The Aussies and the Nazis

 

 I. Introduction: The 'Axis' Australia First Movement

I have read the article The Dawn of Australian National Socialism and here I am offering some thoughts in response. 

Some call it 'National Socialism', Yockey calls it the 'Resurgence of Authority', I call it 'Neo-Nazism': all refer to the one and same thing. I do not like to use the term 'National Socialism' much, as it is hard to define, like so many political concepts (define for me, if you can, 'democracy' or 'liberalism' or even 'socialism'). One problem I have with the term is that 'National Socialism' can be applied to many socialisms: was Mao's communism 'National Socialism'? Stalin's? Perhaps the word 'Nazi' works better at distinguishing the German National Socialism from all the others, but the word 'Nazi' has now  in 2020 been destroyed through overuse and misuse. 

The Dawn article raises the question: can there be such a thing as an Australian 'Nazism'? Stephensen and the Australia First Movement (AFM) were not Nazis in the sense of being card-carrying members of the NSDAP; but then, neither were many of Hitler's collaborators - Degrelle, Tiso, Pavelić, Quisling, Szálasi, and others. Stephensen - and his letters, his essays in the Publicist, prove this - sympathised with the Nazis from 1937 onwards, and in an offhand manner, you could classify him and the entire AFM as Nazi sympathisers. But we do not know how far that sympathy would have extended. If we were to sketch out some alternative history fantasy - along the lines of Philip K. Dick's Man in the High Castle (1962) - in which the Germans invaded and occupied Australia, we could use it as a foundation for speculating as to whether or not Stephensen and the AFM, in these circumstances, would have crossed the line from sympathy to collaboration. Based on the evidence, I answer yes, Stephensen and AFM would have collaborated. 

More controversially, Stephensen and the AFM sympathised with the Japanese after the outbreak of the second Sino-Japanese war in 1937 and up to Pearl Harbour. Again, we must ask how far that sympathy would have extended. Suppose that, in 1942, there had been a Japanese invasion and occupation (something much more probable than a German): would Stephensen and the AFM collaborated? A strong possibility is that at least the Western Australian branch of AFM would have, which is why the Australian government rounded up the AFM and interned them in a concentration camp (along with other Nazi and Japanese sympathisers) for the remainder of the war. (Stephensen himself, before and after the beginning of his pro-Japanese phase in 1937, poured cold water on the notion of a Japanese invasion of Australia and mostly refused to discuss it; if he did touch upon it, he would use it in an argument for one of his favourite theses, that Australia could not rely for its defence upon Britain). 

Even though the AFM ceased to exist and Stephensen's political career came to an end nearly eighty years ago, the AFM / Publicist circle should be studied because they formed the mold for contemporary Australian Far Right activism. When I read about the AFM, I experience a shock of recognition: we modern activists tread along the roads which were laid down by the AFM in the late 1930s and early 1940s. (The AFM's fervently pro-Nazi and bilious anti-Semitic journal, the Publicist (1936-1942), could be compared to one long series of 4Chan 's**t-posts'). Everything the AFM did in the 1930s and 1940s bears on what came in the decades afterwards. Today's Australian Neo-Nazis are ideologically descended from Billy Miles, the activist who founded the Publicist. And he could be described as the grandfather of 20th century Australian nationalism; he coined, or at least helped promulgate, the slogan 'Australia First' as early as 1917. 

(I should note here that the AFM did not officially form until October 1941; before then, the AFM circle had been informally gathered around the Publicist. Throughout this article I use 'AFM' to refer to the Publicist circle before and after the AFM's founding). 

The older Miles played Socrates to Stephensen's Plato, and probably is the one who bears responsibility for steering Stephensen - and a generation of Australian nationalists - towards sympathising with National Socialist Germany and Imperial Japan. It is the AFM example that shows that nationalism for one's own country can co-exist with a sympathy for German National Socialism - and so do the examples of Degrelle, Pavelić, Tiso, Quisling, etc. (It should be noted that both Stephensen and Miles in the late 1930s had close contacts with German agents - real live breathing Nazis - in Australia's pre-war diplomatic underworld and Stephensen commingled with Japanese agents in this period as well). 

But: many of the partisan and resistance fighters in German-occupied Europe claimed to be 'nationalist' during the war, even if they were on the Left; Greek communists claimed to be fighting for the Greek national cause, French communists for the French, and so forth. It is possible that, after a Japanese occupation of Australia, a split could have emerged between the Australian nationalists who supported the Japanese and the Australian communists who opposed them (on supposedly 'patriotic' and 'nationalist' grounds). Who knows, the Australian communists could have taken up arms and waged a guerrilla war with help from the Americans and the Russians, and in this scenario, the most notorious Japanophiles of the AFM (Stephensen, Adela Pankhurst-Walsh and her husband Tom Walsh among them) could have been denounced as traitors and even targeted for assassination. For it could have been that after the Japanese invasion and occupation, the AFM could have taken the same line as the collaborators in German-occupied Europe: yes, patriots were right to resist the invasion, but after the country's defeat, they ought to pitch in and help the occupiers rebuild the country and 'renovate' its culture. 

This is an alternative history novel that almost writes itself. But in order to research it, one would need to examine the history of the collaboration with the Japanese in occupied Philippines, Thailand, French Indochina, the Dutch East Indies, Manchukuo, etc., as Australia is in Asia. 

On that note, until I came across the AFM, I had no idea that the Far Right in both Australia and America contained sympathisers with Imperial Japan. Yockey, in his account of the American Isolationist movement, portrays the American Far Right ('nationalists', he calls them) as being either hostile or indifferent to Imperial Japan. But the example of the great American author, Ralph Townsend, shows that this is not entirely correct. Townsend wrote the anti-Chinese classic Ways That Are Dark (1933), extracts from which often appear on 4Chan, and his career followed the same trajectory as that of the AFM activists who were interned. 

The pro-Japanese sympathies on the Far Right in America and Australia in the 1930s made sense geopolitically, as both Australia and America (at least the West Coast side of America) are Pacific nations and both regard China as a deadly enemy. In defence of their actions in light of what came after, Stephensen and Townsend in the 1930s were only following the adage that the enemy of my enemy is my friend. 

II. Predictions and the Führer Problem

This brings us to the subject of America and how political changes there today affect the prospects of 'Neo-Nazism'  in Europe and Australia. 

The circumstances of Trump's illness are shrouded in mystery. I am unable to ascertain whether or not Trump was ill or feigning illness as a publicity stunt; and if he was sick, was he sick with covid or something else? And what of the conspiracy theories - had he and the other Republicans been deliberately infected as part of what was an assassination attempt by the Left? But in the end, he will go on to win the election, and his victory will mark the beginning of the end of the lockdowns in America and Australia, as Australia (like most of the Western world) goes as America goes. This will free up the Far Right to start organising again (it is no coincidence that the activism of the Far Right in America has been suppressed by the lockdowns while that of the Far Left has been unimpeded). 

But a Trump victory does not rule out a civil war in America; one commentator has compared the 2020 presidential election to the 1860. The Left does not think of much of Biden, and so will be saddened, but not surprised, by a Trump victory, and evidently it is making plans to resume rioting, etc., the day after re-election. 

One result of Far Left malfeasance is that American 'normies', and even American conservatives, are beginning to rediscover anti-communism. The boundaries between the Center Right and Far Right are becoming subtly blurred. We in 2020 live in a landscape which differs completely from that of 2017, when the Center Right turned on the Far Right after Charlottesville. The conservatives - and not only in America - are catching up with the Far Right. But this was to expected; as Mike Enoch says, 'Everyone hates SJWs'. And the significance of this is that in 2021 the Center Right will be off the back of the Far Right, at least for a while. 

What of Europe? My prediction is that it will remain 'pozzed' for some time. Yockey, in Enemy of Europe (1953), blames the American occupation of Western Europe for Europe's general 'pozzedness'. But the trouble is that even if America were to let go of Europe - and even if the entire North American Continent to disappear into thin air tomorrow - the political, social and economic structures erected by the by the Anglo victors would remain. Germany, in particular, labours under a system which is not democracy but a parody of democracy, a system in which political parties dominate every aspect of political and social life. 

As to how Germany could be 'uncucked'... In the 1991 movie King Ralph, the entire British Royal Family dies in a freak accident, and a yokel from America (played by John Goodman) is discovered to be next in the line to throne; hilarity and hi-jinks ensue. For Germany to free itself, the entire elite of Germany - which must number in the tens, perhaps hundreds, of thousands - would need to vanish in a similar freak accident. Next in line to the throne would be the German nationalist and Far Right formations - the AfD, the informant-riddled NPD, and assorted skinhead and Neo-Nazi groups. All of these are hardly a prepossessing bunch, but they are all Germany would have in terms of political leadership. 

The moral is that it is only internal collapse which can bring about the displacements which in turn lead to change. Historical observers ask why it was that France, in 1936, did nothing to stop Germany from remilitarising the Rhineland. The answer is that France at the time was experiencing a political and economic collapse. 

Now, we could hope for a similar implosion in Germany's 'democratic' order, but barring a miracle, that will not happen. The problem comes down to lack of leadership - charismatic leadership. The Nazi slogan goes, 'Ein Volk, Ein Reich, Ein Führer'. If we are to look at Germany and Europe today, we must ask: where are the Führers? This is a singularly important question, as fascism subscribes to the great man theory of history. Fascism could be considered a system of neo-monarchy; the Duce or the Führer steps into where the King would be in a feudal or dynastic regime. The Volk, the people, constituted the infrastructure of National Socialist Germany; the Führer (and the rest of the NSDAP leadership) the superstructure. 

From that perspective, the Neo-Nazi movement resembles one of those royalist tendencies in Europe from hundreds of years ago which await the return of an exiled king or which get behind a pretender (or more accurately, a claimant) to a throne. Such 'royalist' political movements can survive and even prosper for a long time. The Peronist movement, for example, in Argentina waited nearly twenty years for the return of the exiled populist and quasi-fascist Juan Perón. Political tendencies such as the 'royalist' can prevail because concreteness can be located at their center: the tendency is bound up with a particular person. It is significant that Germany collapsed militarily one week after Hitler's death; Hitler, while he was alive, held the Third Reich together. In America, the Republican Party's relation to its leader has become like that of the NSDAP to its Führer, and so the question is being asked, what will the Republican Party do once Trump goes? 

Can a 'royalist' movement survive the death of its leader? The populist governor of Louisiana, Huey Long, founded a Share the Wealth movement during the Great Depression which attracted a significant number of Americans; after he was assassinated in 1935, the Share the Wealth clubs fell apart. Likewise, Maoism disappeared from China almost immediately after Mao's death in 1976. One could enumerate many such cases. (Trotskyism could be the exception to the rule, as Trotskyite parties have only multiplied after his assassination in 1940, but Trotkskyism claims to be only a continuation of Leninism - the Leninism supplanted by Stalinism). But that places Neo-Nazism in a position which is unique of all the ideologies in the world: it seeks to survive as a nostalgia movement designed to promote the wise policies of a deceased leader. Perhaps an ingenious political thinker could transform this liability into an asset. 

III. 'Not for Export'

Hitler said famously that 'National Socialism is no article for export'. This quotation has been used in arguments for the thesis that German National Socialism is restricted to Germany and consequently, the Anglo nations - America, England, Australia, New Zealand, Canada - have nothing to learn from Hitler's teachings. 

German National Socialism may be divided up into three periods: the Years of Struggle (1919 to 1932), the golden years in which Germany enjoyed a national revival and great foreign policy success without bloodshed (1933 to 1938), and finally the Third Reich years (1939 to 1945). As Carolyn Yeager points out, white nationalists - and the dissident Right - tend to lavish praise on the first two periods and heap scorn on the third. They take this dim view of the Third Reich years for reasons which I will not elaborate here. What is important to note is that intellectuals and scholars of the Far Right will pass over the Third Reich period in their researches. Mein Kampf gets the lion share of their attention, even though that book - crucial as it is to understanding the National Socialist Weltanschauung - was written by Hitler as a young man in the Years of Struggle; the main enemy in Mein Kampf is not the Jews, but the French. 

The Third Reich period ought to be studied the most, for in the last analysis it is this on which Hitler and the NSDAP will be judged. So, what resources do we use? For the purposes of a study of the political history - and not just the military history - of the Third Reich years, books published in the war and immediate post-war years provide the best store of knowledge, even if these are written by Germany's enemies (and virtually all of the books in English from that time are), as they are (surprisingly enough) relatively free of the bias of later years. None of the books from the war mention the Holocaust, and only a few of them mention the gas chambers; at the very most, they will make in passing allusions to an 'extermination' of the Jews, and even then they choose not to dwell on it, as they feel that they lack the evidence to verify the Jewish atrocity claims. (Most writers, even during the war, did not take the propaganda utterances of the World Jewish Congress (WJC) and the Polish government in exile all that seriously). The 1942 book, The New Order in Poland (1942) by Simon Segal (presumably a Jewish author) describes the hard lot of Jews and Poles under German occupation but gives us a reasonably fair and balanced account. One is almost tempted to call the work Holocaust Revisionist even though Revisionism had not come into being yet. 

The wartime accounts disprove the 'No article for export' thesis, as it becomes clear that Germany did a great deal of exporting National Socialism in the years 1939 to 1945. Millions of Europeans were mobilised - many, admittedly, against under duress - for the German war effort, such that Europe came to be a cross between a beehive and a foundry. To the modern reader, German-occupied Europe foreshadowed the European Union (but a different European Union to the one we know today). And indeed, in Albert Lauterbach's Economics in Uniform: Military Economy and Social Structure (1943), we find headings such as 'European Union - National Socialist Edition' and 'Continental "Socialism" on the German Model'. 

In principle, Lauterbach likes a European Union; in practice, he does not like it - if the Germans are the ones running it. 

I cannot claim, as others have done, to have uncovered the secret of the actual intentions or discussions of the Nazi rulers, and evidence from German sources on definite details of the proposed Nazi reorganization of Europe has been limited. However, unless the term Grossraumwirtschaft is used in an unusually narrow sense, it seems to make little difference which particular administrative technique of domination the Nazis proposed to use. They might or might not decide to admit local puppet governments, they might apply different methods of control to various regions, but their general policy was always directed toward a centrally planned management of all Europe's economic activities in the exclusive interest, as they saw it, of the German nation. 

In other words, in the event of a decisive German victory, the policy envisaged was clearly a militarized Grossraumwirtschaft within a comparatively self-sufficient European continent, controlled by National Socialist ideas, interests, and methods. The power and potentialities of such an economic and political unit were bound to be tremendous. 

It is the German influence, the German control, the German domination, which was resented the most. England fought two wars (and in the process destroyed itself) to prevent Germany from becoming the leading force on the Continent, and one of the main geopolitical objectives of England and America after the war was to prevent a German return to ascendancy. But inevitably, the Continent will fall into the German orbit - it is doing so already. Germany exerts a magnetic attraction even under its present hapless leadership. Books such as Lauterbach's give us a portent.

I began my political life as a pan-European, an advocate of European unity, of Imperium Europa - it was a vision inspired by Yockey, Thiriart and Mosley - and it was not until the 2010s that I came across the writings of Yeager and started to myself how it was how the structure of the new Imperium would work. Which European nation would do the heavy lifting? The question answers itself. We know which nation it is, and it is not Portugal nor Ireland nor Denmark nor Hungary, it is not even England nor France. And once I began to explore the matter, my writings began to meet with a frosty reception. Talk of European unity, pan-Europa, would induce warm fuzzy feelings, but I once I brought up the subject of Germany and the Germans, well, that only served to awaken latent hostility towards Germany that was always simmering below the surface. And this is related to one of the persistent themes in the wartime writings by Anglos, an objection to the National Socialist idea of the Herrenvolk. Anti-Nazi propagandists mistranslate Herrenvolk as 'Master Race' when it means something more like a 'People who are Gentlemen', and this mistranslation in itself is revealing. Hitler's Table Talk offends because Hitler here states crudely and bluntly that Germany could do a better job of running Ukraine and the tracts of German-occupied Russia than the Ukrainians and Russians themselves. And that really gets up the nose of the dissident Right movement. We on the Far Right can accept the idea of a qualitative differences between races but not nationalities. 

IV.  AFM and the Jews

A staple of German propaganda during the wars is: German rule will do good things for your country. In the chapter, 'The Occupied Countries and Fortress Europe' of German Radio Propaganda: Report on Home Broadcasts during the War (1944), we find: 

Countries conquered by the German army fulfil a threefold function in German propaganda: as occupied territories, they are reconstructed; as neutrals, their approval is quoted, as allies, they send troops. Reconstruction starts with the arrival of the German soldier, whom National Socialist propagandists describe as even more civilized and considerate than did propagandists of Imperial Germany Germany builds new schools in the protectorate, it repairs devastation in the Ukraine; the Dutch, Danes, and Slovaks enjoy the blessings of her protection, and the consolidation of France advances rapidly after her submission. The appreciative response of the conquered is regularly stressed, and whenever possible the German character of the conquered territories: Alsace is rescued and returns to the homeland. 

[From a German news broadcast:] Colmar, a German town in Alsace, with its Gothic St. Martin’s Cathedral, shows little sign of damage. This town has been wearing a strong French ‘make-up’ for the past twenty years, not at all in keeping with its German character . . . Life in Colmar is returning to normal.

The phrase ‘returning to normal,’ like the word ‘reconstruction,’ occurs frequently. In Norway, in Denmark, in Holland, life returns to normal in a very short time. But there is something more than normality in the German picture of reconstruction. Liege, which had been a very dirty city, was turned by the efficient Germans into an earthly paradise. The railroads which the French had neglected were thriving. And there was remarkable engineering in process to unite the north of Norway with the south. The German listener is regularly informed of every school that is re-opened in conquered Russia. On the German radio, conquered Europe becomes a region of flowers, gladness, and reconstruction. 

The Germans may have repaired infrastructure, true, but what of the cultural and racial domain? National Socialism is 'Not for export': if you were a Jew or Mason or Bolshevik in wartime Hungary or Norway or Greece or Holland or France or Italy, you could take comfort in the phrase; the Nazis would leave you unmolested because 'It can't happen here', that is to say, National Socialism is only for Germans, not for Hungarians or Danes. France is to be allowed to rot under Jewish or Communist or Masonic domination because Germans - being selfish - do not want to share the blessings of National Socialism with the French. 

But of course that was not true. 

While some conquered lands are always referred to as conquered, others, in propaganda, regain their neutrality. They achieve this status by adopting Germany’s enemies as their own. The first enemy they acknowledge is the Jew. The quisling governments, step by step, adopt National Socialist principles of anti-Jewish legislation.

The dissident Right today should take great interest in that legislation, study it, examine it. But an Australian nationalist can object that it was all European, specifically Continental European, and that European-style anti-Semitism would have found no foothold here in Australia. But, eighty years ago, an Australian Far Right political movement walked down the same road as the Continentals in regard to anti-Semitism, and that movement was the AFM. In the most succinct book on the AFM, The Puzzled Patriots: The Story of the Australia First Movement (1968), Bruce Muirden writes that in 1941: 

Stephensen also found a foe in Cyril Pearl, editor of the Sydney Sunday Telegraph, who had asked the government to act against the Publicist... Pearl said of the Publicist that 'month after month it churns out a stale mixture of rabid anti-British nationalism, Nazi-inspired, and anti-Semitism and windy Fascist pseudo-philosophy'. Stephensen's counterblast had in it a certain inevitability: 'We of the Publicist do not know whether or not the editor of the Sunday Telegraph is a Jew'. 

I think Pearl's characterisation of the Publicist is harsh but true. (Amusingly, Stephensen typically responded to  his opponents with a typical Far Right tactic which is still used today on 4Chan and other forums: he accused them of being Jewish). 

Muirden goes on to say of the Publicist contributors: 

Miles, Graham, Arnold and Stephensen were beyond question anti-Semitic, and their increasingly unpleasant attacks on Australian Jews constituted one of the least savoury and defensible aspects of Publicist and Australia First propaganda. When the flow of Jewish refugees from Europe increased from 1938, the Publicist became more offensive. Miles and Stephensen, who gradually became as adept as his master in Jew-baiting... 

 

 The Jewish refugee question in the 1930s obsessed the AFM circle. Publicist contributor William Hardy Wilson, an architect who lived in Melbourne, designed a concentration camp for the Jews which was to be situated in the Dandenong Ranges. (The name of this camp? Israelia). 

Stephensen's attitudes to Germany on the outbreak of war are interesting. Muirden recounts: 

Stephensen wrote in the delayed September Publicist that before the war he had done his best to create goodwill between Australia and Germany, 'not because I held a brief for the Germans, but because I thought Australians were being mentally weakened by the revengeful Jewish campaigns of anti-Hitler hate which for years has flooded our Australian news press. If we are to fight against Germany, let us at least fight for an Australian, not a Jewish, reason'. 

The last sentence at first appears to be an evasion until we think it over. Stephensen's drift is that Australia in 1939 had no reason to 'fight against Germany', and so, had not reason to go to war. This was in keeping with Stephensen's anti-war position throughout all his career; he fiercely objected to Australia's participation in British punitive expeditions in Sudan, China and South Africa and, it goes without saying, Australia's entrance into the war on the British side in WWI. 

V.  Priorities

I have dwelt on the AFM circle at length because I wish to make the point that German and Nazi-inspired politics did not drop into Australia from the heavens; it is not a utopia without a material basis; it is not a castle in the sky. The AFM, and Stephensen, eighty years ago provided us with a precedent. One can ask whether the AFM's politics are entirely appropriate to the present day. I answer no: I myself do not believe that Melbourne's Jews should be interned in a concentration camp in the Dandenongs. More important is the fact that politics of the Stephensen sort once existed in this country. In the same way, today's Southern nationalism - a uniquely American product, definitely not for export - is founded on historical practice. It once existed. Much of the dissident Right makes fun of the Americans because of their inability to organise at a national level, e.g., form a nationwide party capable of taking on the Democrats and the Republicans; but at one point, the Southerners formed their own ethnostate - the Confederacy - and printed their money, elected their own president, etc., and even after their crushing defeat in the Civil War they maintained a regime of segregation right up until sixty years ago. In Far Right politics, one must always be grounded in the historical, the actual. So, if you want to build a Hitler-centered and anti-Semitic movement here in Australia, look to the example of the AFM, whose leaders networked with NSDAP members in Melbourne and Sydney. One will arrive not at a 'Nazism with Australian characteristics' (to paraphrase Mao) but at the least a nationalist philosophy which could be considered to be Nazi-compatible, Nazi-adjacent, a philosophy that puts the AFM in the same sphere as Petain, Tiso, Quisling, Pavelić and others. 

No doubt, 'Nazi-adjacent' politics poses all sorts of difficulties. A biography of Quisling reveals that a tension - which manifested itself behind closed doors - existed between Quisling's Nasjonal Samling and Norway's German occupiers. The Germans demanded that Quisling's party be reorganised along German lines so as to make it more like the NSDAP; they attempted to reorganise Norway's labour organisations along German lines as well (and in doing so met great resistance). Overall, a tension existed between the Norwegian interests and that of German 'New Order' imposed upon Europe. Both Hitler and Quisling shared the same ideology - fascism - but shared the same ideology of nationalism as well, and it was their differing perceptions of the national interest of their respective countries that led to a clash. Similar complications would have emerged in Australia had the Axis won the war: the ideology of Stephensen and Miles would inevitably have clashed with that of the Germans, the Italians and the Japanese. 

But such is politics. In the end, when one evaluates a political system, one must do so by the criterion, how far did it go to meet my political priorities? A Marxist in the early years of the Soviet regime would have been perfectly indifferent to the famine, poverty, misery and deaths brought about by Lenin and the Bolsheviks. He would have justified it all on the the grounds that, in the USSR, for the first time in history capitalism had been abolished and a dictatorship of the proletariat introduced. Socialism trumps humanism in the Marxist's world-view. We could here make an analogy with an anti-Semite - an obsessive anti-Semite of the Stephensen or Miles sort - living in German-occupied Europe. Accounts of Europe in that period make it sound like an unpleasant place, to put it mildly: Europeans lived through great suffering, deprivation and misery - black markets, rationing, Allied blockades, Allied bombing, deportations, labour conscription, starvation... But the anti-Semite living in German-occupied Oslo or Athens, Budapest or Paris, could at least console himself with the thought that someone was finally doing something about the Jewish problem - and the Mason problem and the Marxist problem. The great French  nationalist thinker, Charles Maurras, loathed Germany and spent a great deal of his career attacking it, but he loathed Jewry more, and he criticised the Vichy 1940 anti-Jewish laws as being too soft. Maurras never had a good word to say about the Nazis, but I am sure that - when pressed - he would have admitted that the German occupation had its positive aspects. (Maurras resembled Miles in temperament to a great degree - both were irascible old men - with the main difference being that Miles was favourably inclined to the Germans). 

VI. The hero ideal

In politics, one has to balance negatives with positives, and today, Far Right politics is overly weighted to the negative. A thoroughly representative American website, which I shall not name here, is filled every day with posts which are obsessively anti-Semitic, which denounce Trump as being a pawn of the Jews, which denounce Christianity, which promulgate depressing, fatalistic conspiracy theories, and which feature stories detailing some really unsavoury subjects. The same site also puts up speeches by Nazis and articles on Holocaust Revisionism, but it does so apparently out of a sense of duty, that is, only because it is expected to do so. The site's owner is definitely not a 'Nazi', and is a scruffy, bearded American white nationalist type - he does not even deign to sport a 'fashy' haircut like Richard Spencer. In its defence, I will say that the site champions things which it regards as positive - homeopathic remedies, a simple, agrarian 'Volkisch' lifestyle, veganism, and so forth; but on the whole this is too little, too late, and the positive is outweighed by the negative. 

In contrast, the Southern nationalist emphasises the positive, and he has a hero ideal, an archetype which inspires him - the Southern Gentleman. 

Hunter Wallace's Occidental Dissent used to be Southern nationalist but then dropped it; now its comments section is filled with who are nihilists who do nothing but sneer, scorn and 'spew anti-Semitic bile' (as Abe Foxman would put it) as a means of demonstrating their supposed integrity. There is a point when rote 'Jews this, Jews that' rhetoric becomes obnoxious, and Occidental Dissent - and so many other white nationalist sites - reached it long ago. Fine, get rid of the Jews and the Zionists, but what do you have to put in their place? The answer is, nothing: hence, nihilism. 

If the Southern nationalist holds up the Southern Gentleman as his hero ideal, the German National Socialist holds up the German or Prussian soldier. This archetype - who debuted on the world political stage around the time of the Napoleonic Wars - evolved by 1939 into the one we are familiar with today through thousands of movies, novels, comic books, computer games... He is clean-shaven, has dueling scars, wears a monocle, wields a riding crop or baton or even a whip. Even though he is reviled by the rest of the world, the true German nationalist regards him as a hero, a positive rather than a negative. In German National Socialist ideology, he balances out anti-Semitism. Jewry, Masonry, Bolshevism, liberalism, feminism, national decadence, etc., are portrayed as obstacles which are preventing his rise. 

Whatever you can say of him and the Southern Gentleman, and there are many intellectual criticisms one can make of both, it must be conceded that they are a something, not a nothing. The choice becomes one of having an ideal or no ideal.

As a rejoinder to this, the materialist will point out the obvious: neither of the two archetypes exists today. The materialist will regard this as the final refutation, because to him, what is in front of him is all there is and all there ever will be - if he cannot see an idea (and it is the nature of an idea that it cannot be seen) when he looks out his window, he does not believe in that idea. The vast majority of nationalists and racialists today in the West, especially in the Anglosphere, hold to materialism, and so will pour scorn on the notion of a revival of the two archetypes. But the argument can be turned back on them. You can make the observation that the ethnic homogeneity enjoyed by Americans (for example) during the 1930s and 1940s does not exist, so by their logic, that homogeneity will never return - ever. A good many American white nationalists have apparently accepted this rather defeatist argument, which goes some way to explaining why so many of them seem to have given up. 

My advice to young 'National Socialists' is, make the German archetype your avatar, your totem. And form relationships with German nationalists (the 'based Kraut bros' in 4Chan parlance). In this you will be following the example of Miles and Stephensen. As David S. Bird writes in Nazi Dreamtime: Australian Enthusiasts for Hitler's Germany (2012): 

Miles ensured from this time onwards [1937] that his journal endorsed every aspect of German Nazism that came under its scrutiny in the belief that there was no conflict between national-socialism and 'Australianism'. He appeared to have no concern for public opinion other than brazenly to deny it and would go where even the appeasers feared to tread, endorsing Germany's claims for the return of colonies like New Guinea in September 1937. This was hardly 'Australia First', but it did elicit good wishes from Baroness von der Golz in Pommerania (sic) in December and an editorial acknowledgment: 'Your German leaders appear to us to be doing very well. May Germany prosper!'. 

The Metalstorm: Why some nationalists dislike the Nazis

I.

After the eruption of hostilities in Europe in 1914, the English - and the Americans - produced a torrent of literature denouncing German and 'Prussian' cruelty, aggression, rapacity, militarism, authoritarianism, racial self-aggrandizement, Machtpolitik, Kultur, and war crimes (real or imagined); a hundred years later, this torrent shows no signs of abating. But if the English polemicists and the German nationalists - who wrote rebuttals - agreed on one thing, it was that 'Prussianism', 'Prussian militarism', 'Prussian ethical-socialism' (as Spengler called it), defined the essence of the German national character.

To Spengler, each of the five leading nations of the West - England, Germany, France, Spain and Italy - could be summed up a certain Idea, a style, a culture, and it is this that distinguishes one nation from the other. In much the same way, a certain style of each race - in that most racialist and ethnocentric of sci-fi TV shows, Star Trek - helps us to tell one race apart from another, so much so that one would never mistake a Klingon for a Vulcan, a Romulan for a Ferengi. Of course to a Ferengi or Klingon, all kinds of difference - mainly political - exist within the race, but the casual outside observer hardly sees these: he only sees unity and homogeneity. And this uniformity is determined by the style of the race as much as the genetics.

After Germany's defeat in 1918, venerable German institutions - the German Army, the German General Staff, Junkerdom, and the East Prussian state itself - survived; after Germany's defeat in 1945, they were destroyed. Nothing of them remained, not even the 'Prussian Idea' itself. We see here the complete disappearance of a culture, a style. Only ghosts of it linger: we find fleeting images of it in the first three Star Wars movies, in episodes of Star Trek and Battlestar Galactica, in the multitude of computer and board wargames devoted to WWI and WWII. Pertinent to this subject - the prevalence of Nazi and 'Prussian' types in popular culture - is this comment at Steve Sailer's site:

Having Nazi bad guys in situations where Nazism isn’t at all relevant is just the mark of a lazy writer who can’t be bothered to develop good antagonists on their own. Even in situations where they aren’t actual Nazis, the aesthetic provides a convenient visual shorthand.

In Star Wars we would know the empire was evil just by looking at the officers’ uniforms, which were heavily reminiscent of the uniforms worn by Wehrmacht and SS officers during WW2. Additionally, the peaked caps were shaped like those worn by Imperial Japanese military during the war. Add in the patrician affect of Imperial officers(a lot like the aristocratic manner stereotypical of German officers in movies of that period) and you have instant baddies without having them say or do anything evil. Vader’s helmet was specifically designed to be recall the German stahlhelm.

But times of changed. It seems that American filmmakers no longer want to depict dapper fascists. To judge by the listings of upcoming movies at IMDB.Com, Hollywood seems to have slowed down on the production of one of its staples - the anti-German war propaganda movie: I count only one WWII drama slated for release in 2020.

In the world of politics, outside of entertainment and popular culture, the 'Prussian' - with his monocle, riding crop, long boots, dueling scars, smart uniform, and cap set at a jaunty angle - has ceased to exist. His resurrection was predicted by Yockey on the reasoning that while one can kill a man, one cannot kill an idea: one can lop off the top of a tree, but so long as the tree has roots deep in the soil, it will regrow. But 75 years after the end of WWII, this analogy has been shown to incorrect.

The disappearance of 'Prussianism' violates one of the tenets of geopolitics - that nations almost always revert to type. For the past 75 years, Japan has kept its head down and sought to avoid being noticed, and it shies away from all war and all power-politics. But because of the recent Chinese bellicosity in the South China Sea, smaller nations such as the Philippines and Vietnam are looking to Japan as a protector, and as a result, Japan is being forced to accept the mantle of a leading Asian power. One cannot escape one's geopolitical destiny. But for Germany, this law has been suspended. In all the negotiations between the UK and the EU over Brexit, France has taken the lead: the understanding is that France, and not the faceless EU bureaucracy, which gives voice to the sentiments of the EU, and if Boris Johnson or Theresa May want to parley, they must parley with Emmanuel Macron. Germany has been conspicuous by its absence. One would think that Germany was not the wealthiest and most powerful nation on the Continent, and that it had no opinions on what is the most important question for the EU for the 21st century. The British press, performing its traditional role of stoking British resentment against the Germans, continually tries to goad Germany into making provocative statements on Brexit, but Merkel refuses to take the bait.

II.

The Germans will not be taking up Spengler's 'Prussian Socialism' any time soon. But suppose that certain prerequisites were fulfilled for its return, one of the prerequisites being the election to office of a German nationalist party (such as the AfD): what would happen then? I think we all know the answer. England and America, Israel and Russia, would demand that the results be overturned and 'democracy' restored - otherwise, war.

The world will ignore the calls of the 'international community' for sanctions and war only under one condition: that it ceases to believe or starts to doubt that the Holocaust happened. As part of a public relations campaign for German nationalism, the new German nationalist government could deban all Holocaust Revisionism within Germany's borders and promulgate Revisionism across Europe and the world. It could muster up an international task force of forensic investigators to take examine the 'death camps' of Auschwitz, Treblinka and Sobibor for traces of the poison gas which killed millions of people. If no traces were found, or even if the final report of the investigators was divided on the matter, doubt and confusion would be sowed in the minds of British and American public - the same public which normally would join wholeheartedly the chorus of condemnation of the nationalist Germany.

One can dream: the above scenario at the present seems highly unlikely. The reason for that is that German nationalists, even nationalists of the most populist and civic stripe, are faced with a paradox, and this is: they cannot win power without the help of Holocaust Revisionism, but they cannot disseminate Revisionism unless they win power.

The stalemate can only be broken by a miracle. In the South Park episode 'Are You There God? It's Me, Jesus', God visits Earth and before an assembly of South Park residents, offers to answer one question - any question. One of the South Park children, Stan Marsh, asks a question which is quite trivial. God answers it easily (with His perfect and omniscient knowledge) and then departs the Earth, promising to return in the year 4000, much to everyone's dissatisfaction. Now, suppose that this celestial visitation were to occur today and the question was asked of God, 'Did the Holocaust happen?'. Suppose that God's answer was no, and that Hitler and the NSDAP did not order the extermination of Europe's Jews, did not gas the Jews (or shoot them en masse) and did not kill 60,000, let alone six million, Jews. And then suppose that God's answer was beamed into the minds of every sentient being on Earth: that and only that would bring about the change in the attitude of humanity towards Germany that the German nationalists so sorely need.

This story line - and indeed, it will remain nothing but a story - implies that Holocaust Revisionism constitutes a revelation to the world (and in my daydream above, a divine revelation), but in truth, the world has known, and known for some time, that the Holocaust did not happen. But this understanding has not been acted upon because those in authority will not acknowledge the truth of Revisionism.

When I am speaking of those in authority, I am speaking of three leading groups in particular. These are:

- International Jewish groups. If six million did not die, then Jewry would lose its right to Palestine. Jews see the Holocaust as a religious justification, in accordance with ancient Talmudic prophecies, for the recovery of the lost State of Israel.

- The Anglo-Conservatives. By 'Anglo-Conservative', I mean American and British conservatives of the Victor Davis Hanson and Rush Limbaugh sort. Usually boomers, they hew to the official party line on WWI and WWII and America's involvement, and they hate German nationalism (of any era) with a vengeance.

- Left-wing journalists. If God were to come to Earth (as per my South Park fantasy above) and reveal the truth to the world regarding the Holocaust, the media would simply refuse to report it.

All politics is an activity related to power, Yockey writes, and we would assure the triumph of Revisionism were we were to knock the three groups out of their leading position in the power structure. The question is, how?

III.

It goes without saying that the 'Prussian' is a soldier. This is important for the reason that in German nationalist ideology, politics is tied to war.

The Left takes the same view of politics. One of the dirty secrets of 20th century communism is that no communist won power without waging war beforehand: the successful communists did not win elections in Russia, China, Vietnam, Cuba, they won battles. Stalin, Trotsky, Mao, Tito, Kim Il Sung, Ho Chi Minh, Castro: all commanded soldiers, their example presenting a stark contrast to the anemic leftism of today.

The former left-wing terrorist T. Derbent wrote a classic monograph, 'Categories of Revolutionary Military Policy' (2006), which is a treatise on military science and left-wing politico-military strategy. Much of it can be applied by both the Left and Right: the white nationalists in William Pierce's Turner Diaries (1978), for instance, followed the same strategy as the left-wing urban guerrilla groups operating in the 1960s and 1970s. (Pierce, much to his chagrin, was compared by hostile reviewers to the left-wing Brazilian guerrilla Carlos Marighella).

And this brings us to the heart of the problem. Warfare has changed since the time of Hitler and the Kaiser, Guderian and von Moltke. In the first half of the 20th century, the Germans led the way when it came to warfare, but since then, 'Prussian militarism' and the institution of the General Staff have become archaic, outmoded. This partially explains, to my mind, the success of computer games such as Hearts of Iron IV. Gamers can exercise their 'Prussian' world-conquering urges and live vicariously through it, but they can also return to a distant past which is unlike our present and in some respects qualitatively better.

But in other respects, nationalists see the past as worse than the present. No nationalist in the West wants to see a return to WWI or WWII. Today nationalists see white life as something precious and whites as an endangered species. Our sons are not be sent off to die in wars, and no blood of a white Western man is to be spilled.

And this contravenes National Socialist (and 'Prussian militarist') doctrine. In the wartime book 'The Spoil of Europe' (1941), written by an anti-Nazi, Thomas Reveille, we find an (mostly accurate, to my view) enunciation of the fundamental principles of National Socialism:

The State, according to Hitler, has a twofold domestic task. The first is to ''forge the sword” which shall "secure for the German Volk the land and soil that is due to them on this earth” and "their position as lords of the world.” The second domestic task of the Nazi State is to ensure "the preservation and advancement of a community of physically and spiritually similar living creatures.” This twofold task is to be pursued simultaneously. In case of need, however, the latter should be temporarily sacrificed for the former...

[In order to conquer Europe, Germany needs] The forging of the sword and the creation of an indissolubly unified Germanic community in the existing frontiers of the Reich. The Nazi doctrine always assumes that the sword must be ultimately wielded in order to achieve each major objective...

Germany's mission is to rule the world and to fulfill this by any and all means. Europe is the center of the world. The Reich has obligations to its kith and kin overseas. It has also the imperious duty of making Germany's acquisitions perpetually secure not only by forging a sword for their defense but also by a simultaneous attack, through political disintegration or war, against possible enemies and coalitions. Full account is also taken of obstacles to the process of the continuous outward push of Germandom. 

The white nationalist may like the Volk talk, the talk of blood and soil, and the goal of 'the preservation and advancement of a community of physically and spiritually similar living creatures', which sounds rather like David Lane's slogan of the 14 words. But the 'forging of the sword' frightens the white nationalist, because a war waged by any European or Western nation automatically entails casualties - white casualties. And indeed, not only white nationalists but most European white men object to going to war, possibly because they  understand (more than they did a hundred years ago) what it means. As Steve Sailer writes in 'The Dregs of War', 

I want to mention how this latest phenomenon supports John Mueller’s hypothesis in The Remnants of War (which he should have titled The Dregs of War).

Mueller is the Woody Hayes Professor of National Security Studies at Ohio State. He argues that Kursk-Orel battles between mass armies in open fields are over. If they gave that kind of war, nobody would show up.

His specific examples had to do with the 1990s Balkan Wars, which were portrayed in the press as driven by ancient mass enmities. But Mueller argues that the amount of bloodlust in the overall populations was quite low. The various states had massive problems with draft evasion. Basically, nobody wants to go to a modern battlefield with state of the art weapons because everybody figures they wouldn’t last long in the metalstorm.

Sailer points to the conflict in Ukraine as an example of the new kind of war, a war which differs from WWII: 'The Battle of Stalingrad, it isn’t. So far'.

Because the realities of war have changed, then, the Far Right needs to grope around like the Far Left (as Derbent does in his monograph) for a new politico-military strategy.

IV.

We should keep in mind that the socialist and conservative regimes in Western Europe today were (in the case of France, Holland, Belgium, Germany, Austria, Italy, Norway, and Denmark) installed at the point of a bayonet: the British and Americans waged a ferocious war to 'liberate' them from fascism and Far Right conservatism. It could be that the Far Right, the nationalist Right, in those countries may need to wage another war to win them back: quite possibly, the Merkels and Macrons cannot be pushed out any other way. If that is the case - and keep in mind we are in the new age of the 'dregs of war' - what would that war look like?

Years ago, a poster on 4Chan/Pol detailed a long-running fantasy of his - a fantasy informed by the Terminator movies and other cyberpunk pop culture works. A race of cyborg warriors would time-travel from the future, wage war against the Merkels and Macrons, and free Europe. This post stood out for me, as I  - in a similar science-fiction-ish mood - had indulged in a similar daydream. And at the time it seemed quite logical to me, given the circumstances, that the only army which could take on the liberal establishment and win would be one composed of super-soldiers using a technology far advanced from that of present.

In my scenario, the soldiers would win eschew a direction confrontation with the armies of Europe and avail themselves of Fidel Castro and Che Guevara guerrilla tactics, which, to my mind, would prove to be extremely effective.

Of course I understand that such a war (cyber-war?) can only take place only in the realm of fantasy. But does another way forward exist? Bismarck famously said that politics is the art of the possible, and by this he meant there is more than one path to the fulfillment of a political task. He may have been right in this, but at present, I can only see one possibility - one which is (I admit) quite impossible. 

In Defence of 'Scum' Nationalism

Joe Owens has done another inflammatory video - he cranks out half a dozen a week - attacking other British nationalists and proffering civic nationalism, populism and UKIP as the solution to all of nationalism's ills: this one is entitled 'REAL NATIONALISM or SCUM nationalism'.

Owens shows us a few clips of odd British nationalists at demonstrations, some of whom seem lumpenproletarian and defective. We see a few strange-looking and obese people. I was struck by the sight of one youngish man (at 06.18), walking with a cane and who appeared to have gout - a rich man's disease. Owens contrasts this with photos of nationalist demonstrations - including those held by the National Front - from the 1980s, when nationalists, and British people as a whole, were skinnier and fitter.

I can't speak for the British nationalists, of course; I can only speak for the Australian. Owens' video does relate back to us. A common complaint which has been heard on the Australian scene for years is, 'Why can't we attract more decent and healthy people - nice, well-educated, clean-cut, middle-class types...'. The answer is that those types for the most part don't participate in fringe politics, whether it be of the extreme Right or Left (and we should keep in mind that the ranks of the Far Left itself today are filled mainly with 'marginalised' people who appear weird or defective in some way - not healthy proletarians). The ones who do will, at the most, vote for the civic populists - such as One Nation, Rise Up!, Australian Liberty Alliance. They may even join those parties (but it should be noted that Australians in the main do not like joining political parties, even the mainstream ones). In other words, the 'nice, normal' types will gravitate, always, towards the mainstream political parties or their offshoots (such as the civic and populist formations); what's more, they confine their political activities to participation in the normal electoral process - that is, campaigning for parties and voting for them. They don't recognise that a politics exist outside the electoral sphere; they don't want constitute themselves (as the Far Left does) as an 'extra-parliamentary opposition'.

This brings us back to a criticism I made earlier of Joe Owens: those of the electoralist mentality believe that one should engage in politics only on election day (in state and federal elections) once every three years; for the intervening periods between election days and campaigns, one ought to just to sit idle - and perhaps fulminate, as Owens does, against those nationalists who are doing something during those periods.

Owens is asking a lot. We in Australia have just had a federal election, in which One Nation did well, and this year the state of Queensland will hold an election in which One Nation is expected to well. Those Australian nationalists outside of Queensland, then, are meant to do nothing and go to sleep for the next three years until the next federal election, when they ought to - according to Owens' recommendations - campaign and vote for One Nation, again.

But, contrary to what Owens says, politics in Australian nationalism does manifest itself in between elections and outside elections. In fact, we ought to take up a Marxist-Leninist, 'totalitarian' view of politics. Here is Selznick in the Introduction to The Organizational Weapon (1952):

The nature of bolshevism cannot be understood unless we grasp the fact that Leninist political doctrine rests upon a broad interpretation of the nature of power. In particular, bolshevik theory and practice recognize that power is social,- generated in the course of all types of action (not simply the narrowly “political”) and latent in all institutions.

This insight stems in part from basic Marxist theory and in part from the over-all aim of bolshevism—a total transformation of society that will invest every institution with political meaning. Leninism views politics as omnipresent. As a consequence, bolshevik strategy has identified vast new areas of political potential in what are usually thought to be nonpolitical special-purpose social institutions and mass organizations. This theory of power has increased the sensitivity of bolshevik strategy to unconventional methods of gaining influence. Exploitation of these devices has helped to keep the communist movement from adapting itself to constitutional methods; in this way, it has rejected the path of accommodation taken, for example, by most sections of the international socialist movement.

The bolshevik pursuit of power is subversive (1) because it is not limited to the areas where constitutional, responsible power is won, but is carried on everywhere in the social structure, wherever an increment of power can be squeezed from control of an institution or a portion of it; and (2) because communism knows no stopping place in its search for power short of concentrating total control in its own hands. This unceasing and unbounded struggle, associated with the politicalization of every facet of society, is a basic characteristic of totalitarian politics. Many of communism’s specific techniques are found elsewhere as well, but total subversion summons all the devices normally hidden in the interstices of a political order, emerging temporarily and episodically in times of constitutional weakness or crisis.

It is convenient for a subversive group to seek sources of power that may be won without bidding for direct popular support. Consequently it is better to work where small disciplined minorities can have their greatest impact. These are areas neglected by the major political forces, where the marginal strength of a minority can be most effective. Recognizing the importance of such areas of operation. Leninism stresses the need to build organizations designed to compete effectively in nonelectoral arenas.

There you have it: Joe Owens and civic nationalism refuted in four (not so simple) paragraphs. Communists understand the above on an intuitive level, even though they would not have phrased it as bluntly as Selznick does here; so did the earlier generation of British nationalists such as John Tyndall. Owens belongs to that generation which was well-versed in 'totalitarian' theory and practice, which is what makes Owens' rejection of building 'organizations designed to compete effectively in nonelectoral arenas' so jarring.

To return to Australia: our nationalists and populists were given a signal opportunity to engage in politics in 'nonelectoral arenas', to summon 'devices normally hidden in the interstices of a political order', on Australia Day. They could have held some event to commemorate our national day. But, so far as I know, Hanson's One Nation, Katter's Australian Party, Hinch's Justice Party and the rest did nothing. I can reveal that one function was held in Victoria, attended by representatives of four nationalist organisations - and most of these attendees were what the Left, and the media, would characterise as 'Neo-Nazis'; Owens might even think that one or two of them were 'scum nationalists'. The point is that the civics, populists, anti-Islamic patriots, were conspicuous by their absence on that day, in Victoria at least; they could have held their own civic nationalist, 'anti-Nazi', 'anti-white nationalist' Australia Day commemoration, but they didn't. Only 'Neo-Nazis' possessed sufficient motivation, and organisation, to do anything.

As the Americans say, 'Personnel is policy', and when most of those who are driving ordinary, day-to-day activity in the nationalist scene are 'Neo-Nazi' and 'scum' nationalist, that scene will take on a 'Neo-Nazi' character by default. That's what happens when the civics and 'nice people' abandon the nonelectoral arena.

The same process can occur within an organisation which is infiltrated by communists: it becomes communist because most of the personnel is communist. When the communists who are members are the only ones bothering to turn up to meetings of a British Labour Party branch or a trade union, and doing all the legwork, the non-communist members - who are usually apathetic and don't have the energy or the motivation to put up a fight for the control of the organisation - will be thrust out. Selznick in his book describes this progression many times. In order to justify the sidelining of non-communists in a target organisation and that organisation's takeover, the communists will call upon a doctrine Selznick calls 'activism', which says in essence, 'We communists are the ones turning up to these sparsely-attended meetings, we are doing most of the work, so therefore we deserve the right to rule'.

It's not my intention to debate the rights or wrongs of this, merely to inject a note of realpolitik. We need to acknowledge the facts. If 'Neo-Nazis' predominate in the most basic day to day activities of the Far Right, then they will invest it with a 'Neo-Nazi' character - it matters little whether they are 'scum' or not.

Tangled Web: Jews, Anglo-Saxons and the Arab Uprising

I. Introduction

Several of my nationalist friends have asked me what my opinions are of the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia. One of them has sent me an article, by F. William Engdahl, the Larouchian conspiracy theorist, which essentially blames the uprisings on a shadowy cabal of US NGOs like the Rand Corporation and the Carnegie Endowment, and governmental institutions like the CIA, who are pulling strings and manipulating the Arab masses in order to bring about liberal democracy in Egypt, and are, in effect, serving George W. Bush's agenda for bringing democracy to the Middle East. (See 'Egypt's Revolution: Creative Destruction for a "Greater Middle East"?'). In other words, the Egyptian and Tunisian masses are pawns, are being manipulated by conspiratorial forces - forces who dwell in the darkness. The same forces orchestrated the 'coloured' revolutions in the Ukraine, Georgia and Khyrgyzstan. Engdahl argues that the abortive Iranian youth revolt of 2009, powered by FaceBook and Twitter - the 'Green' revolution - was another attempt, by the conspiratorial forces, at a 'coloured' revolution.

In this article, I will be coming up with an attempt at an interpretation of the Egyptian and Tunisian uprisings, sketching out the nationalist position, explaining the contradictory and puzzling positions taken by Jewry and the American government, and attempting to refute Engdahl.

II. The nationalist position on Egypt

I think that Engdahl's article is terrible: badly argued, fallacious, full of half-truths and misreprentations, poor scholarship and a poor understanding of Arab society, culture and politics. Unfortunately, such articles are commonly circulated among the Far Right, and taken, more often than not, as gospel. The mainstream press - such as Reuters and the New York Times - and mainstream commentators (including Arab intellectuals and journalists) offer a much better view of events. The Jew Noam Chomsky once commented that he never read the left-wing press - it was too ideological and a poor source of information. He much preferred the Washington Post and the New York times. I am of a similar opinion when it comes to the Far Right press.  

The truth is that the Arab uprisings are quite complex - there are all sorts of contradictory splits occuring, in the mainstream (American and Jewish) political establishments with regard to attitudes towards the uprisings; these splits are visible, daily, in the media and in the equivocating and dithering in the Obama administration. For nationalists, it, in fact, makes no difference as to what constitutional form exists in the Arab, and Middle Eastern, countries. Supposing that a brutal theocratic regime, like Iran's, emerges in Egypt: it would have little to no effect - on the Western peoples. Iran, for instance, is run by an authoritarian, backward, bigoted theocratic government, but still sells us oil; so would the Gulf countries, were they to be run by Islamist theocrats, and not Arab monarchies.

For Israel, however, the consequences of an Islamist Egypt would be serious: for one, such a regime would be less inclined to keep the border crossing to Gaza closed and thus enforce the blockade of Hamas. As well as that, Egypt has the largest, and most well-equipped, army in the Arab world, which is probably the best of the Arab armies. Despite being beaten in the 1956, 1967 and 1973 wars, its army is still the only conventional one capable of standing up to Israel. So a non-Mubarak Egypt could be a powerful enemy of Israel. But what does this have to do with the West? Not much. Pro-Israel commentators are always trying to identify Israel's interests with 'The West's', but this is not the case. Iran and the Islamic and Arabic countries of the Middle East are a threat to Israel, not to white Europeans.

One possible argument against democracy in Egypt is that an Islamist Egypt could be used as a base for Islamist, jihadic terror. This is possible; but Pakistan, a close ally of the US, is probably the world's biggest exporter of jihadist terrorists. What is more, many of Islamist extremists are operating inside Europe itself - thanks to a liberal immmigration policy which has permitted millions and millions of Muslims to emigrate there.

Islamist terrorism, in the West - that is, America, Europe, Australia - is an insurgency. The best way to combat an insurgency is to separate the guerillas from the population which supports them. This is classic counter-insurgency technique. The guerilla depends on the civilian population to give him food and lodging, and to shield him from the authorities; he also aims at bringing the population over to his side, by weakening the government through relentless terrorist attacks, and setting up his own, substitute 'shadow' government within the community he lives in. (This is  what the Taliban are doing in Afghanistan). In the really successful counter-insurgency campaigns - waged by the British in Malaysia, Kenya and Cyprus, and the French in Algeria - the civilian population was separated from the guerillas and relocated in 'strategic hamlets', i.e., fortified villages with fences and a militia to keep the guerillas from infiltrating the population.

From this it follows that the Muslim population, in the West (including Luton in Britain, which has incubated many an Islamist extremist), should be relocated to such strategic hamlets; or, expelled altogether, and sent back to their own lands. That would win the war against jihadist terrorism in the West.

In Egypt, at any rate, there seems to be little danger of a theocratic government gaining power. The Muslim Brotherhood, and the liberal opposition (including the jet-setting Egyptian expatriate, Mohammed El-Baradei) have become, over the course of Mubarak's 30-year rule, weak and emaciated. The uprising has been motivated, not by the opposition, but by students, youth, trade unions, the middle class - all sectors of Egyptian society which has traditionally been too apathetic, or afraid, to get involved in politics. This does not prevent, however, plenty of pro-Israel commentators from making a bogey out of the Muslim Brotherhood.

The remarkable thing is that America - or rather, the Judeo/Anglo-Saxon alliance which rules America - is so thoroughly divided on the uprising. We have Jewish neoconservative commentators for it (Thomas Friedman, Abrams, the former anti-Soviet dissident Sharansky (who now lives in Israel)and others), while Netanyahu, the Israeli press, are against it. The Jewish Holocaust "scholar", Cesarani (christened 'Rat-Face' by David Irving), has called for the uprising to be crushed, brutally, in a Tianamen Square fashion.

The same division is appearing in Anglo-Saxondom. The conservative commentator and the Australian Liberal Party member Tom Switzer (I am unable to determine if he is a Jew or not), produced a garbled argument against it in the early days of the uprising. His position was that the Arabs were not advanced enough yet for liberal democracy and the rule of law, and so Mubarak's regime - based on despotism, permanent emergency rule and the overriding of the rule of law - had to be maintained until the day the Arabs reached a sufficient level of readiness for liberal democracy; otherwise, the Muslim Brotherhood would take over. This position - a jumbled mix of Friedrich Hayek, Carl Schmitt and anti-Arab racism - has been quite typical. British prime minister David Cameron, the White House, and the British press have inclined towards it. At the same time, Cameron, in parliament question time, declared himself 'moved' by the Egyptian uprising, and the White House continually oscillates between pressuring and threatening Mubarak and then backing down.

Why the splits? Why the contradictions? The Anglo-Jewish empire, or the Washington-Tel Aviv axis, is built on two legs. One of them is the America that laid waste to, and conquered, Western Europe in 1945, and, through the machinations of Roosevelt, steered France, Britain and Poland to war with Germany in 1939. The other is Israel, the Jewish State, which will be, according to the prophecies of the Talmud, the capital of the world, a 'light unto nations', following the reunification of Jerusalem and the coming of the Moschiah. Both America and Israel, Anglo-Saxondom and Jewry, are powerful, but not powerful enough to rule alone; they need each other. What we are seeing, in the debate over Egypt, are two tendencies: on the Jewish side, the question is, 'Is Egypt good for the Jews?'; on the Anglo-Saxon side, 'How does Egypt advance Anglo-Saxon, liberal democratic ideals?'.

Francis Parker Yockey wrote a classic article, 'The World in Flames: An Estimate of the World Situation' (1961), in which he asked the pertinent question: why does post-war America, when it comes to protecting its own interests, so consistently fumble and drop the ball? America, after the end of the war, was in possession of much of the world, and yet failed, at crucial points, to defend its Europe's old colonial possessions from 'Third World' liberation movements. Worse than that, America would oscillate between the attempt at a defence, and then giving up altogether. Yockey writes:

Jewish-American political stupidity is invincible... Washington is on both sides: it is with the French Government [in Algeria], as its "ally": it is with the rebels by virtue of its world-program of "freedom" for everybody. In Egypt, the Washington regime told [Israel], England and France to attack, and when Russia rose, it told them to stop. It was, within a week, anti-Nasser and pro-Nasser. It occupied Lebanon, then evacuated. It held back Chiang when from his island, he would have attacked China with whom the Washington regime was then at war. It defended South Korea, but helped the Chinese maintain their supply line to the front. During the Chinese War in Korea, it made war and negotiated peace at the same time, for years. In Cuba it forbade exportation of arms to the loyal Batista and thus helped Fidel Castro; now it is committed to the overthrow of Castro. [...]

Why the contradictory behaviour? The answer is:

It is a psychological riddle, decipherable only thus: the Zionists have two minds, which function independently. As Zionists, they are committed to the destruction of the Western Civilization, and in this they sympathize with Russia, with China, with Japan, with the Arabs... As custodians of the United States, they must half-heartedly remain at least the technical and political domination of that Civilization even while destroying its soul and its meaning. In a word, they are working simultaneously for and against the Western Civilization. Quite obviously they are thus doing more damage than conferring benefit! If a commander of a fortress sympathizes with the enemy, but yet insists in defending the fortress rather than surrendering it, he has surely found the highest formula of destruction. [...]

So we have two groups of Jewish intellectuals, journalists, politicians and policy makers: the first supports the Egyptian uprising because of a traditional Jewish sympathy for revolutions in 'the coloured world'; the second opposes it, because of the damage it can do to Israeli and American hegemony in the region. The first group, I call the romantic 'Castroite' or 'Nasserite' Jews; the second, the 'Imperial' Jews.

The assent, and support, of the 'Castroite' Jews for revolution only goes so far. Revolutions are often intoxicating, exciting and romantic, and they lure people towards them. But supposing that there was a similar revolution in Germany, France or Sweden - a popular uprising against Jewish-Zionist power, or against Muslim immigration: then the 'Castroite' Jews would change their tune. The coming to power of the National Socialists in Germany in 1933 was a revolution, but Jews everywhere, regardless of their political affiliation, portrayed it as a descent into darkness. The New York Times, whose Jewish op-ed commentators have so far backed the Egyptian protestors, howled in dismay when the populist, nationalist Sweden Democrats won 17% of the vote to the Swedish parliament, the Riksdag, in 2010. The op-ed headlines screamed that 'Sweden has no unique culture' - the inference being that, because Sweden has no culture worth defending, it has no right to vote for Far Right populist nationalists. One can imagine the reaction, then, from the Times editorship and its Jewish columnists, were the Far Right successes in Sweden were to be repeated on a larger, more popular, Egyptian, scale.

There is more to this than Judaism, though: there is Anglo-Saxonism. We Anglo-Saxons are romantics, too, when it comes to revolution - which is why so many of us supported the Bolshevik revolution of 1917. More than that, however, is the fact that the uprisings in the Middle East are against regimes which are so opposed to traditional Anglo-Saxon ideals. The Fedine and Mubarak governments were opposed to the rule of law, parliamentary democracy, human rights, freedom, equality, social progress. And both regimes show that, when a leader and a regime has been in power for so long, stagnation  results. Both practised a system which kept new, fresh, young people out of positions of leadership; the only way to 'get ahead' in either country was to cultivate close ties with the ruling family and government. What can be said of Egypt and Tunisia can be said, too, of the rest of the Arab countries. So, from a progressive and liberal standpoint, Obama (an honorary Anglo-Saxon), Cameron and other Western leaders have acknowledged the shortcomings of the Mubarak regime and put forth demands for change.

In addition that, as Yockey pointed out, in America there is a tradition of looking at liberal democracy as something almost divine. That is, America has a God-given mission to spread democracy throughout the world. Yockey recounts how the American president, Woodrow Wilson, claimed to have heard God talking to him, telling him to introduce democracy to Europe in the aftermath of WWI. But Yockey is not alone in pointing this out: many on the Left have as well. George W. Bush and Tony Blair, both devout Christians who, through prayer, communed with God on a daily basis, saw their drive to 'democratise' the Middle East as a religious crusade. It is no suprise, then, that, given the history, the Obama administration, and many Anglo-American intellectuals and journalists, support the Egyptian uprising, even if the consequent democratisation of Egypt will prove detrimental to Israeli power.

At the same time, there is the commitment - especially among America's political élite - to maintain Jewish political rule, in both the Middle East and elsewhere. WWII, in Europe was a war to the death, a war of no compromise, unconditional surrender, against the anti-Semitic governments of Vichy France, Nazy Germany, Fascist Italy - precisely because of their anti-Semitism. Roosevelt's America had no problem with atrocities, real or alleged: it tolerated, and even applauded, Stalin's regimé, giving it full diplomatic recognition to the USSR in the early 1930s (the period of the Ukraine famine, which killed millions). But it was prepared to go to the brink to drive the anti-Semites out of Europe, hang them like common criminals, and enforce Jewish hegemony - political, cultural, economic - on the Continent. In short, the Anglo-Saxons adore their Jews, and Obama and Roosevelt, Cameron and Churchill, are no different in that regard. So, today Israeli interests are paramount to the Anglo-Saxon countries. But, at the same time, there is a clash between that interest and America's traditional evangelising on behalf of democracy.

So the opposing tendencies are: 'Nasserite' and 'Imperial' within Jewry, and 'Pro-liberal' and 'Pro-Jewish' within Anglo-America.

III. 'Coloured' revolutions and conspiracy theories

The question is, is Engdahl right? Are the Arab masses being manipulated, controlled, by a small group of liberal activists who are funded by George Soros, the Rand Corporation and the CIA?

In order to answer it, we need to explore some of the presuppositions behind it. The first presupposition is that the Arab masses - in Tunisia and Egypt - are pawns, easily manipulated and controlled, with no wills of their own. The second is that they are in thrall to dark and conspiratorial forces, who dwell in the shadows; these puppet-masters have complete control over the subjects - all they have to do is send one or two activists into the target country (after training them in FaceBook and Twitter), and, almost at once, bring about a liberal democratic revolution against regimes which have been in power for decades.

This kind of world-view, so common to conspiracy theorists, is almost theological. Some religious doctrines state that man has no free will, and that all his actions are controlled by God. He lives in a world created by God, and, knowingly or unknowingly, serve's God's purpose. Carl Schmitt declared that political concepts are secularised theological concepts. In conspiracy theories, the political rulers are God, alone endowed with free will; their subjects, the helpless masses, have none, and are completely controlled by their rulers.

But, in the world of Engdahl (and others on the Far Right), this religious world-view becomes a Gnostic one. The world, as we know it, is created by the devil; humans have no free will and are controlled, completely, by the devil. Transposing this theology to politics, our rulers (in this case, the CIA, the Rand Corporation, Soros, Israel and the Jews) are the devil, alone have free will, and completely control the masses.

This sort of theorising is not confined to the Far Right: one finds it on the Left as well. Marxism preaches that humans are subject, completely, to the economic and historical forces. The real innovation of Marxism was to declare that, not only do the masses lack free will - their rulers do as well. The ruling class (the capitalist class) are as much in the thrall of historical and economic forces as the masses.

(It may be a misnomer to refer to 'free will'. In conspiracy theories, and in Marxism, man has the power of choice; it's just that his choices have no effect on events - they lack efficacy. In the conspiracy theory, the rulers alone have efficacy, the masses none; in Marxism, neither the rulers nor the ruled have efficacy. In Marxism, all one can do is join the communist party and prepare for the impending communist revolution. That will put one on the right side of history).

All I can say here is that Engdahl's worldview is false: that the Arab masses protesting against Mubarak are not puppets and pawns, without free will, and without a political agenda of their own.

The Left made the same argument as Engdahl about Chile in the 1970s: the coup against Allende, and the political and economic chaos leading up to it, was the work of Nixon and the CIA. Without a doubt, Nixon was delighted by the overthrow of Allende, but Allende brought his troubles on himself. Through his actions, he stirred up at least half of Chile against him, including conservative and anti-communist elements in the military.

In the case of Chile, we have coinciding agendas: the right-wing, anti-communist Chilean agenda coincided with the American. The same goes for the abortive Iranian 'Green Revolution' of 2009: Netanyahu and Israel applauded it, the two agendas, liberal Iranian and Israeli, coincided.

Having said that, Engdahl, like a good many people, believes that the Georgian and Ukrainian 'coloured' revolutions were brought about by subversives funded by the CIA and George Soros. I myself have no evidence that the "revolutionaries" were connected to Soros and the CIA, and neither does Engdahl. But, indeed, the results of both "revolutions" were governments which were antipathetic to Russia and were indeed in the Western sphere of influence.

In both "revolutions", the same technique - the 'Al Gore method', I call it - was used. An election was held, and the opposition declared the results rigged, and therefore null and void. The opposition then demanded a recount, like Gore in the US presidential elections of 2000, and that the head of state step down. When neither was forthcoming, the opposition and protestors stormed the parliament - in effect a coup. In the case of Georgia, subsequent presidential elections, held almost immediately after the storming of parliament, resulted in the legitimation of the coup-de-état, with the election of opposition leader Saakashvili. The same process occurred, almost identically, in the Ukraine.

In the end, Saakashvili himself turned into a despot; he was accused of rigging the 2009 elections, and responded brutally to mass demonstrations with tear gas and rubber bullets. Was he a stooge of the CIA and Soros? Most definitely, a pro-American and pro-Israel, and anti-Russian politician, who is still being supported by the US State Department and the Obama administration.

In the case of the 'Orange Revolution' in the Ukraine in 2004, that too, fell apart, because of a lack of popular support for the "revolutionary", pro-American, anti-Russian candidates and in-fighting amongst them. The pro-Russian candidate, Yanukovych, won the 2010 elections and brought Ukraine back into the Russian sphere of influence.

In both cases, America supported the "revolutions", politically and diplomatically, in the hope of stealing two valuable countries away from Russia. All one can say is that the Ukrainians and Georgians who originally supported the "revolutions" did so of their own free will, believing, mistakenly, that their lives would be better, realising, only later, that they were being sold faulty goods. And, quite possibly, the initial success of both "revolutions" emboldened America into thinking that 'Soros/CIA'-style subversion was did work and did bring about good results, and that therefore the masses, in other countries, could be easily manipulated like pawns.

What of Iran? The causes for the 'Green' uprising are more complex - they are social, not political. All I will say is, on the basis of anecdotal evidence, life in Iran, under the mullahs, is incredibly repressed, and has only grown more so after the ascent of conservatives within the theocracy in the last five to ten years. What is this repression? It is to do with women's clothes - banning women from wearing trousers and so on - but, more significantly, it is sexual repression. Iranian youth does not enjoy the freedoms that youth in the West takes for granted. It is no surprise, then, that the mass of the Iranian demonstrators in 2009 were youth. This is not to say, of course, that the protestors were not demonstrating against political and economic grievances; just that the primary target was the level of social repression. The Iranian youth was in favour of, just like the hippies of the 1960s, a measure of sexual liberation and personal freedom; except that the West, in the time of the 1960s, was never as repressive as Iran is today. Possibly, because of the youth component, the 'Green' revoluton failed: it had lack of sufficient support from a wide-cross section of Iranians; whereas in Egypt, they are from all sections of Egyptian society.

In short, all that the Iranian demonstrators had with the Egyptian and Tunisian ones was a reliance on FaceBook, Twitter and mobile phones.

Engdahl's reasoning is flawed regarding US (and Israeli) strategy. It makes sense to send in subversives to countries like Georgia and the Ukraine which are in the Russian sphere of influence; it makes no sense to send in subversives to Egypt, a country which the US, and Israel, have controlled for over three decades. Engdahl admits this, and says that the US, by allegedly funding and controlling subversion in Egypt, is, in effect, shooting itself in the foot. But neither the US, nor Israel, would have the need to destabilise a rock-solid, faithful ally.

Engdahl explains away the discrepancy by resorting to a Marxist-Leninist thesis: that the US wants to 'open Egypt' up to US corporations and international markets, so that capitalists can exploit and plunder Egypt's resources. But that explanation can be used for anything, as there is no real way of determining, on an empirical basis, the degree of  'openness' of a country like Egypt to 'international markets'.

IV. Why a revolution?

In order to explain why a revolution occurs, one can point to a variety of the usual causes - corruption, unemployment, cultural stagnation, inflation, and the rest. The more appropriate, and interesting, question in the case of Egypt and Tunisia is: 'Why now?'. Egyptians have been living a more or less third-rate existence, under Mubarak, for three decades; Tunisians, nearly 25 years. Why did they not revolt before?

The answer is that political power is, as Yockey states, a plenum, the opposite of a vacuum. When you lose n amount of power, your political enemies gain power precisely that same amount. The Washington-Tel Aviv axis has been losing power steadily over the past ten years, because of defeats in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Georgia and Gaza. The successive defeats have been surprising and dehabilitating for the US and Israel - surprising in the Israeli case because, in its first sixty years, Israel has won every war against the Arabs, and in Lebanon and Gaza, lost, for the first time (and, to add insult to injury, it not only lost against the Arabs, it lost against lightly-armed Arab irregulars). David Irving wrote, of Hitler in late 1944, 'Every defeat eroded his authority'. The same is true of Washington-Tel Aviv after 2001. As a result of its erosion of authority, Judeo-America's enemies have been steadily gaining. Not only have Russia and China, and a host of smaller, anti-American states, benefited, the domestic opposition has as well. In Egypt and Tunisia, that domestic opposition was a wide number of liberals, Islamists, intellectuals, students, communists, trade unionists, all of whom had a grudge against the ruling regimes for years. In 2011, the dams burst; just as in 2007 in Gaza, when Hamas swept the Palestinian Authority out of power on a wave of popular discontent (which had seen an electoral win for Hamas in 2006).

One can imagine that these Arab anti-Mubarak and anti-Fedine activists went through the same plodding routine, year after year, as nationalist activists in the West: that is, years of putting pamphlets in letter-boxes, making speeches, organising demonstrations, putting up posters, writing books and articles, setting up websites, attempting to convert friends and family - and nothing. Are the masses you are attempting to win over apathetic? Will change ever come? And then, suddenly, the rupture, the big break-through. After that, everything changes, the floodgates are opened. Formerly, one was going through the motions of attempting to bring about political change; now, one is living change, living politics. What made the difference? The answer is, the politics of power - Machtpolitik, the Germans would say. Simply put, the rulers of Tunisia and Egypt weren't exerting the same power any more, because their rulers - Israel and the United States weren't exerting the same power either. In other words, the external conditions were not right.

The lesson for nationalists is, it could happen here - in Britain, in Germany, in France, in Spain, in Italy. Nationalists will face obstacles, of course: for one, they won't get sympathetic write-ups from Thomas Friedman and Elliot Abrams. But then, that lack of sympathy is nothing compared to what the Arabs are going through: tear-gassing, clubbing, potential arrest, imprisonment and torture at the hands of the police and the military.

In the mainstream press, there is a sense of unease about the events in Egypt which one can detect between the lines. That is, the Washington-Tel Aviv axis is on a downward spiral from which there is no pulling out, and Egypt - formerly a bastion of American and Israeli power - is proof. The loss of Egypt is as significant, and potentially devastating, for Israel as the loss of France was for Germany in WWII, or the loss of the Phillipines for Japan. The harder, more cynical, more realpolitiker Jews understand this, which is why they are wringing their hands. Possibly, they do not believe that the Muslim Brotherhood is about to become the new Hamas or Hezbollah, and turn Egypt into the new Iran; but they do understand the magnitude of the loss, its strategic significance. To them, the Middle East is like a map in which each country has a little Israeli flag pinned on it signifying whether or not the country is in the American, and Israeli, sphere of influence. Syria, Libya, Lebanon, and Gaza do not have flags, and now, when it comes to Egypt, one can remove it.