcho-syndicalism (which in turn was based on 'spontaneous' worker's socialism sprouting out of trade union militancy).

At any rate, I didn't get to see the riot this morning. But it's good to pay attention to such things: they haul you out of the incestuous confines of nationalist politics. If we were to put all the members of the various racialist, nationalist and Far Right Australian groups together in Lonsdale Street in Melbourne - there wouldn't be half the number of union strikers that were there, in that same street, that day. Granted, the unionists had a strong economic incentive to be part of the union and participate, but, at the same time, they are losing money every day of the strike. (Not as much as Grocon, which claims it is losing $370,000 a day). All of that unified effort, collectivism, self-sacrifice and abnegation of one's own individuality - on behalf of white men. Gives one pause, doesn't it? Why can't nationalism do the same?

My advice to any nationalist group is: do what Jobbik did, and get some gear together, get it on, and give the appearance (appearance is the operative word) of renouncing your identity and subordinating yourself to the group. It doesn't have to be a military-style uniform: it could be a t-shirt, a belt-buckle or a tie-pin.

'To uniform or not to uniform?' is a question which has been asked, countless times, in post-war nationalist circles. There is a whole thread, on the neofascist forum IronMarch.Org, about it, with many intelligent arguments, for and against, on both sides. Reading it makes one aware of the role played by the uniform in politics, whether it be on the Far Right or the Far Left.

I found this comment, from Benjamin Noyles, particularly insightful:

It depends on your aim, In some cases it may be that being militant and threatening, alienating and frightening may just be the only way to get anyone to pay attention to you. Certainly almost nobody in the group below would have been known if they did not activly go out of their way to offend everyone - it got them speaking venues in university events across america, tv interviews, radio shows, full media coverage, the works. The Uniform was just a tool to get people to change their perceptions so in this sense they were artists rather than a sincere political movement. They knew that the american right wing was going to be dead unless it learned to embrace it's shadow. what does it look like when an artist of all people babbles in an interview about how they are not this or that and they don't want to upset anybody.

Like with a musical subcluture being marginalised can also be the appeal for some, and can in time make itself acceptable.

- Really it all depends what your aim is at the time and the task you are doing.

He's right, he makes a good point. We have to consider the political and intellectual context of the times, of course. America was in the period of the early 1960s, so ably depicted in the TV series Mad Men (2007-2012), when the WASP hegemony of America (and the West) was at its full height) and the New Left was just beginning to cast its dark shadows over Western lands. The American Far Right, at the time, was starving. The likes of Rockwell just couldn't break through to mainstream America in order to warn them of 'The Negro and Commie Jew-fink menace'. He had tried, unsuccessfully, to work with respectable Far Right conservative organisations, and even front groups for (what he called) National Socialism; but he came away burned each time. He recounts the story in his autobiography This Time the World (1961) (I re-read parts of it tonight for the first time in years, and I still find it as brilliant and demented as ever). One can say he went too far, but one has to laud his courage for doing what he did in the first place. His theory may have not been that sound, but in his actions, he showed himself to be a real fascist and a real showman - an heir to Goebbels...

Am I counselling nationalist groups to dress like the Rockwellian Nazi bad guys in The Blues Brothers (1980)? No, and even the mere suggestion of such a thing brings out some strong opposing reactions from nationalists - even nationalists who post on a neofascist message board like IronMarch.Org. I'm making the point that Rockwell (who was well aware of it) broke the media embargo against Far Right nationalism and racialism with his methods, and, I'm sure, for a time, blew every single rival nationalist and racialist group out of the water.

Monday, August 20, 2012

Back to the Basics: Hardcore Neofascism for Britain

Poor old Nick Griffin! The Guardian has written a piece on Fatty Nick's denunciation (in a "report" authored by him, and released last week) of the English Defence League for excessive "Zionism". There's also a 48-minute speech, by Griffin, which, according to Counter-Currents, is 'An excellent exposé of the English Defence League and the Counter-Jihad movement as a Jewish-controlled false opposition'. Wait a moment: 'Jewish-controlled'? Doesn't that sound... "Nazi"? Isn't it the case that "Anti-Semites" who peddle zany "conspiracy theories" about Jews are dragging the British nationalist movement down? Aren't they all "Nutzis"? These were the Griffinite positions of five or so years ago; anyone who remembers the Griffinite line from then must be chortling now...

I must confess I have a personal stake in the matter. Five or so years ago, there were quite a few nationalist activists on the Australian scene who preached the Griffin doctrine (which I now call 'Breivikism'): the movement, in Australia, would only take off if all the "Nutzis", crazy anti-Semites - including me - could be purged. Continental Far Right-style, anti-Islamist populism was the order of the day. In all fairness, Far Right populism has done well on the Continent - especially on the Western side (or Europeans closely related, by dint of culture, to the Western side - e.g., the Scandinavian nations Finland, Norway and Sweden). It was a reasonable assumption that the same type of tactics could be applied, and meet with similar success, in Britain. Given that the nationalist movement had been, for the thirty or so years prior to the advent of Griffin, doing so badly, five years ago I was inclined to give Griffin the benefit of a doubt and wait and see if his new approach would work. But I was certain that Breivikist, populist anti-Islam wouldn't take off in Australia, simply for the (obvious) reason that we don't have a large Muslim population (unlike Britain, France or Holland). Yes, we have plenty of Chinese, Vietnamese, Filipinos, and a burgeoning Indian population: but not that many Muslims. Europe, on the other hand, is in danger of being Islamised and Africanised out of existence (although the Breivikist anti-Islamics take care not to mention the Africans - that would be "racist").

We all know how the Griffinite project turned out. He went as far as he could go towards Ziophilism of the Breivik and Wilders type: but then two other groups - the English Defence League and the new British Freedom Party - went even further. The EDL had great success in mobilising British working-class people, especially (previously apolitical) soccer hooligans and chavs, and leading them on exciting, Mosley-type, BUF-type marches, and into confrontations with the police and activists for Islamism and "anti-racism". Just like the old days of the 1930s - or the 1970s, when the National Front did more or less the same thing.

As to why Griffin's project failed - I could blame the man himself (he's turned into a British version of Pauline Hanson, and is quite clearly in it only for the money now). But, more than that, nationalist political parties have a short shelf life. They are conceived, as political units, in certain historical and cultural circumstances which are unique to them and their time. The National Front came into existence in the turbulent 1970s, when the first wave of mass non-white colonisation of Britain was getting started; the British National Party, in the early 1980s, when that first wave became a solidly-established, and stoutly-defended, bridgehead. Now, of course, in 2012 - to use a WWII metaphor - the invaders have broken out of their bridgehead, have seized Paris and Brussels, and are now standing at the Rhine. The killer blow to Britain is about to administered. Or perhaps it won't be over quickly: Britain will suffer a slow, agonising death, the death of the thousand cuts (one such cut we saw at the Olympics opening ceremony). In any case, British nationalists are in a different position than they were in 1974 or 1982. They have to adopt new tactics, a new ideology, a new charter. Which means that old warhorses like the British National Party, or the National Front, have to be put out to pasture. (The same thing could be said of that relic from Australia in the late 1990s - Pauline Hanson's One Nation).

At any rate, the Guardian reports that there are now (by nationalist standards) a massive number of British nationalist and Far Right parties on the market:

The most striking aspect of this year's elections was the number of far right parties competing alongside the BNP. In England, local elections were contested by 149 candidates from far right groups other than the BNP, and in some areas these out-performed the 30-year-old party. In Dudley, for example, the BNP was forced to watch its old and more ideologically extreme rival, the National Front, attract more votes. This owes much to a series of personality clashes and ideological splits that have spawned an increasing number of groups, including Britain First, British Freedom, British People's party, England First, National Front, English Democrats, Democratic Nationalists and the Britannica party. Most lack resources and members, but their emergence reflects a scene that is in transition and has not yet decided on its destination.
This really gave me pause. How the devil is a British nationalist group to distinguish itself from the competition? How is to become, in the jargon of business, a 'market leader'?

The answer, I think, is this. The British groups - or the leading ones, such as the EDL, British Freedom Party and the British National Party - have swung as far as possible to the 'left' of the Far Right, that is, towards Wilders and Breivikism. Now it's time to swing back the other way - towards Mosley, Lord Haw-Haw and John Amery, some of the most decent and principled men British politics in the 20th century has ever produced.

As for visuals, nothing conveys power and punch like this:

This is, of course, Jobbik, who revive the ideology, and appearance, of the wartime Hungarian Arrow Cross, but aren't a revivalist party as such: they have their own look and own ideology (unlike John Tyndall and Colin Jordan's 1960s-era group, the National Socialist Movement):

Nothing wrong with uniforms as such, just make them original uniforms.

But wait, aren't paramilitary uniforms banned in Britain, under the infamous 1936 Public Order Act? Well, that Act is open to interpretation. In any case, to judge by the evidence (and I am willing to be contradicted on this point), the Act's provisions against 'uniforms for political purposes' weren't used to arrest the members of the National Socialist Movement: other provisions were used instead. (The Act has been used, quite a few times, since then, and not always against nationalists: e.g., the Act was supposedly used against the British miners during the miner's strike of 1984). Most arrests, detentions, prosecutions, of nationalists since the 1960s have come about through the breaking of laws forbidding freedom of speech on race. An excellent article, on the history of the "anti-fascist" and "anti-racist" laws and their applications to British nationalists and fascists, can be found here: 'British Fascism and the Measures Taken Against It by the British State' (1998) in the Libertarian Alliance journal. (I advise all nationalist activists, especially nationalists with a bent for law, to read it).

I'm inclined to believe that the National Front, which used many of the street tactics of fascism (just as the EDL does today) refrained from outfitting its members in uniforms because it wanted to distance itself from the fascism of the 1930s and 1940s, and the uniformed clowning of the 1960s NSM (and other related Rockwellian groups) - not out of a fear of being shut down by the provisions in the Public Order Act.

Let's, for the moment, go to the Continent, where even more repressive "anti-fascist" laws apply. The German constitution expressly forbids the wearing of uniforms. But what of this? Here are pictures of the latest offshoot of the German Freie Nationalisten / Autonomous Nationalist tendency. They are a nationalist 'flash-mob' called The Immortals. They wear freaky V for Vendetta masks:

Dr Hajo Funke, a professor at the Free University of Berlin, told CNN he believes the tactics employed by the Immortals are designed to attract young people to their cause.

The Immortals, a German neo-Nazi group wearing masks and carrying torches, is flash mobbing cities


In truth, I find these plastic masks very frightening. They remind of the Autons from Doctor Who:

Or worse, that Michael character from John Carpenter's Halloween (1978):

I think this is pretty terrible. Masks, of course, have their own power; in classical theatre, they allowed actors to assume the personalities of the characters they played on stage. The impression conveyed the Immortals' mask isn't exactly positive.

The fascists of the 1920s, 1930s, 1940s, didn't wear masks, of course. Fascism is about, among other things, naked publicity, drawing attention to yourself and your cause. The showing of one's face, in public, is a dangerous enterprise for someone on the Far Right, considering that so many communists in Europe were prepared to harm or even kill you, or, at the very least, apply pressure to have you removed from your place of employment, your home, etc. The showing of one's face was an indication of one's courage, foolhardiness, and pride.

But as for uniforms, especially paramilitary uniforms - that's a different thing altogether. I'm sure that reams of material have been written on the psychological effects of seeing large numbers of men march by, in paramilitary uniform; or being part of a group of men in paramilitary uniform. Academics (who specialise in writing treatises on fascism) will say that uniforms confer, on their wearers, a feeling of belonging, cohesiveness, identity, and of status, power and authority - which is all correct. But, simply put, men like uniforms, because they make men feel, and look, good. And there's a feeling of safety in numbers, too, when the group is primarily of uniformed men: and a nationalist needs that feeling, when he is facing down a crowd of hundreds, if not thousands, of Trotskyites, anarchists, Antifa, who are literally baying for his blood. (Wearing a suit and tie - the 'uniform' of the conservative - just doesn't cut it in those circumstances). The militant Left, too, believe in safety in numbers: they indulge in foolhardy acts of provocation and violence because they are part of a large group, and large groups tend to be less inhibited about these things.

At any rate, aren't the Immortals, pictured above, wearing uniforms 'for political purposes'? Granted, the German law doesn't use that phrasing, but the intent is the same. When you think of it, there are plenty of groups and subcultures - e.g., anarchists, skinheads, even 'Gay Pride' protesters who wear identical pink shirts - who are political and who adopt uniforms of one sort or another. What makes the fascists unique is that they use paramilitary uniforms.

I think that the Public Order Act, in Britain, really needs to be tested, pushed to its limit, by British nationalists who wear paramilitary outfits. We need to see what the definition of a 'uniform for political purposes' is. Granted, the British state will use any excuse to ban a march or arrest members of a nationalist group. But...

I've come to the conclusion that, for a country like Britain, things have deteriorated too far to be arrested by a mere, reflexive and reactionary British Far Right conservatism. The old institutions don't have to be preserved, they must be destroyed (and they are being destroyed, by the anti-white clique that controls Britain, anyway). Perhaps only a Libyan-style uprising could work. At any rate, the British parliament needs to be shut down, and elections suspended for at least ten years. Britain, too, needs to become a republic and to exile, permanently, the Windsor family.

As regarding policy: the white man has to reclaim sovereignty, in his own lands, before one can make the really big, important decisions - on the nationalisation of property, on which immigrants to keep and which ones to expel, and so forth. The communists in Russia, Cuba and China understood this: they seized power first, and made up policy later, improvising, and responding, to a large extent, to the unique circumstances their individual countries faced.

So political power, for nationalists in Britain, can only be achieved by a white, working-class and radical political party, with a Marxist and anarcho-syndicalist base (in other words, a party like the old fascist parties). The old 'preservationist' brand of Enoch Powell Far Right conservatism just won't cut it.

As it is, if present trends continue, there won't be a Britain in fifty years: there'll be, instead, a new country - Afro-Indo-Islamistan - where Africans, Indians and Muslims are the dominant ethnic groups, and the 'old' British are relegated to a minority.

Ideologically, of course, the Lord Haw-Haws, Mosleys, Amerys, and, by extension, the Hitlers and Mussolinis, have to be embraced, not spurned. The words "Nazi" and "Fascist" shouldn't be rejected: they should be seen as badges of honour. Isn't there something clean, clear cut, appealing and reassuring about the 'old' ideologies? One knows what one is; one knows where one stands. I'm sure that the Indian Maoists - one of the few genuinely Marxist groupings around today - feel the same about their simple, clear-cut ideology. It's not a case of fetishism or nostalgia; no, it's a case of, to paraphrase Nietzsche, 'How one becomes what one is'. That is, acknowledging and embracing one's true self. Which is quite a change from the British nationalist movement of today, which has become schizophrenic under the influence of the Nick Griffins and Tommy Robinsons.