Saturday, November 30, 2019

The Metalstorm: Why some nationalists dislike the Nazis



I.

After the eruption of hostilities in Europe in 1914, the English - and the Americans - produced a torrent of literature denouncing German and 'Prussian' cruelty, aggression, rapacity, militarism, authoritarianism, racial self-aggrandizement, Machtpolitik, Kultur, and war crimes (real or imagined); a hundred years later, this torrent shows no signs of abating. But if the English polemicists and the German nationalists - who wrote rebuttals - agreed on one thing, it was that 'Prussianism', 'Prussian militarism', 'Prussian ethical-socialism' (as Spengler called it), defined the essence of the German national character.

To Spengler, each of the five leading nations of the West - England, Germany, France, Spain and Italy - could be summed up a certain Idea, a style, a culture, and it is this that distinguishes one nation from the other. In much the same way, a certain style of each race - in that most racialist and ethnocentric of sci-fi TV shows, Star Trek - helps us to tell one race apart from another, so much so that one would never mistake a Klingon for a Vulcan, a Romulan for a Ferengi. Of course to a Ferengi or Klingon, all kinds of difference - mainly political - exist within the race, but the casual outside observer hardly sees these: he only sees unity and homogeneity. And this uniformity is determined by the style of the race as much as the genetics.

After Germany's defeat in 1918, venerable German institutions - the German Army, the German General Staff, Junkerdom, and the East Prussian state itself - survived; after Germany's defeat in 1945, they were destroyed. Nothing of them remained, not even the 'Prussian Idea' itself. We see here the complete disappearance of a culture, a style. Only ghosts of it linger: we find fleeting images of it in the first three Star Wars movies, in episodes of Star Trek and Battlestar Galactica, in the multitude of computer and board wargames devoted to WWI and WWII. Pertinent to this subject - the prevalence of Nazi and 'Prussian' types in popular culture - is this comment at Steve Sailer's site:

Having Nazi bad guys in situations where Nazism isn’t at all relevant is just the mark of a lazy writer who can’t be bothered to develop good antagonists on their own. Even in situations where they aren’t actual Nazis, the aesthetic provides a convenient visual shorthand.

In Star Wars we would know the empire was evil just by looking at the officers’ uniforms, which were heavily reminiscent of the uniforms worn by Wehrmacht and SS officers during WW2. Additionally, the peaked caps were shaped like those worn by Imperial Japanese military during the war. Add in the patrician affect of Imperial officers(a lot like the aristocratic manner stereotypical of German officers in movies of that period) and you have instant baddies without having them say or do anything evil. Vader’s helmet was specifically designed to be recall the German stahlhelm.

But times of changed. It seems that American filmmakers no longer want to depict dapper fascists. To judge by the listings of upcoming movies at IMDB.Com, Hollywood seems to have slowed down on the production of one of its staples - the anti-German war propaganda movie: I count only one WWII drama slated for release in 2020.

In the world of politics, outside of entertainment and popular culture, the 'Prussian' - with his monocle, riding crop, long boots, dueling scars, smart uniform, and cap set at a jaunty angle - has ceased to exist. His resurrection was predicted by Yockey on the reasoning that while one can kill a man, one cannot kill an idea: one can lop off the top of a tree, but so long as the tree has roots deep in the soil, it will regrow. But 75 years after the end of WWII, this analogy has been shown to incorrect.

The disappearance of 'Prussianism' violates one of the tenets of geopolitics - that nations almost always revert to type. For the past 75 years, Japan has kept its head down and sought to avoid being noticed, and it shies away from all war and all power-politics. But because of the recent Chinese bellicosity in the South China Sea, smaller nations such as the Philippines and Vietnam are looking to Japan as a protector, and as a result, Japan is being forced to accept the mantle of a leading Asian power. One cannot escape one's geopolitical destiny. But for Germany, this law has been suspended. In all the negotiations between the UK and the EU over Brexit, France has taken the lead: the understanding is that France, and not the faceless EU bureaucracy, which gives voice to the sentiments of the EU, and if Boris Johnson or Theresa May want to parley, they must parley with Emmanuel Macron. Germany has been conspicuous by its absence. One would think that Germany was not the wealthiest and most powerful nation on the Continent, and that it had no opinions on what is the most important question for the EU for the 21st century. The British press, performing its traditional role of stoking British resentment against the Germans, continually tries to goad Germany into making provocative statements on Brexit, but Merkel refuses to take the bait.

II.

The Germans will not be taking up Spengler's 'Prussian Socialism' any time soon. But suppose that certain prerequisites were fulfilled for its return, one of the prerequisites being the election to office of a German nationalist party (such as the AfD): what would happen then? I think we all know the answer. England and America, Israel and Russia, would demand that the results be overturned and 'democracy' restored - otherwise, war.

The world will ignore the calls of the 'international community' for sanctions and war only under one condition: that it ceases to believe or starts to doubt that the Holocaust happened. As part of a public relations campaign for German nationalism, the new German nationalist government could deban all Holocaust Revisionism within Germany's borders and promulgate Revisionism across Europe and the world. It could muster up an international task force of forensic investigators to take examine the 'death camps' of Auschwitz, Treblinka and Sobibor for traces of the poison gas which killed millions of people. If no traces were found, or even if the final report of the investigators was divided on the matter, doubt and confusion would be sowed in the minds of British and American public - the same public which normally would join wholeheartedly the chorus of condemnation of the nationalist Germany.

One can dream: the above scenario at the present seems highly unlikely. The reason for that is that German nationalists, even nationalists of the most populist and civic stripe, are faced with a paradox, and this is: they cannot win power without the help of Holocaust Revisionism, but they cannot disseminate Revisionism unless they win power.

The stalemate can only be broken by a miracle. In the South Park episode 'Are You There God? It's Me, Jesus', God visits Earth and before an assembly of South Park residents, offers to answer one question - any question. One of the South Park children, Stan Marsh, asks a question which is quite trivial. God answers it easily (with His perfect and omniscient knowledge) and then departs the Earth, promising to return in the year 4000, much to everyone's dissatisfaction. Now, suppose that this celestial visitation were to occur today and the question was asked of God, 'Did the Holocaust happen?'. Suppose that God's answer was no, and that Hitler and the NSDAP did not order the extermination of Europe's Jews, did not gas the Jews (or shoot them en masse) and did not kill 60,000, let alone six million, Jews. And then suppose that God's answer was beamed into the minds of every sentient being on Earth: that and only that would bring about the change in the attitude of humanity towards Germany that the German nationalists so sorely need.

This story line - and indeed, it will remain nothing but a story - implies that Holocaust Revisionism constitutes a revelation to the world (and in my daydream above, a divine revelation), but in truth, the world has known, and known for some time, that the Holocaust did not happen. But this understanding has not been acted upon because those in authority will not acknowledge the truth of Revisionism.

When I am speaking of those in authority, I am speaking of three leading groups in particular. These are:

International Jewish groups. If six million did not die, then Jewry would lose its right to Palestine. Jews see the Holocaust as a religious justification, in accordance with ancient Talmudic prophecies, for the recovery of the lost State of Israel.

The Anglo-Conservatives. By 'Anglo-Conservative', I mean American and British conservatives of the Victor Davis Hanson and Rush Limbaugh sort. Usually boomers, they hew to the official party line on WWI and WWII and America's involvement, and they hate German nationalism (of any era) with a vengeance.

Left-wing journalists. If God were to come to Earth (as per my South Park fantasy above) and reveal the truth to the world regarding the Holocaust, the media would simply refuse to report it.

All politics is an activity related to power, Yockey writes, and we would assure the triumph of Revisionism were we were to knock the three groups out of their leading position in the power structure. The question is, how?

III.

It goes without saying that the 'Prussian' is a soldier. This is important for the reason that in German nationalist ideology, politics is tied to war.

The Left takes the same view of politics. One of the dirty secrets of 20th century communism is that no communist won power without waging war beforehand: the successful communists did not win elections in Russia, China, Vietnam, Cuba, they won battles. Stalin, Trotsky, Mao, Tito, Kim Il Sung, Ho Chi Minh, Castro: all commanded soldiers, their example presenting a stark contrast to the anemic leftism of today.

The former left-wing terrorist T. Derbent wrote a classic monograph, 'Categories of Revolutionary Military Policy' (2006), which is a treatise on military science and left-wing politico-military strategy. Much of it can be applied by both the Left and Right: the white nationalists in William Pierce's Turner Diaries (1978), for instance, followed the same strategy as the left-wing urban guerrilla groups operating in the 1960s and 1970s. (Pierce, much to his chagrin, was compared by hostile reviewers to the left-wing Brazilian guerrilla Carlos Marighella).

And this brings us to the heart of the problem. Warfare has changed since the time of Hitler and the Kaiser, Guderian and von Moltke. In the first half of the 20th century, the Germans led the way when it came to warfare, but since then, 'Prussian militarism' and the institution of the General Staff have become archaic, outmoded. This partially explains, to my mind, the success of computer games such as Hearts of Iron IV. Gamers can exercise their 'Prussian' world-conquering urges and live vicariously through it, but they can also return to a distant past which is unlike our present and in some respects qualitatively better.

But in other respects, nationalists see the past as worse than the present. No nationalist in the West wants to see a return to WWI or WWII. Today nationalists see white life as something precious and whites as an endangered species. Our sons are not be sent off to die in wars, and no blood of a white Western man is to be spilled.

And this contravenes National Socialist (and 'Prussian militarist') doctrine. In the wartime book 'The Spoil of Europe' (1941), written by an anti-Nazi, Thomas Reveille, we find an (mostly accurate, to my view) enunciation of the fundamental principles of National Socialism:

The State, according to Hitler, has a twofold domestic task. The first is to ''forge the sword” which shall "secure for the German Volk the land and soil that is due to them on this earth” and "their position as lords of the world.” The second domestic task of the Nazi State is to ensure "the preservation and advancement of a community of physically and spiritually similar living creatures.” This twofold task is to be pursued simultaneously. In case of need, however, the latter should be temporarily sacrificed for the former...

[In order to conquer Europe, Germany needs] The forging of the sword and the creation of an indissolubly unified Germanic community in the existing frontiers of the Reich. The Nazi doctrine always assumes that the sword must be ultimately wielded in order to achieve each major objective...

Germany's mission is to rule the world and to fulfill this by any and all means. Europe is the center of the world. The Reich has obligations to its kith and kin overseas. It has also the imperious duty of making Germany's acquisitions perpetually secure not only by forging a sword for their defense but also by a simultaneous attack, through political disintegration or war, against possible enemies and coalitions. Full account is also taken of obstacles to the process of the continuous outward push of Germandom. 

The white nationalist may like the Volk talk, the talk of blood and soil, and the goal of 'the preservation and advancement of a community of physically and spiritually similar living creatures', which sounds rather like David Lane's slogan of the 14 words. But the 'forging of the sword' frightens the white nationalist, because a war waged by any European or Western nation automatically entails casualties - white casualties. And indeed, not only white nationalists but most European white men object to going to war, possibly because they  understand (more than they did a hundred years ago) what it means. As Steve Sailer writes in 'The Dregs of War', 



I want to mention how this latest phenomenon supports John Mueller’s hypothesis in The Remnants of War (which he should have titled The Dregs of War).

Mueller is the Woody Hayes Professor of National Security Studies at Ohio State. He argues that Kursk-Orel battles between mass armies in open fields are over. If they gave that kind of war, nobody would show up.

His specific examples had to do with the 1990s Balkan Wars, which were portrayed in the press as driven by ancient mass enmities. But Mueller argues that the amount of bloodlust in the overall populations was quite low. The various states had massive problems with draft evasion. Basically, nobody wants to go to a modern battlefield with state of the art weapons because everybody figures they wouldn’t last long in the metalstorm.

Sailer points to the conflict in Ukraine as an example of the new kind of war, a war which differs from WWII: 'The Battle of Stalingrad, it isn’t. So far'.

Because the realities of war have changed, then, the Far Right needs to grope around like the Far Left (as Derbent does in his monograph) for a new politico-military strategy.

IV.

We should keep in mind that the socialist and conservative regimes in Western Europe today were (in the case of France, Holland, Belgium, Germany, Austria, Italy, Norway, and Denmark) installed at the point of a bayonet: the British and Americans waged a ferocious war to 'liberate' them from fascism and Far Right conservatism. It could be that the Far Right, the nationalist Right, in those countries may need to wage another war to win them back: quite possibly, the Merkels and Macrons cannot be pushed out any other way. If that is the case - and keep in mind we are in the new age of the 'dregs of war' - what would that war look like?

Years ago, a poster on 4Chan/Pol detailed a long-running fantasy of his - a fantasy informed by the Terminator movies and other cyberpunk pop culture works. A race of cyborg warriors would time-travel from the future, wage war against the Merkels and Macrons, and free Europe. This post stood out for me, as I  - in a similar science-fiction-ish mood - had indulged in a similar daydream. And at the time it seemed quite logical to me, given the circumstances, that the only army which could take on the liberal establishment and win would be one composed of super-soldiers using a technology far advanced from that of present.

In my scenario, the soldiers would win eschew a direction confrontation with the armies of Europe and avail themselves of Fidel Castro and Che Guevara guerrilla tactics, which, to my mind, would prove to be extremely effective.

Of course I understand that such a war (cyber-war?) can only take place only in the realm of fantasy. But does another way forward exist? Bismarck famously said that politics is the art of the possible, and by this he meant there is more than one path to the fulfillment of a political task. He may have been right in this, but at present, I can only see one possibility - one which is (I admit) quite impossible. 


Sunday, November 10, 2019

Cyberpunk and shopping malls: On becoming blue-pilled and dropping out of the movement





I.

Over twenty years ago, I read a book on postmodernism by a left-wing author who decried the horrible world of the postmodern age: a world of Blade Runner (1982), Robocop (1987) and Total Recall (1990) brought to life, a world of 'hyperreal' capitalism (like that depicted in Oliver Stone's Wall Street (1987)), a world of gangsta rap (a musical genre which encourages African-Americans to shoot each other for the possession of pairs of Adidas sneakers), a world of the hitherto unknown and frightening phenomena of the Information Superhighway, Virtual Reality, Cyberspace, Cybersex, 'Electronic Mail'... The author, a baby boomer, wrung his hands in despair over these cultural and economic developments, but I had the opposite reaction: the postmodern Brave New World sounded exactly like the one I lived in - and exciting and fun to boot.

At the time, had I been indoctrinated with white nationalist and dissident Right ideas, I would have commiserated with this left-winger and lamented white Western Man's lost authenticity; perhaps, had I National Bolshevik tendencies, I would have shaken my fist, too, at the Center Right which in the nineties celebrated the End of History and the downfall of communism. But - and this is no coincidence - at the time I was fairly innocent of any politics. In the nineties, I voted, I was interested in social questions, I felt sympathy for the plight of oppressed brown folk overseas (the Palestinians and the Kurds), I was interested in the important policy debates of the seventies and eighties (monetarism versus Keynesianism, for example); but at the same, I wasn't necessarily a political animal. I myself only became truly politicised after discovering the ideas of the Far Right in the 2000s.

In the 1990s, extremist ideologies flourished: you had survivalists, militias, evangelicals, cults like the Branch Davidians and Heaven's Gate, terrorists of the Left and Right (Ted Kaczynski and Timothy McVeigh), skinhead gangs, and for me most important of all, white nationalists, and it was in this decade that the careers of Tom Metzger, William Pierce, Richard Butler, Ben Klassen and Don Black began to take off. But because of the then-novelty of the Internet, the ideas of these men did not spread far and wide, and for the most part, the general public (the 'normies', of which I was one) did not encounter them. My politicisation only commenced after the Internet became available in every home, and it was then that I discovered White Nationalism 1.0  (as Hunter Wallace calls it) - and with it, anti-Semitism and Holocaust Revisionism, Julius Evola and Francis Parker Yockey, Savitri Devi and George Lincoln Rockwell... Before my 'red-pilling' in the early 2000s, I had spent the nineties in a state of (what seems to me now to be) blissful ignorance.

These days, quite a few in the Far Right movement look back on the 1980s and 1990s through rose-coloured glasses - they will see the 1990s, for instance, as the 'last conservative decade'. I feel nostalgia, too, for the decade of my lost youth, but for different reasons. To explain. Becoming 'red-pilled' can liberate you but at the same time it can impose its own peculiar burdens. Obsessions with certain political or social questions can spiral out of control - one only has to see how global warming (which may be real or not) has drawn many white people into what is akin to a cult. At the least, thinking too much about a subject such as the 'white genocide', the 'great replacement', the 'scramble for Europe' can weigh you down; you begin to feel a tremendous sense of duty which can make itself felt in every nook and cranny of your life. Shedding that responsibility, then, becomes attractive, and so does looking backwards to the time when you did not feel that responsibility.

Assuming that 'blue-pilling' is desirable, how does one do it? The answer is: one can't. For instance, once you make the discovery that the mass gassing of Jews in giant gas chambers in WWII probably didn't happen, and that the Jews insisting that it did happen are doing so for mostly for religious reasons, you simply cannot forget it in a hurry. One would need to perform a lobotomy on oneself.

The same applies to that other subject beloved by white nationalists: the 'colour of crime'. Knowledge of that signifies that one has become worldly, streetwise; renunciation of that knowledge means that one has reverted to being a naïf, a simpleton.

One cannot attain a state of forgetfulness and recover lost innocence, but one can change one's perspective, and key to that is the recognition that much of the Far Right lives in the past.

Take, for example, race-mixing: who, in the current year, cares about it? And who, in 1989 or 1999, had a problem with it? Only white nationalists opposed race-mixing and were obsessed with it (and punishing it - witness the popularity of the famous passages in the Turner Diaries (1978) concerning the 'Day of the Rope'). This explains why every evening on 4Chan/Pol outsiders will try and spam the board with race-mixing pornography. They know that it 'triggers' the white nationalists, Neo-Nazis and Alt-Rightists, and they experience a transgressive, almost erotic thrill in this 'triggering'. But the 'normie', looking at it all from the outside, would see it as ridiculous, and rightfully so. Race-mixing, and pornography depicting it, would have transgressed social mores in 1930 or 1830, but not in the current year.

The posting of German National Socialist material from the 1930s and 1940s constitutes another example of being out of sync with the current year. The NSDAP speeches, articles, book chapters seems particularly incongruous when they appear on websites which are not German, and furthermore, the old German material does not seem to gel with the other content, which mostly concerns breaking American and European news. But, on closer examination, it becomes apparent that the old German speeches and writings represent, to the editors of Radio Aryan, Renegade Tribune and CarolynYeager.Net, an authenticity, a truth, which has been lost in the modern era; they serve the same purpose as Rick Deckard's photographs (taken in the 19th century?) strewn across the top of Deckard's piano in Blade Runner. They are intended to evoke a past which is more pure, more beautiful, than the present.

Hunter Wallace's Occidental Dissent recently featured some footage (entitled 'Paradise Lost') of St Louis in 1965  - and indeed, that footage does manage to capture a Paradise Lost, a lost world of handsome men and beautiful women, white men and women, all of whom deported themselves in the best Mad Men style (and Mad Men was another exercise in nostalgia, conveying a longing for the lost white past). Meditations on the decline of the white West, a decline which dates from the post-war era, form a staple of dissident Right polemics, and without a doubt, these touch upon a truth - the cleavage between the old world and the new. Sometime around 1990, it was as though a segment of our familiar white, Western world was teleported and joined into the world of Blade Runner, postmodernism and cyberpunk.

The cyberpunk genre of science fiction was conceived in the 1980s by authors William Gibson (Neuromancer) and Neal Stephenson (Snow Crash), but as old as it is now, it still manages to capture the essence of modernity - much more so than German National Socialism or Southern nationalism - and it remains popular enough to the extent that a much-hyped upcoming XBox game, Cyberpunk 2077, promises to deliver to gamer fans a return to the good old eighties cyberpunk / Blade Runner experience (see 'Neon and corporate dystopias: why does cyberpunk refuse to move on?'). It is true that the trailers for Cyberpunk 2077 depict a locale ('Night City') which is bereft of children, families, the elderly - all of whom we would expect to see in the everyday life. But even so, 'Night City' stands closer to our world than the world of Berlin in 1940 or St Louis in 1965.

Fragmentation, a sense of loss, and the sundering of wholes - whether they be ethnic, religious, national, class - accompanies the postmodern and makes up one of postmodernism's most persistent themes. That subject is tackled by the author of the article, 'California is a Real Life Cyberpunk Dystopia', but when he comes to how it relates to race and immigration, multiculturalism and 'diversity', he takes the politically correct line. But no matter, he has done us a service by making an important fact evident, and that is: the Los Angeles of Blade Runner of the future year of 2019 lacks the ethnic and cultural homogeneity of the Los Angeles of the 1940s. (The latter era, the era of film noir, numbers among the inspirations for Ridley Scott's film). In Blade Runner, only one to two dozen whites seem to live in Los Angeles; all the rest have moved away - perhaps to another planet, 'Off World'. (Interestingly, the much-maligned sequel, Blade Runner 2049 (2017), boasts more white characters than the original).

The white characters of Blade Runner look at this state of affairs as a fait accompli - nothing much can be done about it. But a white nationalist / dissident Rightist would say otherwise. He knows (or claims to know) the precise point at which the old, authentic world of yesteryear transformed into a cyberpunk dystopia; he knows who is responsible for that change (Jews, globalist elites, liberals, baby boomers, Cultural Marxists, Illuminati Satanists, corporations, et al.); and he opines that present conditions will worsen unless his advice is followed.

Deckard and the other white denizens of Los Angeles in 2019 (and not to mention the protagonists of Neuromancer and Cyberpunk 2077) would disagree with the last of these propositions, one can imagine; they would retort, 'How can things get any worse?'. And they would deem the other two theses - who is responsible for the transition and when it happened - as largely irrelevant.

But otherwise, they would agree with our fringe rightist (or leftist) in that the cyberpunk / postmodernist world is bad. As the anarcho-primitivist John Zerzan notes, postmodernism imagines 'a world without nature'. At the end of the original version of Blade Runner (the version which was released in cinemas in 1982), Deckard and Rachael flee Los Angeles (and all its neon, rain, smog, darkness and Asians) and return to nature; in the closing scene before the end credits, Deckard pilots his flying car, Rachael by his side, over the sunlit rollicking hills of regional California.

II. 




After first coming across William Pierce's famous Dissident American Voices Internet radio broadcasts, I treated them as entertainment. But after listening to a dozen broadcasts in a row, Pierce's sermons had their desired effect, and I began to ask myself if there was something to what Pierce was saying. The question bothered me enough to prompt an exploration, and I soon discovered Stormfront and Michael Hoffman II's writings on the Talmud. From that point on, there was no looking back. I abandoned my 'normie' political position (or absence of a political position) and with it, my 'normie' commonsensicality.

It took me some time to recognise that the Far Right (as well as the Far Left) upholds certain morals and values which would strike the 'normie' as being quite strange. The strictures of white nationalism and dissident rightism command one to forgo certain activities which the 'normie' regards as innocuous - for example, the watching of anime (see this rather bizarre article from the Renegade Tribune, 'Anime is unhealthy - here's why you need to stop watching it').

Robert Stark's radio show features a wide variety of guests, many of whom stand at the fringes of the Far Right movement or even outside the Far Right altogether. Stark, a bohemian, prefers the novel and the unusual, and at first sight his guests seem to be an odd bunch of characters - but in comparison to many white nationalists (like the author of the aforementioned article) they really are not. In Stark World, you are allowed to like anime. This explains why, to me at least, so many of his guests seem comfortable and familiar: they remind of the people I went to university with.

Both the Far Right and Left share a puritanical distaste for consumerism - and shopping malls. In contrast, Stark likes shopping malls, and did a broadcast with Matthew Pegas and David Cole in which the three share fond reminisces of the malls of their youth. Compare this to passages from the leftist Carl Boggs' book, The End of Politics: Corporate Power and the Decline of the Public Sphere (2000), which offer a rather sour Marxist denunciation of nineties shopping mall culture:

In such a transformed American political culture lies another powerful element of post-Fordism: an unprecedented resort to personal consumption, which finds ready expression through the countless images circulated in the spheres of advertising, mass media, popular culture, sports, and fashion... The shopping mall perhaps best embodies this post-Fordist reality... The consumer mall functions in an altogether different way to induce privatism and passivity, constituting a main linkage between corporate agendas and everyday life... [By the 1970s] soon even people who made up the urban poor could partake of a consumer world made more seductive by a wide array of glittery images, media spectacles, and material inducements of all sorts. As part of the revitalized American dream, sprawling malls and shopping centers became virtual universes unto themselves, escapes from the demanding regimen of work and everyday life - all fueled by advertising, the credit economy, increased physical mobility, and of course the wonders of sophisticated technology. 

In his program on shopping malls, Stark observes that malls created a sense of community. Boggs differs, and sees that community as false, artificial:

Reflecting on how commodification sustains an ethos of privatised withdrawal, Lauren Langman argues that mall culture offers a type of pseudodemocratic experience that gives people a sense of public engagement while also discouraging in myriad ways any genuine civic participation... Here the mall phenomenon serves as yet another conduit of corporate colonisation in that the commodification of social (and political) life can easily generate a false sense of empowerment that works its magic across class, regional, ethnic, gender and age divisions... For adults the mall constitutes a ubiquitous outlet for selfhood through the acquisition of clothes, electronics, cosmetics, videos, music CDs, and the like.

To Boggs, we can't have that. We can't have this either:

It should be noted, as well, that other places where people gather - restaurants, cafes, bars, theaters - are also frequently located in or near shopping malls. For young people, in particular, this prime outpost of consumerism offers glitzy alternatives and a constant stream of seductive images and spectacles that provide temporary tangible relief from the mundane world of job insecurity, career anxieties, school, family and personal problems, or simply boredom. Hence, the mall phenomenon, deeply rooted in everyday life, far transcends in its impact the historic presence of the downtown Chamber of Commerce in most American cities. 

Boggs should be happy, as for a multitude of reasons, shopping malls in America seem to be entering a stage of terminal decline. (Amusingly enough, the Wiki article on the phenomenon of the 'Dead Mall' makes a connection between the decline of the mall and one of Robert Stark's favourite themes: 'Due to their often retro and outdated aesthetic, dead malls as a cultural phenomenon are often loosely associated with vaporwave aesthetics and music'). The point is that the American leftist Boggs here sounds uncannily like a Southern nationalist or white nationalist. Both the American Far Right and Left regard capitalist consumerism as sinful, evil, perhaps irredeemably so, and their sermonising on the subject recalls Protestant evangelising, so much so that the possibility exists that the attitudes of both the American Far Left and Right are rooted in the faith of their holders' upbringing. The fervor of William Pierce always reminded me of that of a hell and brimstone evangelical, and perhaps Pierce was influenced, unconsciously, by the Southern Protestantism of his childhood...

A reaction against this moralism accounts in part for the success in the 2010s of 4Chan/Pol and Chan culture. In true postmodernist fashion, the 'based irony bros' of 4Chan did not take politics seriously, at least not as Pierce, Duke, Metzger, Black and Butler did, and secondly, they condoned (and did not condemn) some of the most serious vices of contemporary Western man: marijuana, pornography, 'vidya' games and Mountain Dew. As a matter of fact, 4Chan gives free rein to almost every form of licence. This stands in contrast to the moralism of the old Far Right. In my experience, the nationalist movement founded in the seventies and eighties disapproved of every vice with the exception of alcohol. 'Old nationalism', then, seems more serious, more out of touch with modernity, and less fun than the 'new nationalism' which, through the medium of 4Chan, denounces modern 'degeneracy' while simultaneously reveling in it.

On coming across Pierce's radio broadcasts for the first time, I saw Pierce as an entertainer. From this I gained the false impression that, as I delved further into it, 'the movement' would prove to be as equally as fun and entertaining. How wrong I was! 'The movement' as such should be characterised as filled with negativity. Given that, how are 'normies' to be attracted to it? In contrast, the postmodernist, 'End of History' culture of the nineties did show some negativity, but overall this was leavened by postmodern superficiality and lightness.

III.

To sum up. To paraphrase Sadiq Khan, the Pakistani mayor of London, 'white genocide', the 'great replacement', 'demographic engineering' forms part and parcel of living in the big city - the Neuromancer or Blade Runner big city. (Of course one could leave the city, and thereby escape being confronted by 'demographic engineering' that way, but the fact is that most of the white population of any Western country chooses to live in cities). As to whether this existing order can be overturned remains to be seen. It is possible: stranger things have happened in politics.

In the ideology of the Far Right, the Western city is seen as a prison from which there is no escape, a prison in which one is forced to share with non-whites, Jews, communists, degenerates... Postmodernism takes a somewhat more positive view. It sees man as a spectator who encounters a multiplicity of shifting, divergent perspectives. The implication of this doctrine is that one can escape the obsession with 'white genocide' by changing one's perspective: as the saying goes, if you don't like the conversation, change the channel. Having said that, one could end up in the same predicament as Bruce Springsteen - there may be '57 channels and nothing on'.